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Preface
The European Community (EC), enlarged in 1973 by the accession of
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, is now facing its second
enlargement to include Greece (which has already become the tenth
member), Portugal and Spain. Much of the public debate on the sec-
ond enlargement is conducted in political terms: The spirit of the
Treaties of Paris and Rome is supposed to require the Community
of the Nine to integrate its southern periphery. From the new en-
trants' point of view, full membership has long been considered a
means of strengthening their political democracy (restored only re-
cently), although these feelings are beginning to evaporate somewhat:
The present Greek Government, which came into power after the par-
liamentary elections of October 1981, reportedly was considering to
hold a referendum on Greece' s continued membership in the EC; in
Spain one cannot overlook the growing grievances about the continu-
ous French and other member governments' reservations against
a rapid accession of this country. Whatever the political merits of
the enlargement may be, the economic implications for the Nine as
well as for the Three should not be ignored - indeed, they must be
openly discussed. Some of these implications will be far-reaching,
particularly as the present Community has entered the 1980s in a
state of crisis and it is debatable whether the enlargement will ac-
tually be beneficial to it and thus reinforce the process of economic
integration in Europe.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the major adjustment chal-
lenges posed by the EC's southern enlargement to both the present
Community and the new entrants under present conditions, as well
as to discuss its policy implications. Emphasis is given to the basic
economic questions raised in the general discussion of the subject.
After we have outlined the unfavourable background against which
this second enlargement is taking place, the development trends in
Greece, Portugal and Spain are analyzed and the economic problems,
constraints and inefficiencies in agriculture and industry are worked
out. Furthermore, the changes in the division of labour in manufac-
tured trade between the new entrants and the old Nine are examined
with regard to the past and explored with regard to the future. The
implications for the new entrants of adopting the prevailing pref-
erential trade agreements between the Community and developing
countries are then discussed. Next, the weakness of the Common
Agricultural Policy and the prospective effects of the enlargementXVI
are examined. There follows an evaluation of the impact of the en-
largement on the so-called Global Mediterranean Policy of the Com-
munity, which mainly affects the trade in agriculture. The intrinsic
difficulties of shaping an effective Community regional policy are an-
other issue considered. Finally, common budgeting problems are dis-
cussed because they ultimately reflect inherent shortcomings of Com-
munity policies.
We deliberately refrained from discussing all economic aspects of
the second enlargement. There are simply too many for us to be able
to deal with all of them adequately, given our time constraint. Thus
we did not embark on industry and commodity studies; nor did fac-
tor movements within the enlarged Community receive treatment;
likewise not all important issues relating to monetary and fiscal inte-
gration were broached and social policies were not covered either.
It should also be stressed that the study is basically an exercise in
applied economics. It might supplement other recent comparative
studies in which the EC enlargement is discussed mainly in terms
of international political economy [Tsoukalis, 1981] or the "depen-
dencia" approach [Seers, Vaitsos, 1982] . All this said, it is hoped
that the study is sufficiently stimulating and that it may encourage
both research on questions which were left open and a deeper exam-
ination of the problems treated here.
In writing this study we benefited from discussions with our colleagues
at the Kiel Institute, to whom we are much indebted for helping us
in the task of presenting our thoughts more clearly. We also wish to
thank the following persons who have helped us with their country ex-
pertise and knowledge on specific subjects: Jorge Braga de Macedo,
Hugh Corbet, Joao Cravinho, Timothy E. Josling, Nicos Kiriazidis,
Luis Angel Lerena, Allan F. Matthews, Achilles G.J. Mitsos, Her-
man Muegge, Manuel Jacinto Nunes, Wolfgang Renner, Pere Puig
Bastard, Pedro Schwartz, Alfred Tovias and Alberto Ullastres.
Thanks are due to the Commission and the Statistical Office of the
Community which provided unpublished materials and trade data. Man-
fred Salden efficiently organized the statistical work, most of which
was carried out by Julia Feldmeier. Ingrid Hohmann was responsible
for the careful typing of the final manuscript. Leila Fuchs, Patricia
Jassmann and Bernhard Klein edited the text for publication.
Kiel, October 1981 The AuthorsI. The European Community at the Crossroads
1. Introduction
The second enlargement of the European Community (EC) to include
Greece (which already became the tenth member state on January 1,
1981) as well as Portugal and Spain
1 (with whom the official negotia-
tions on the terms of accession are under way) is taking place at a
time in which the process of economic integration has reached a se-
rious impasse. A quarter of a century after the (former) European
Economic Community (EEC) was founded, it is obvious that many of
the goals which originally were set have not been achieved - most
prominently an equal level of development of the various Community
regions and a stepwise political integration. The Common Market
which was established as one instrument of achieving chosen econom-
ic objectives, has been eroded increasingly since the end of the 1960s.
Instead of harmonizing the national economic policies, which was
thought to be the other instrument, the Community has been experi-
encing widening policy divergencies between its member countries
on important issues
2 . Every member-state government is prone to
assert genuine "national interests" (whatever this means) and to pur-
sue them vigorously. The Community institutions which once were
created to play a leading role in the integration process and to push
it ahead, have developed to little more than supra-national bureau-
cracies which find their comparative advantage, as do other bureau-
cracies, in administering themselves, in working out complicated
and costly regulations interfering with the market mechanism, and
in ultimately maintaining the status quo. As coherent policy concep-
tions have not been formulated, the EC has also proved almost com-
pletely unable to exert an active influence on international affairs.
On the contrary, both the European Commission and the European
Council of Ministers (or of Heads of State or Government) are in-
creasingly preoccupied with finding ad hoc solutions to emerging
problems that are frequently not even correct responses but merely
1 The countries will be called hereafter applicant countries, new entrants
or the Three.
2 "Establishing the common market" and "progressively approximating
the economic policies of the Member States" are expressly mentioned
in the Treaty of Rome as the two instruments of achieving the objec-
tives assigned to the Community [EC, 1973 ] .agreements at the level of the lowest common denominator
1.
Under these circumstances one need not wonder that the Community's
enlargement has become a major issue of concern both to the entrants
and to the nine old member countries [Tsoukalis, 1981 ]
 2 . The Three
will have to give up substantial parts of their national sovereignty to
an organization which has lost much of its former reputation over the
last decade. They will have to agree to their trade with third coun-
tries being governed largely by rules set in Brussels; they will have
to open up their markets to products and producers from the Nine;
and to a large extent they will have to abolish selective protection
hitherto granted to specific domestic producers. Irrespective ofother
concessions which they will have to make following their entry into
the EC, the acceptance alone of the common external trade policy and
of the free intra-Community movement of goods and services is es-
sential to the Three: In these countries, much more than in any of
the nine old member countries, government intervention into foreign
trade and into domestic production structures has traditionally played
a decisive role, not only on the grounds of infant-industry considera-
tions aiming at fostering the economic development process, but also
as a means of achieving higher-ranking national goals such as politi-
cal prestige or economic autarky (Chapter II). What the entry to the
Community offers in turn for the loss of sovereignty is merely a prom-
ise of new development impulses, but certainly not a guarantee that
this will really happen.
In the Nine, the enlargement is broadly perceived as a source of ad-
ditional disagreements on important policy issues and as an obstacle
to the further development of the Community at large. Moreover, as
in the applicant countries, much more attention is paid to the conse-
quences of an increase in competition for domestic producers, above
all in agriculture, than to the opportunities which the enlargement
opens up for improving living standards and employment levels in the
future. Part of the growing scepticism about positive effects of the
For a critical evaluation of the Community's policies, highlighting the
gap between good intentions and embarassing practices, see Cairncross
et al. [1974]; Coffey [1979 ] ; Donges [l981c ] .
The concerns were clearly expressed by representatives of the EC Som-
mission and the Southern European countries before the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the German Federal Parliament which held hearings
on the enlargement in Bonn in 1978. All statements made, including
those by Klaus-Werner Schatz on behalf of the Kiel Institute of World
Economics, are recorded in Deutscher Bundestag [1978] .entry of Greece, Portugal and Spain to the EC may be due to the rath-
er uncertain outlook at present for the old member countries in terms
of overcoming unemployment and resuming economic growth. It is
equally important, however, to note that the resistance against the
enlargement seems to reflect a massive loss of faith in the EC itself
and in its future; the EC seems to have become too fragile an institu-
tion to cope with the challenges which the enlargement by the three
Southern European, and less developed, countries might imply.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the main causes of the pre-
sent state of crisis in the Community with the aim of better under-
standing the rather slow progress in the negotiations about the en-
largement, particularly in those between the EC and Spain. Much
emphasis is laid on the present member countries
1 changing percep-
tions of the original "Community spirit". Most of the issues raised
here are discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.
2. Changing Views of the Community Objectives
The concern about the cohesion of the EC can be related directly to
the Treaties of Rome (1957) and to the way in which the Treaties have
become manifest in actual policies. The alternative to the EC agree-
ments could have consisted of a system in which each country opens
up its economy to other countries to the extent that it feels may be
advantageous and therefore agreeable to the constituency at home.
In this case the integration process would have developed along with
the deepening of the international division of labour between countries,
thereby emulating the classical model of international trade which
prevailed until the end of the 1920s. In the early 1950s, however,
such a system was regarded as insufficient to bring about the Euro-
pean integration process after World War II, which many people prop-
agated at that time as necessary to secure lasting peace in Europe.
There were two major reasons for choosing the EC model. Firstly,
the experience of the Great Depression in the pre-war period had ap-
parently proved that the voluntary opening up of countries provided
no stable and lasting basis for the fusing of economies. Once the coun-
tries faced unemployment and production losses, governments did
not refrain from reintroducing barriers to imports which had previ-
ously been abolished. In order .to hinder such beggar-my-neighbour
policies, it, therefore, seemed appropriate to withdraw control over
foreign-trade policies from national governments and to allocate
it to a supra-national body, which was to be the EC and its institu-tions. Secondly, as one result of World War II, the European coun-
tries had become relatively unimportant economic and political pow-
ers. If Europe was to regain influence on world affairs, it had to be
unified in some sense.
As an immediate political unification was far beyond any realistic
consideration for the time being, its adherents conceived the econom-
ic integration - based on the creation of a trading block with own supra-
national institutions - as the means to pave the way for achieving the
political objective. In the course of time, the newly created Econom-
ic Community was to be transformed into a political one. For this
reason, the Treaties of Rome (and for this matter also the Treaty of
Paris by which the European Coal and Steel Community was founded
in 1951) postulated more than the creation of a free-trade area, which
leaves the gains and losses of trade where they accrue. Besides the
establishment of the Common Market and the shaping of a common
external trade policy, the Community was to seek the balanced eco-
nomic growth of its various member states. This meant that some
type of internal policy had to be pursued in order to promote the de-
velopment of both the inherently backward regions and the regions
adversely affected by the integration process. For reasons going be-
yond the creation of a mere free-trade area, the Community institu-
tions were also assigned own political responsibilities, which were
to be extended at the expense of member-state governments with the
maturation of the EC. It was believed that the economic integration
would increasingly create realities which through their own power
would prevent their being neglected and force the national govern-
ments to a co-ordination of their policies, thereby facilitating the
political unification. By the same token, there existed the convic-
tion that, with the obligations that were accepted by signing the found-
ing Treaties and which would increasingly flow from the Community
policies, national outsidership would automatically become impossible.
Out of the three principles which are basic to the EC (the Common
Market including the common trade policy; financial solidarity; pol-
icy harmonization), the establishment of the Common Market was
the most acceptable one to the'contracting parties. It implied the
creation of an international public good from which each country
could benefit without diminishing the wealth of others and from the
use of which no country could be precluded. The advantages of im-
plementing the Common Market consisted, of course, in the static
and dynamic welfare gains which the abolishment of internal bar-
riers to trade and the reduction of external trade barriers entailed
[Balassa, 1962] . Much more important than this removal of obsta-cles to trade was presumably the fact that the EC creation led to a
stabilization of producer and consumer expectations. As free trade
and free factor movement between the Community members was no
more a question of the willingness and ability of national governments
but a principle guaranteed by the Treaties, politically rooted trade
and production risks for producers and for consumers were signifi-
cantly reduced. The security of the rules supplied by the EC estab-
lishment lengthened the time horizon in intra-European trade and
strengthened the basis for the division of labour among member coun-
tries and regions. Economies of scale and of (horizontal and vertical)
specialization could be exploited to a larger extent than before in the
existing firms, and the introduction of large-scale technologies in
newly established plants was encouraged.
The hopes of those days seemed to be soundly based. The period of
transition which was to last twelve years beginning with the enforce-
ment of the Treaties on 1st January, 1958, could even be substantial-
ly shortened with respect to most provisions. While not disregarding
the achievements in this first phase of the EC, one has to be aware
that the transitional provisions concerned above all the introduction
of the free market and the establishment of the common external
trade policy which reduced, on average, the Community trade bar-
riers vis-a-vis third countries. Except for the shaping of a common
agricultural policy, however, hardly any measure was taken beyond
the creation of the customs union, which in any case emanated as a
direct obligation from the Treaties and was not subject to inter-gov-
ernmental agreements.
With the liberalization in the transitional period the EC confirmed
the signs of the time which were generally set for reducing obstacles
to the international division of labour. Through the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which came into force in 1948,
the industrial nations were already striving for a competitive inter-
national trading system based on the principle of non-discrimina-
tion. Moreover, the European Free-Trade Association (EFTA) was
about to be created by a number of other European countries also
aiming at a common market, but not envisaging the longer-ranging
distributional and political unification aims of the EC. As much hope
is set by today's new entrants in trade-induced growth effects follow-
ing the removal of barriers to trade with the EC 9, it seems worth-
while to summarize past experiences within the EC.
In fact, all member countries experienced a rapid economic growth
at the time when the integration process was put into motion. Pres-sures stemming from the trade-induced adjustments of production
and employment structures thus could be easily absorbed. The stabi-
lization of expectations by the establishment of the Community sub-
stantially supported the growth process; whether it was also its driv-
ing force is open to debate. The economic integration meant the re-
moval of obstacles which could have hindered further economic growth.
National economic policies, however, which aimed at improving the
overall conditions for economic growth, remained decisive.
For instance, both Italy, and Germany had already experienced a fast
development of their economies before they joined the newly created
European Economic Community, thereby having partly exceeded later
achievements substantially. Both countries had gradually opened up
to the world markets since the end of the 1940s and had almost com-
pletely liberalized their foreign trade in manufactures by the early
1950s. France, on the other hand, was a country subject to many gov-
ernment interventions, in this respect resembling best today's ap-
plicant countries. In view of the EC formation, the French Govern-
ment took several measures of both internal and external liberaliza-
tion. Thus, in 1957, the general freezing of prices, introduced five
years before, was abolished, so that the functioning of relative prices
allowed for a more efficient allocation of resources and provided in-
centives to raise investment. Foreign trade was liberalized to some
extent even earlier, mainly through the abolition of import quotas,
which together with a substantial devaluation of the French franc in
1957 and 1958 (by 20 and 17.5 percent, respectively) contributed to
making import-substituting as well as exporting industries more com-
petitive vis-a-vis foreign suppliers. Incidentally, the lack of inter-
national competitiveness of the French manufacturing industry in the
early post-war period, above all compared to German producers,
was a major reason for envisaging the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), for which the French government pressed on the grounds of
compensation. Likewise, in the first enlargement round the British
government insisted on regional aid for compensation. During the
present second enlargement round requests for compensatory poli-
cies favouring the new entrant countries are yet again under discus-
sion.
As for growth, that of trade included, it may be doubted that the EC
formation was the cause of the rapid expansion which took place be-
tween the member countries, though it gave significant impulses.
Even before the EC had been created, most spectacular'increases in
exports and imports had been achieved by a number of countries which
had opened up to world markets. Moreover, empirical studies sug-gest that the intra-EC trade expansion which followed the Community
formation had little to do with trade diversion at the expense of third
countries and was mostly effected by trade creation
1. The reason for
the small size of trade diversion is presumably that the protection of
the intra-Community trade vis-a-vis third-country trade was relative-
ly low, once the internal trade liberalization had been accomplished.
Before the Community was founded, the average tariff protection rate
of the individual member countries was about 12 percent (in nominal
terms); in 1968, after the internal trade liberalization had been com-
pleted, the average protection rate of the Community was 10 percent
[Resnick, Truman, 1975] . This means that the advantage of the mem-
ber countries over third countries accumulated to a level of 10 per-
cent over a ten-year period, which is relatively little compared, for
instance, to wage-cost differences which have increased much more
within the Community and between the Community and third countries
during the same period
2 .
The rapid expansion of trade between the Community members re-
flected to a large extent the fact that these countries were growing
fastest in the world economy, together with only a few other coun-
tries. At the beginning of the 1950s they accounted for only a quarter
of the per capita income of the United States, for instance, whilst
for about two thirds at the end of the 1960s. Additional export mar-
kets could be found easiest in countries which themselves were grow-
ing fast, and which relied on improving production structures by sub-
stituting imports for uncompetitive domestic supplies. With the de-
crease of the risks of policy interventions, the division of labour
could become particularly intensive within the EC. The creation of
the Common Market was all the more significant as scale economies
became increasingly important with the sophistication of modern in-
dustrial goods and as the competitive production of many of these
1 See, for instance, Balassa [1975] and Williamson, Bottrill [ 1973 ] . For
an assessment of the static effects of the first enlargement of the EC,
see Kreinin [1981 ] .
2 These arguments might also hold when the changes of the rates of ef-
fective tariff protection are considered. For example, calculations made
for Germany show that the effective rates in the industrial sector were
on average 10.4 percent for imports from EC member states and 11.8
percent for imports from third countries in 1958 (as compared to nomi-
nal rates of 8.5 and 9 percent, respectively), while in 1970 the rate of
effective tariff protection against third-country supplies was 11.9 per-
cent (the nominal rate was 8.8 percent). For details see Donges et al.
(1973, pp. 16-38] .goods was possible within the larger Common Market only. One im-
portant aspect of the fast development of the EC was that it dimin-
ished the scope for trade with third countries because of the struc-
tural changes associated with growth. On the one hand, catching up
with the then more advanced economies led to a supply of high-tech-
nology-intensive goods which could substitute for former complemen-
tary third-country products; an increasing intra-industry trade with-
in the EC was the result. This process was favoured by the fact that
the EC had a relatively low wage-cost level during the catching-up
period, enabling it to successfully compete and making it attractive
for direct foreign investment as well. These experiences should all
be of particular interest to Greece, Portugal and Spain. On the other
hand, third countries, which had been by far the most important sup-
pliers of raw materials and raw-material-intensive products, suf-
fered decreasing shares in the EC trade as these goods lost relative-
ly in importance the more the EC developed and its trade expanded.
Not only were many developing countries adversely affected in this
way, but also the United States. Therefore, the high degree of trade
creation, which emerged in the course of the European integration
process, was also due to the member countries' specialization in
goods with a high income elasticity of demand, which most third coun-
tries apparently did not produce in sufficient quantities. Notable ex-
ceptions were Japan, Austria and Switzerland, which could expand
the volume of their exports to the Community at rates comparable to
those of the intra-Community trade.
The lesson to be learned from the transitional period of the EC is,
above all, that it was not the creation of the Common Market in itself
which provided for growth and trade expansion, but rather the nation-
al economic policies which - in advance of the EC establishment,
though perhaps in view of it - had aimed at fostering economic growth
by reducing barriers to structural change both internally and external-
ly, hence increasing the competitiveness of domestic producers. In
this way, the member countries were able to seize the opportunities
which the creation of the Common Market offered. The first enlarge-
ment of the EC (in 1973) obviously confirms the lesson from the EC
creation phase. For instance, in the case of the United Kingdom, the
entry to the Common Market hardly provided for a speeding up of eco-
nomic growth, as the domestic obstacles to development continued to
exist. By the same token, the three Southern European countries
which are to enter the EC now, cannot rely on any automatic provi-
sions for growth; rather, they have to shape their national policies
in a way that will enable them to exhaust and to newly create compara-
tive advantages over the nine old member countries of the Community(Chapters II and III). Moreover, the reduction in future of risks in
the division of labour with the EC 9, from which the new entrants suf-
fered significantly in the past, will contribute little to their develop-
ment, if the home-made risks persist which destabilize expectations
of investors and of customers.
Although the former Six managed to establish the Common Market,
they did not achieve a completely free and undisturbed exchange of
manufactured goods among themselves. Some non-tariff barriers
prevailed, especially in the form of technical-standards require-
ments for imported goods and of government procurement policies
which discriminated against partner-country suppliers even when
they were cheaper. Moreover, the member-country governments did
not renounce their "right" to subsidize domestic industries when con-
sidered necessary (which in future was to become a significant in-
strument in distorting trade flows within the EC). Finally, there was
even an occasional reimposition of tariffs or quotas by one member
state against the exports of another member state on "market-disrup-
tion" or balance-of-payments grounds, which could not help but pro-
duce uncertainty among producers and retailers engaged in intra-Com-
munity trade. All this shows that in spite of the political enthusiasm
which preceded the foundation of the Community, the national govern-
ments, acting through the Council, ensured that the EC remained a
group of independent nation states rather than a group moving towards
unity. Matters have become even worse after the transition period.
3. Political Turbulences and Institutional Setbacks
Strain was laid on the Community as it was still in the phase of fast
economic growth, when the CAP was seriously questioned for the
first time. In 1965, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands com-
plained about the size of the financial contribution to the EC which
the CAP was likely to blow up out of proportion because of produc-
tion guarantees to EC farmers at prices above market equilibrium
(Chapter V). These three countries demanded that the Council should
take decisions in order to reshape the CAP. Moreover, they insisted
that the Council should apply the majority rule to its decisions after
the transitional period of the EC was over, as envisaged by the found-
ing treaties. The French government rejected substantive changes
of the prevailing system and refused completely to accept majority
decisions, arguing that this would mean an intolerable loss of sov-
ereignty; in order to stress its point of view France decided to with-10
draw from the Council ("empty chair" policy). The controversies be-
tween France and the other five members ended up with the famous
"agreement to disagree" at the Luxemburg Summit in 1966. On the
one hand, it was stated that France and the other five insisted furth-
er on their differing positions with regard to the application of the
unanimity and the majority principle. On the other hand, it was stated
that no concrete case for the application of the majority principle was
at hand, that France could therefore return to the Council, and that
it would be decided in due course whether or not majority decisions
were to be taken. Under such an "agreement" the CAP could not be
reformed
1.
The events of 1965 and the development in the following years are
illustrative at least in two aspects of the discrepancy between the
aims or intentions of the Treaties and the factual scope for integra-
tion in the EC. On the one hand, the application of the unanimity prin-
ciple to practically all important issues demonstrates that most pro-
visions of the Treaties that aim at going beyond the creation of the
Common Market are still subject to much disagreement among the
Community members. In the present EC it is by no means only France
which-insists on unanimity. On the other hand, the use of sectoral
policies (inter alia) as a means of income redistribution and of aiding
backward regions, or regions adversely affected by structural change,
shows that the Community has not achieved meaningful concepts for
obtaining financial solidarity. Sectoral policies are not restricted to
agriculture, where they have attained the most important role (and
the greatest publicity). They are applied to many other economic
branches, too, often based on claims for regional aid. Thus the for-
eign-trade policy of the Community strictly protects the textile and
clothing industries (mainly via the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA),
which is effective since 1974) and the iron and steel industries
(through cartel-like arrangements put into force in 19 77 and made
stricter in 1980). These policies do not only distort the division of
1 The Luxemburg compromise was somewhat modified at the Paris Sum-
mit at the end of 1974. There it was agreed that, in order to improve
the functioning of the Council, the practice was to be given up to insist
on unanimity in any future decisions. It was stated, however, that this
modification did not mean that the member states had changed their
minds with respect to their positions as fixed in the "agreement to dis-
agree". In the aftermath of the Paris Summit, the majority principle
has been applied in a growing number of cases. The code of conduct
which has emerged, applies, however, only to questions which are of
minor political importance.11
labour with third countries, but in general they also hamper a more
efficient supply structure within the Community. This is so because
the support of industries in distress at their traditional locations pre-
vents activities of the same sort from emerging at new places within
the Community - in countries, for instance, in which wage costs are
lower and productivity is higher. In any case, to pursue financial
solidarity by means of sectoral protection as does the Community,
imposes considerable costs on consumers; they have to pay higher
prices or higher taxes to finance the income transfers and suffer
further losses in real income on account of the inefficient use of re-
sources.
It is above all the waste of resources connected with the present sys-
tem of redistribution, which causes resistance to financial assistance
to low-income regions, and to financial solidarity in the Community.
Financial solidarity may contribute towards making free trade ac-
ceptable to countries which suffer from inabilities to adjust their pro-
duction structures at the required speed to the foreign-trade competi-
tion by other Community members or third countries. Or, it may
help backward regions to catch up with the more advanced ones. In
this way financial contributions of richer to poorer regions could be
an acceptable price which has to be paid in order to reach the closer
co-operation, for which the citizens in the EC may be striving (Chap-
ter VII). However, there is no reason why financial solidarity or re-
gional aid within the Community should require the pursuance of poli-
cies which, for instance, lead to the creation of milk lakes or but-
ter mountains which impose unnecessary burdens on consumers and
harm third countries, above all developing countries, by entailing
import barriers and by export dumping.
The danger that the political immobility of the EC might increase
further along with the increase in heterogeneity which the enlarge-
ment implies, and might create further obstacles to the internal in-
tegration process and to finding the role which the EC could or should
play in the world economy, may serve as one explanation, in addi-
tion to others, for the many reservations against the enlargement.
For instance, in the context of the second enlargement round, the
Commission put forward the view that in the enlarged Community
the policy-making process and the development process of the EC
will run the risk of being obstructed even more than in the past if
the unanimity-voting principle is not replaced by the majority rule
to a larger extent. The Commission itself has listed those cases in
which decisions taken by majority are presumably unacceptable be-
cause they either affect the principles and foundations of the Com-12
munity or because they raise politically particularly delicate and dif-
ficult questions from the point of view of individual member-state gov-
ernments. Cases in point are:
- additions to, or adjustments of, the Treaties;
- the structure and responsibilities of the Community institutions;
- the enlargement of the Community.
These items disguise such crucial issues as the European Monetary
System (EMS), which is not covered by the Treaties of Rome, but
may be regarded as necessary in order to ensure that the objectives
of the Treaties can be attained (Article 235). Moreover, the financ-
ing system of the Community, in particular the replacement of fi-
nancial contributions of member states by own resources, is left to
decisions taken unanimously by the Council (Article 201). Further-
more, association agreement with third countries (Article 238) and
measures on transport claimed on the grounds of support by certain
regions which would otherwise face adverse effects on their standard
of living and on employment (Article 75), are to continue to require
unanimous approval.
As opposed to the cases mentioned above, in which national govern-
ments have in fact demonstrated on various occasions that they have
quite different views and that they therefore insist on the unanimity
principle in the Council, the Commission has listed a number of
cases where it sees scope for the introduction of the majority prin-
ciple. The list includes
- the harmonization or approximation of provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action (Article 99 and 100);
- measures to be taken in the field of business-cycle policies (con-
junctural policies), which are regarded as a matter of common con-
cern (Article 103);
- foreign-exchange policies (Article 70);
- the establishment and implementation of the budget of the Com-
munity (Article 209).
Again, a number of crucial issues is at hand, for instance, the har-
monization of member-state legislation on direct and indirect taxes,
of customs-valuation practices, of import-licensing procedures or
of regulations concerning technical trade'barriers.Bibllothek des Inattafe
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It would be difficult to show that there has been significantly less dis-
agreement among the member states in the one set of cases than in
the other which the Commission mentions. Differences of opinion on
the aims of the EC and on the means to achieve them have persisted
or newly emerged in either field. Therefore, while not disregarding
that more consensus would, of course, be a stimulus to the EC, it
must be noted that the Commission's suggestions are based more on
wishful thinking than on political reality. The difficulties of the EC
are not caused by an insufficient application of majority principles;
rather, the difficulties arise from the obvious gap between the aims
and ideals and the willingness and ability of the various member
states to agree on the aims and ideals. As evidence suggests, even
if more use was made of majority decisions, national governments
would hardly refrain from refusing to accept them and from following
their own perceptions whenever they feel it is necessary. Agricul-
ture is only one example, though the most striking one in this re-
spect. Thus, whatever the voting rule may be, the tendency to agree
on the smallest common denominator only, that is to say, in general
on the most inefficient solution, will hardly be reduced as long as
the differences of opinion on the aims continue to exist.
Apart from the unanimity principle, the reluctance of the national
governments to surrender rights to the supra-national institutions
also manifests itself in the relative decline of the Commission's role.
Many of those who set their hopes on a rejuvenation of the EC, claim
that the role of the Commission must be strengthened. The Commis-
sion, the members of which are appointed by common accord of the
national governments, was created for the following purposes, inter
alia:
- to ensure the application of the Treaties and the measures taken
by the institutions;
- to formulate recommendations, if expressly provided by the Trea-
ties or considered necessary by the Commission;
- to take own decisions and to participate in the shaping of measures
by the Council and the European Parliament, as provided in the
Treaties;
- to exercise the powers conferred to it by the Council for the im-
plementation of the rules laid down by the latter.
Instead of receiving more responsibility, as was the initial idea, the
Commission has been increasingly confined to support the decision-14
making process of the Council by working out technical and adminis-
trative details. Moreover, the Commission has not acquired the gen-
eral power to administer and to carry out the decisions which the
Council has taken. With respect to these tasks, the Council relies
largely on its bureaucratic apparatus instead, which has been ex-
panded rapidly over time (Table I)
1 and is bound to become even con-
siderably larger in the course of the enlargement.





































Source : Budget Plans of the European Communities.
1 This table includes staff payed out of funds for personnel only; addi-
tional personnel is employed under various other budget items. The
total number of persons employed by the EC accounts for about 21,000
in 1981.15
The Commission has complained about the concentration of respon-
sibilities in the Council. It is argued that, under the given institu-
tional arrangements, the Council is increasingly being overloaded with
work which could be done by the Commission itself, and that the pre-
sent division of labour between the two institutions is hindering the
Council in its virtual task, policy making. In view of the increase in
the number of member states, the Commission fears that the exces-
sive administrative burden, from which the Community is suffering
already, will be aggravated substantially. There is little reason for
not sharing the Commission's view. In addition to administrative con-
siderations, there are a number of other arguments which suggest that
an increase in the competences and responsibilities of the Commis-
sion at the expense of the Council would be beneficial to the Communi-
ty development. Presumably, following the strengthening of the Com-
mission, this body could also regain its attractiveness for imagina-
tive persons who are able to push forward the process of integration.
The degeneration of the Commission to a producer of technicalities
has to be seen within the context of a growing disagreement among
the member countries about the aims and the future role of the EC.
As long as there was a longer-term perspective for the Community
it was relatively easy for the national governments and, consequent-
ly, for the Council to adopt common decisions. Each of these deci-
sions may have been imbalanced in the sense that some countries ben-
efited more from it than others, which perhaps even suffered losses.
But the decisions taken as a whole provided for a balance of interests.
Moreover, because agreement existed on the direction in which the
EC should move, it was even possible to take care of complex issues
from the very beginning without debating much about the national pros
and cons in detail. Once the stock of common causes as laid down
in the provisions of the Treaties was exhausted, a new, mutually ac-
ceptable longer-term perspective did not emerge. Therefore, instead
of moving forward with respect to concrete matters, the EC is con-
fined to finding out where movement is possible at all and in which
direction. Given the present lack of consensus, agreements can be
achieved more easily on technicalities than on substantive policy is-
sues; moreover, each decision has to be balanced in itself, which,
of course, requires a large amount of detail information and of admin-
istrative fine tuning of which the Commission has to take care so as
not to hurt the interests of any of the member countries.16
4. Strains from Wrong Assignments
In this way, the EC has attained not only the image of an immobile
bureaucracy, the value of which is increasingly doubted by the mem-
ber countries' citizens, but in fact it has almost paralyzed itself.
This is not to say that the Commission has not been creative in defin-
ing new fields of activity and policies. Rather the opposite is true.
In 1967, for instance, the General Directorate for Regional Policy
was established, as it was felt necessary to co-ordinate the EC mea-
sures with regional implications, and to lay stronger emphasis on re-
gional economic policies. Industrial policies becoming a major issue
for the EC (within the General Directorate for Internal Market and
Industrial Affairs) provide another example. However, there is much
debate about the ultimate objective of such policies. In the case of
regional policies, the member governments could not agree on the
policies to be pursued by the Commission. They only established, in
1975, the Regional Development Fund, which was strongly advocated
by the United Kingdom and through which money can be made avail-
able for EC regions; a coherent concept on how to spend the money
has not been elaborated. As to industrial policies, the main problem
is that no consensus whatsoever exists as to what the term industrial
policies implies and, hence, what the Community could concretely do
in this field - not to mention, of course, national disagreements on
what the Community should do. Instead of shaping a common policy,
the EC has only been able to grant subsidies to a number of indus-
tries and projects without taking into account the risks of distorting
effects and the likelihood of friction and tension among member-state
governments
1. Regional and industrial policies of the EC are only two
of a large number of examples which reveal that the implementation
1 It has become common practice at the Community level (as is at the na-
tional government level) to justify selective measures by referring to
market failures (which often result from preceding administrative inter-
ferences with the price mechanism). This is said to be particularly im-
portant with regard to the specialization patterns which evolve in the Com-
munity. If the market forces were allowed to guide the division of labour
according to a member country's comparative advantages, the Commu-
nity would be bound to become a group of increasingly unequal partners,
especially after its second enlargement. The deep mistrust of the mar-
ket mechanism contrasts with the almost unlimited faith in the omnicom-
petence of bureaucracies and governments, in spite of mounting evidence
to the contrary. All that is needed are "good" EC policies ! Reasoning
of this type is provided, for instance, by Musto [1981 ] . See also Seers,
Vaitsos [1982 ].17
of new Community policies often reflects political expediency and the
desire to play for time rather than the conduction of actions directed
at solving concrete problems
1.
Moreover, the more the Community institutions are in charge of pol-
icies on which the member countries obviously disagree, the more
the EC as a whole will be weakened; the enlargement would have few
positive effects, if any at all, on the continuance of the integration
process. To put it differently: a good policy for Europe is not a pol-
icy which aims at dismantling national sovereignties and at increas-
ing the competences of the Community institutions as indispensable
symbols of European unity, but rather a policy that seeks to assign
tasks to the Community which it can fulfil better than national gov-
ernments, or which national governments cannot fulfil at all, and on
which the member countries could agree.
With such an approach based on an appropriate division of labour be-
tween the Community and the member states, a number of current
EC policies would presumably have to be abandoned or reshaped,
either because there is no need for them or because they are at pre-
sent counterproductive. The latter is certainly true of the CAP. The
case for the GAP, apart from trade liberalization (which could have
been attained by bilateral or multilateral agreements without the crea-
tion of the EC), was that it could provide for a stabilization of expec-
tations and, hence, for a more efficient division of labour in agricul-
ture. As a matter of fact, however, the CAP has come to serve in-
come redistribution objectives within the Community by means of
price policies. Without a fundamental change of the CAP, the future
of the EC is gloomy, and this is all the more so in view of the EC
enlargement (Chapter V). It has become increasingly difficult to
reach agreements on prices and related issues, which is not surpris-
ing at all since the views on "just" incomes for agricultural produc-
ers differ among the countries and so do the perceptions on the "just"
financial burden for each country resulting from the CAP. Moreover,
the cohesion of the Community is facing serious strains as a result
of the de facto renationalization of agricultural markets by the intro-
duction of often unpredictable obstacles to intra-EC agricultural trade.
And one should not forget that the waste of funds spent on the dispos-
al of agricultural production surpluses hinders the Community from
(usefully) spending its money on other policies.
1 For details about the emergence and significance of Community policies
see Wallace et al. [1977 J .18
Many of these "other" policies certainly would not necessarily have
to be conducted at the EC level. It can be done, however, insofar as
national governments agree on them, and provided that these policies
generate positive external effects and do not prevent the pursuit of
alternative policies which are more effective in regard to economic
integration. For instance, the case for a European Regional Policy
is not that regional policies are necessarily required in order to im-
prove the allocation of resources - frequently regional policies in fact
disturb the division of labour -, nor that regional policies in the Com-
munity can be pursued best at the Community level. Rather, the ar-
gument is that if income redistribution between Community regions
is a high-ranking aim which cannot be escaped anyhow (Chapter VII),
regional policies are a less harmful means than the CAP, as they do
not necessarily disturb relative output prices and are less detrimen-
tal to competition.
5. Integration Through a Monetary Union?
Another example of the tendency to design Community policies which
lack internal consistency and are not really backed by all member-
state governments is the attempt to strive for monetary integration,
which incidentally is not provided for by the Treaties of Rome. The
EMS, which was put into operation in March 1979 after protracted
negotiations (and delays caused by disputes between the French and
German governments over the CAP!) is often thought to be a crucial
step in this respect. The EMS at large represents a return to the
rules of the Bretton-Woods System (which broke down between 1971
and 1973). By establishing fixed, though adjustable exchange rates
between the member-state currencies, the governments are to be
induced to co-ordinate their national economic policies. In order to
defend the peg, the central banks of the EMS members intervene into
foreign-exchange markets. The interventions can be financed through
credits at subsidized interest rates which the central banks grant to
each other directly (not yet through the European Market Fund, the
implementation of which, originally scheduled for March 1981, has
been postponed indefinitely). Thus the EMS has all the long-term dis-
advantages which the Bretton-Woods System had, and some others
in addition
1.
1 For a critical assessment of the EMS, see Vaubel [1979] . There is an
extensive literature on the EMS, which also includes optimistic views.
Useful summaries are provided by de Vries [1980 ] and Cohen [1981 ].19
As the EMS knows no sanctions, governments cannot be forced to a
co-ordination of their policies, and in particular not to a co-ordina-
tion of their monetary policies which would be a precondition for keep-
ing exchange rates irrevocably fixed. Therefore, national preference
functions, in particular as between price stability and full employ-
ment, can prevail. As long as the national economic policies are not
effectively co-ordinated and as long as inflation rates differ, a sys-
tem of fixed but adjustable parities will be based on illusions of eco-
nomic agents. Experience suggests, however, that markets are aware
of inflation differentials. Balance-of-payments disequilibria will
emerge, sooner or later calling for exchange-rate adjustment despite
all official announcements that parities will not be changed. In the
meantime, credit facilities for weak member economies, given to
avoid a currency depreciation, will make things even worse, as they
will strengthen the typical reluctance of national authorities to adjust
parities at the right time and to an adequate extent, and as they will
prolong the pursuit of a policy which is the cause of the currency weak-
ness, at the expense of the creditor countries, which have to bear the
interest subsidies. One-way speculative capital movements will be
additionally induced, in their turn provoking foreign-exchange re-
strictions. The different rates of inflation in member countries will
make the real exchange rates fluctuate considerably, thereby induc-
ing temporary shifts in the international competitiveness of foreign-
trade-intensive industries and in employment.
Thus the EMS is detrimental to smooth economic development and
contributes to the destabilization rather than to the stabilization of
expectations. Additional uncertainty is created by the loss of mone-
tary discipline - for which the EMS paves the way - in the Communi-
ty as a whole. Under fixed exchange rates which are not adjusted at
the right time, member countries with relatively low price-level in-
creases will import inflation from inflation-prone member states.
The mechanism works either through balance-of-payments surpluses,
which cause the growth rates of money supply to exceed the growth
rates of (real) money demand, or through exploiting the scope for
price increases of internationally traded goods, which is provided
by losses in competitiveness of foreign suppliers on domestic and
on international markets. The more price-stabilizing countries im-
port inflation, the less the pressure on inflation-exporting countries
will be to pursue price-curbing monetary policies. The Community
as a whole may end up with accelerating inflation rates.
It is true that the debtor countries are granted credits under condi-
tions which aim at reshaping their policies in such a way that the un-20
derlying causes of their balance-of-payments deficits and deprecia-
tion pressures will be eliminated. However, there is little reason
to believe that countries will accept conditions leading to fundamental
policy changes which they do not like. Above all, each country can
leave the EMS if it feels that its own interests are not served. For
the sake of its own existence, therefore, the EMS has to provide ben-
eficial conditions for the weak-currency countries. Even if the EMS
member countries were all willing to. co-ordinate their economic and
monetary policies in order to enable the persistence of the fixed ex-
change rates, the currency union which would emerge would imply
interferences of one country in the affairs of other countries. The
reason is that a one-inflation standard has been adopted. Leaving
aside technical problems of co-ordination, the one-inflation standard
requires that in an inflation-prone country the monetary policy is
tight, in defense of its own parity. The standard enables other coun-
tries to go along with lower interest rates. In this way, investment
will be higher in low-interest-rate countries than in those countries
which have to pursue high-interest-rate policies, thereby limiting
the number of investment projects which yield enough returns to pay
for high interest rates. In consequence, some countries within the
EMS would enjoy high growth rates and full employment, while others
would suffer from the efforts aiming at establishing the currency
union through fixed-parity regimes, which exceed their abilities to
adjust.
For these reasons the EMS will presumably turn out, in the final
analysis, to be an unacceptable way towards currency unification,
as was the case with the old "snakes" in operation from April 1972
on. Interestingly enough, the United Kingdom has not joined the EMS,
nor has the new entrant Greece, whereas the participation of Ireland
and Italy had to be bought with generous financial concessions masked
as regional policy aid. An eventual entry of Portugal and Spain into
the EMS might give rise to additional strains, since both countries
traditionally experience high rates of inflation. If the EMS breaks
down, the idea of European integration will be discredited again.
As long as inter-country differences in economic policies and per-
formance prevail, exchange-rate flexibility is clearly a more ade-
quate device to cope with them than the adjustable peg of the EMS.
The achievement of a true monetary union would still be advisable,
since it promises advantages similar to those provided by the crea-
tion of the Common Market. It reduces risks, above all the .risk of
exchange control, makes exchange rates predictable, and reduces
the costs of information about developments on foreign-exchange mar-21
kets. Currency unification, therefore, affects competition, the inter-
national division of labour and the international factor movements in
a positive way. It represents an international public good, which can
serve the interests of the citizens of all union member countries, and
would be the most logical step towards achieving political union. As
the EMS does not lead to a monetary union under present-day condi-
tions, one might think of an approach which leaves little room for
discretionary policies by state governments and rests, instead, on
automaticity. This is the case when the national currencies are sub-
stituted by a Community currency, preferably in a gradual competi-
tive process [Vaubel, 1978]. During the transitional period, control
over national monetary and other policies is left with the national au-
thorities.
At the beginning of this period, a European parallel currency would
be issued (by an independent European central bank) and allowed to
circulate side by side with the ten (or twelve) member-state curren-
cies. Circulation means competition. The parallel currency could
be defined in terms of a basket of weighted amounts of national cur-
rencies. Whenever the basket lost purchasing power because of infla-
tion in the member countries, the parallel currency would be reval-
ued at exactly the rate of that loss, and thus become more attractive
to holders of national currencies. The supply of the parallel curren-
cy would be increased commensurately with the expansion of demand,
i.e. at the rate at which national currencies are offered to the Euro-
pean bank in exchange for the parallel currency at the prevailing ex-
change rates. The currency union would be accomplished when the
parallel currency, thanks to its guaranteed purchasing power, had
replaced - as a common standard of value, a store of value and a
means of payment - the national currencies, which are subject to
inflation. Unlike the EMS, the parallel-currency approach avoids
unnecessary burdens and political conflicts arising from monetary
integration; and due to the gradualism with which the currency union
is arrived at, it allows for a smooth adjustment in the various mem-
ber countries to the requirements of one common currency. It would
make it much easier for countries to participate in the unification
process from the very beginning. And it would stimulate further eco-
nomic integration, particularly in view of the forthcoming second
enlargement. However, after the member-state governments have
invested much prestige in the EMS, its inherent weakness and long-
term inviability have still to become manifest before the time is ripe
for more promising approaches of monetary integration.22
6. On the Political Economy of the Enlargement
Customs-union theory shows that an economic integration between
differently developed countries can be particularly fruitful. If devel-
opment levels and, hence, relative factor endowments as well as rel-
ative factor prices differ among countries, the integration process
offers the opportunity to widen bottlenecks, which result from do-
mestic supply shortages of productive factors, and thus to further eco-
nomic growth. This can be brought about in a direct way through the
migration of labour, capital, entrepreneurs or of technology, or in
an indirect way through the import of goods and services in which
these factors are incorporated. Integration, however, demands struc-
tural adjustment. Like every free-trade area, the Community pro-
tects domestic production against third-country competition by ex-
ternal trade protection (and additional measures). And each of the
new entrants has built up a system of protective measures, too. In
fact, the protective levels of the three countries are much higher than
that of the EC. This is true for trade with the Community (Chapter
III); it is of particular importance, however, vis-a-vis third coun-
tries against which Greece, Portugal and Spain have introduced much
more restrictive import barriers than the Community. Joining the
Community would mean that the barriers to intra-Community trade
would have to be abolished, that the lower Community level of ex-
ternal trade protection would have to be adopted, and that the pref-
erential trading arrangements with developing countries would have
to be joined (Chapter IV and VI).
Nowadays, there exists the wide-spread view in the present Com-
munity, most openly expressed by the Commission and the French
government, that the negative structural shocks in the new entrant
countries, which may result from harmonizing trade policies, will
overcompensate the positive economic effects which are associated
with the enlargement. This presumption implies a lack of mobility
of productive factors, so that growth opportunities will not be fully
exploited. But the insufficiencies in the present EC system as to ex-
ercising solidarity is another major reason why the enlargement of
the Community is resisted by some member states. Greece, Portu-
gal and Spain, which range at the bottom of the European income hi-
erarchy, are setting much hope in arrangements with the Community,
which will help them to cope better with the many economic problems
by which they are plagued (Chapter II). However, if the EC agricul-
tural policies or the foreign-trade policies are extended to the new
entrants and, moreover, if they are shaped in a way that takes into23
account the specific requests for protection of these countries to the
same degree as in the case of the Nine, the burdens from the policies
will increase significantly, both in terms of visible financial contribu-
tions to the budget (as enforced mainly by agricultural policies) and
in terms of less visible welfare losses to the consumers (by trade pol-
icies, and again, by agricultural, and by other sector-specific poli-
cies). Demands by the new entrants for selective aid together with
claims by the present member states for some form of compensation
for the market losses they may suffer as a result of the increase in
competition (notably with respect to agriculture), can easily lead the
Community to end up with a higher level of protection and, hence, with
more inefficiencies.
It is true that the EC has long been accused of harmful effects of its
policies and that resistance against these has increased recently. This
is all the more so as, due to the poor growth performance during the
1970s and the gloomy prospects which many people have for the future,
the willingness of the net payers to the Community budget to make up
for the financial burdens has decreased heavily (Chapter VIII). For
this reason, the beneficiaries of the present policies fear that with
the Community enlargement and with a limited willingness to pay,
they will come out worse than at present. This fear, however, is
not supported by past experiences, which proved that there are no ef-
fective limits to the waste of resources and to financial payments
even though the many deficiencies of the EC policies have been real-
ized by the public and even by the governments. In the end, there has
always been agreement that muddling through would be the best way
to handle the problems - and to postpone solutions to the future, re-
gardless of the distortions in resource allocation which, expectedly,
will then call for new government support again and again.
Moreover, following their entry to the EC, Greece, Portugal and
Spain will be able to exert a strong influence on the Community poli-
cies - a stronger influence than they could exert, for instance, if they
stayed outside and achieved free trade and other arrangements (e.g.
financial assistance for the promotion of their development process)
by association: The application of the unanimity principle in the Coun-
cil gives them the opportunity to determine the course of the EC poli-
cies directly by vetoing (if necessary), and to try to enforce their own
interests. As the interests of the new entrants evidently differ in
many respects from those of the Nine - which is partly a consequence
of their lower development level and of differences in the production
structures - there is no reason to expect that they will not make use
in the Council of their vetoing power since it is in fact exercised by24
each of the Nine., too. It may turn out that claims for protection will
in future be resisted more than in the past, if they imply direct pay-
ments and the Community budget is restrained. However, without a
fundamental turn to more liberal principles, as discussed in Chapter
III, this would only mean that external trade protection will become
stronger. It is in this sense that the second enlargement of the EC
provides a good (and perhaps the last) opportunity to consider and car-
ry out fundamental reforms, both with regard to the institutional set-
up and to the common policies.25
II. Patterns of Economic Development in Greece, Portugal and
Spain
Greece, Portugal and Spain have several economic and non-economic
characteristics in common which clearly differentiate them from the
EC 9. The most important of these similarities is the lower level of
economic development and the lack of maturity of prevailing indus-
trial structures. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the pat-
terns of economic development in the Three which may influence the
prospects of the enlargement. To begin with, the major structural
characteristics are stated. The second section reports on long-term
economic development trends in Greece, Portugal and Spain. The
structural changes of these economies, and particularly those of the
manufacturing industry, are analyzed in the third section. The last
section deals with adjustment perspectives in the three countries with-
in an enlarged Community.
1. Structural Indicators
Once the second enlargement is concluded, the European Community
will be much more heterogeneous in economic terms than it is at pres-
ent. Though economic growth was rapid in Greece, Portugal and Spain
since the late 1950s, notable development gaps between these coun-
tries and the EC 9 (on average) persist (Table 2). In terms of per cap-
ita income, the relations were 1 : 4.3 for Portugal, 1 : 2. 3 for Greece
and 1 : 1. 8 for Spain in 1980. The three Southern economies, partic-
ularly Greece, are less industrialized and more agricultural than the
EC 9. The degree of "openness" to international trade is relatively
low on the export side, especially in the case of Greece and Spain.
All three countries seem to be more inflation-prone than the EC 9,
and only Greece has succeeded in keeping unemployment levels be-
low the Community's average rate.
Within the manufacturing sector, traditional industries which are
characteristic of early development phases, still play a major role
in spite of achievements with regard to horizontal and vertical diver-
sification of industrial output, most notably in Spain. Many firms are
very small and family-managed, using outmoded machinery and tech-
nology and frequently operating with a negative value added at world
market prices. They coexist with a few larger enterprises, which
exploit economies of scale, apply advanced organizational techniques26
Table 2 - Some Indicators for the Economic Structure of Greece, Por-
tugal, Spain and the EC 9, 1980
Indicator
Territory (1 000 km
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Source: OECD [a; b; c J . - IMF [var. iss. ] . - Bank of Greece [var.
iss. J . - Banco de Bilbao [a] . - EIU [a; b; cj .
and, in some cases, even engage in applied research. This sectoral
dualism is attached to a marked regional dualism; all economic ac-
tivities and in particular the sophisticated industries are highly con-
centrated in a few industrial centres. The situation is similar in agri-
culture. In addition to excessive fragmentation and outdated methods27
of cultivation, the poor soil conditions and protracted dry seasons
as well as institutional constraints keep productivity levels much be-
low the Community average, particularly in Greece and Portugal.
Comparing the Three with each other, one finds that Spain's economic
structure is closest to that of the EC 9; its per capita income is the
highest (more than twice that of Portugal), and its agricultural sec-
tor has already declined more and its services sector widened more
than those of the other two countries. Greece's per capita income
does not differ so much from that of Spain; its industrial sector, how-
ever, proves to be quite small, whereas this sector shows astonish-
ingly high shares in the case of Portugal.
2. Long-Term Development Trends
a. Factors Retarding Economic Development
The relatively low development level of the three countries in the Eu-
ropean context reflects their status as latecomers in the Western in-
dustrialization process, the reasons of which can be traced back var-
ious centuries in their history. Situated at the southern periphery of
Europe, they all were isolated from the European development for
a long time and underwent a period of stagnation (in the case of Greece)
or even decline (in the case of the former world powers Portugal and
Spain) at a time when scientific and social revolutions took place in
Central Europe and cleared the path for an economic upswing unknown
before. It was not until the second half of the last century that the in-
dustrialization process started in Greece, Portugal and Spain
1. But
even then growth rates remained low and the gap to Central Europe
continued to widen (Table 3). In the period 1840-1938, real per cap-
ita income rose annually by 1. 1 percent in Greece, 0. 3 percent in
Portugal and 0. 2 percent in Spain, as compared to 1. 2 percent in Cen-
tral Europe taken as a whole.
Reasons for the belated take-off are manifold. To start with, natural
conditions in the three countries were less favourable to industrial
development than in Central Europe: the mountainous and eroded land-
scape did not only provide rather poor soils for agricultural use, but
1 For details on economic history see for instance Coutsoumaris [1963];
Vicens Vives [1969] ; Kartakis [1970 ] ; Payne [1973]; Harrison! [ 1978 ];
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also hindered communication and thus division of labour within the
country
1. Greece, Portugal and Spain possessed only limited natural
resources. In particular the former two almost totally lacked such
raw materials as coal, iron ore and non-ferrous metals, which
proved especially important for an industrial upswing in the last cen-
tury, though Portugal was able to procure at least some of its require-
ments from its colonies.
The social and political environment of these countries was not con-
ducive to early industrialization either. When in Central Europe both
the Enlightenment and liberal thought rendered possible the rise of
new technological knowledge as well as the destruction of the old feu-
dalistic structures with their specific class privileges, the three coun-
tries scarcely took part in this development. In Greece, the isolation
from Europe was mainly due to its occupation by the Turks, which
lasted until the war of independence (1821-1828) and which kept the
Greeks more oriented towards the East. In Portugal and Spain, the
strong dominance of the Roman Catholic orthodoxy and their status
as colonial powers prevented the new ideas from gaining a firm foot-
hold in their societies. Thus the traditional feudalistic system could
survive for a considerably longer time.
As a result, in the last century and during the first quarter of our
century the three countries still showed many of the characteristics
typical of a pre-industrial society. Productivity in the agricultural
sector, which was the largest economic activity in terms of output
and employment, was extremely low. Neither the small- nor the large-
farm sector was run as efficiently as it could have been. The "mini-
fundia" which - for historical reasons
2 - were and are prevalent in
1 To give an example, around 1880 the steamship reduced transport costs
across the Atlantic drastically, thus making it cheaper for the Spanish
periphery regions to buy North American instead of Castilian wheat. The
consequence was a severe agricultural crisis in Spain.
2 The extreme fragmentation of land in the northern regions of Portugal
and Spain was due to recurrent subdivision by inheritance. By contrast,
the South, which had been occupied by the Moors, was distributed after
the Reconquest around 1500 into large units and awarded to the nobles
and military leaders for victories attained in the war against the Moors,
and to the Church as well. In Greece, the large estates, generally owned
by Turkish nobles who once got them as a fief by the Sultan, predomi-
nated until the expulsion of the Turks. Immediately after the war of in-
dependence, most parts of this land came under the control of the State
which sold it in small plots to propertyless peasants. These different30
the northern regions of Portugal and Spain and in most parts of Greece,
were extremely small and often fragmented into several small plots,
and, especially in Portugal and Spain, scattered over large areas.
Techniques in use were extremely backward: they did not go any fur-
ther than the Roman plough; fallowness in alternate years was wide-
spread. The owners of the "latifundia" in the southern parts of Por-
tugal and Spain, where they still prevail (Chapter V), entailed their
land on tenants who in return owed them so much of the yearly harvest
that the remnant left to the tenants became too meagre to provide an
incentive for improving the productivity. Nor were the landowners
themselves by any means entrepreneurs. In general, they were nei-
ther interested in obtaining more than sufficient rents out of their land,
nor compelled by competition to do so. If necessary, they increased
their income by taking formerly unused land under cultivation, dis-
regarding marginal productivities, and by ensuring it against com-
petition from abroad, where cereals for example could be grown much
cheaper, by pressing successfully for tariff protection. The situation
was similar in Greece after it annexed Thessalia and Epirus (in 1881)
and Macedonia (1912-1913). Under such circumstances the agricul-
tural sector could not become the motor of economic development in
any of the three countries.
A number of agrarian reforms that were undertaken
1 changed the land
tenure system only in Greece (in the period 1922-1940). But in none
of the three countries were these measures sufficient to raise pro-
ductivity on a sustained basis. Technological and management back-
wardness was not overcome; acreage and financial services to agri-
culture remained insufficient. Though agricultural production in-
creased, this was almost exclusively due to the increased amount
of land taken under cultivation rather than to higher acreage yields.
In fact, in some cases average returns on agricultural production di-
minished, since the additional land was marginal land. It was only
the massive protection granted by the State which kept the agricul-
tural sector growing in spite of its inefficiency and high costs. At
the same time, this protection biased the internal terms of trade
against other potentially more productive sectors, in particular man-
ufacturing industry, the development of which was retarded as a re-
sult.
antecedents explain why the land tenure is more homogeneous nowadays
and the average farm size is lower in Greece than in Portugal and Spain.
1 Agrarian reform legislation responded more to political pressures of
the moment than to long-term agricultural development plans.31
Thus the manufacturing sector remained small for a long time (Ta-
ble 4). It consisted almost exclusively of handicraft enterprises with
only a few employees, particularly in Greece and Portugal. The main
industries were food processing and textiles; besides, some iron man-
ufacturing and shipbuilding emerged in Spain. The difficulties which
had to be surmounted in the transition from handicraftsmanship to in-
dustrial production were enormous. The owners - indulged in a colo-
nial mentality - in general lacked entrepreneurial skills; there was
not enough qualified labour available; and risk capital was in extreme-
ly short supply. Many investors looked for secure and sufficient rents
on their capital - like the landowners, with whom they were in fact
often identical. Thus they preferred investments in real estate and
especially in the Greek case, capital transfers abroad to the financing
of risky innovations in the manufacturing industry at home.
It was not until the middle of the last century, that the governments
became aware of the importance of building an infrastructure, espe-
cially roads, railways and a telecommunication network, if economic
development was to take place. For this purpose, the governments at-
tracted foreign private capital in considerable amounts. Great Britain
and France were the major capital suppliers to Portugal and Spain,
whereas Greece could draw on the Greek diaspora all over the world.
Though only little of the inflowing capital was invested directly in in-
dustry, it nevertheless contributed to industrial progress: In Greece
it sponsored the growth of glass, textiles, paper and other light in-
dustries and financed almost exclusively the rise of heavy industries
such as non-ferrous metal mining. Spain became, at the turn of the
century, a leading producer of lead, copper, mercury and iron- ore,
partially with the help of foreign capital. Sizeable earnings derived
from the export of these metal ores gave rise to the accumulation of
capital, which made possible the creation of the Spanish metallurgy.
Towards the end of the last century, industrialization became a de-
liberate goal of economic policy in the three countries. And import
substitution was considered the most adequate instrument towards this
goal. Hence, trade policies were shaped in an increasingly protec-
tionist way, an approach which was to prevail until the 1950s. In
Greece, for example, the average nominal tariff rate rose from 19.5
percent in 1887 up to 27.4 percent in 1910 [Kartakis, 1970, p. 9] .
Spain, which had pursued a rather liberal trade policy until it lost its
last major colonies (Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba) in 1898, became
one of the most protectionist countries in the world, the import tariffs
averaging 41 percent in 1925 [Vinas et al. , 1979, pp. 19 ff. ] . This
protection made import substitution quite profitable in a wide range32
Table 4 - Sectoral Structure of the Active Labour Force in Greece,










































































































Source: Bairoch et al. [1968] . - Own calculations and estimates.
of industrial products for which demand was increasing rapidly due
to backward and forward linkages. Tax allowances, subsidies and gov-
ernment procurement in favour of domestic suppliers strengthened
the private profitability of new investments.33
Under import protection it is inevitably more profitable for private
enterprises to produce for the domestic market than to export. Given
the narrowness of the domestic markets, industrial enterprises in
general remained small and could not take advantage of economies
of scale. The technology in use was backward and production was in-
efficient compared to other European nations. In the shelter of the
trade barriers, it was not necessary for firms to be innovative risk-
takers in order to flourish. Industrial growth accelerated until the
Great Depression, but industrial exports were rather insignificant
and real gross domestic product went up rather slowly, mainly due
to the continuing poor performance of the agricultural sector ICout-
soumaris, 1963, pp. 21 ff.; Donges, 1976b,, pp. 28 ff. ] . The Por-
tuguese economy even stagnated in that period, because the proclama-
tion of a republic in 1910 was followed by two decades of extreme po-
litical instability and economic mismanagement, so that the invest-
ment climate deteriorated sharply [Baklanoff, 1978, pp. 102 ff. ] .
b. Experimenting with Autarky
The inward-looking strategies of economic development were greatly
reinforced in Portugal and Spain when Salazar and Franco came into
power in 1932 and 1939, respectively [Baklanoff, 1978, Chs. II and
VII] . This period of autarky was to last until the late 1950s in Spain
and the early 1960s in Portugal. Autarky was considered as the most
appropriate way to create a strong economy and, in Spain, as neces-
sary for the economic reconstruction of the country after the devas-
tating Civil War. But economic nationalism was also imposed by the
international ostracism of the two authoritarian regimes, particular-
ly after Wordl War II.
In pursuit of agricultural and industrial autarky, the State intervened
in almost every field of the economy, either directly or indirectly;
and being suspicious of market forces, it did not rely on domestic
competition as a means of resource allocation within the autarkic
framework. The plethora of policy instruments included the regula-
tion of wages, prices and interest rates, import and export licens-
ing, bilateral trade arrangements, foreign-exchange controls, mul-
tiple exchange rates (in Spain), and the licensing of industrial invest-
ment. Technology from abroad was procured mainly through licence
arrangements with foreign firms, while the legislation on foreign
direct investment became rather restrictive. Public enterprises pro-
liferated rapidly throughout the economy, especially in the Spanish
industry, with the aim of promoting new activities for which the in-34
vestment requirements appeared too large for private firms; coal
mining, basic metals, chemicals, petroleum refining, motor cars
and ships are cases in point. No attention was paid to comparative
advantage in agricultural and industrial production, the high domes-
tic resource costs involved in across-the-board import substitution
were ignored, and exports deliberately discriminated against. All
this was done in order to make employment independent of foreign
demand, to make resources available for the production of import
substitutes, and to ensure the availability of foodstuffs for the popula-
tion. It did not only lead to a significant misallocation of resources,
but also caused the economic development process to be hindered
time and again by balance-of-payments constraints (at the given ex-
change rate). Severe supply bottlenecks, particularly in fertilizers,
energy, steel, non-ferrous metals, building materials and machin-
ery, became a fact of life, handicapping both the agricultural and the
industrial sector and compelling numerous firms to operate far be-
low their productive capacities [Pintado, 1964; Donges, 1976b] .
Agricultural production, for instance, experienced a drastic decline
in Spain during the 1940s, almost causing a famine. The lack of ferti-
lizers and tractors was, however, not the only reason for this devel-
opment. An equally important depressive factor was the government
policy of fixing selling prices below equilibrium levels, especially
in the case of cereals, which induced the peasants to reduce their
production or to diversify by growing alternative crops. Quite con-
trary to the government's targets, Spain thereby became heavily de-
pendent on food imports (including food aid) during this period. Only
with the increase of the prices at the beginning of the 1950s, did
yields start to rise again. Portugal made similar experiences. When
compared with the officially stated targets, the results of agricul-
tural policies in the Iberian Peninsula were poor: Neither did produc-
tion increase at the rate of internal demand, nor was rural labour
emigration stopped, capital formation in the agricultural sector sig-
nificantly strengthened, or the traditionally dualistic system of land
tenure improved. Many problems which the Portuguese and Spanish
agricultures are facing nowadays and which complicate the negotia-
tions on adhesion (especially in the case of Spain), are rooted in dis-
tortions created by the governments during the period of autarkic de-
velopment.
Lasting misallocations and weaknesses also appeared in industry. An
atomistic industrial structure emerged, in which most firms were
too small to make use of economies of scale. Oligopolistic and mo-
nopolistic positions were strengthened and led to a rather defensive35
investment behaviour. X-inefficiency at the firm level was in general
high, as one would expect it to be in economies which have been shel-
tered from foreign competition. In these circumstances, industrial
development was slow and erratic in Portugal and Spain for many
years (until the early 1950s) and the industrial structure that emerged
did not attain international competitiveness even in those areas in
which these countries could be supposed to have a comparative ad-
vantage (e.g. labour-intensive products).
Greece did not share the experience of autarkic development with Por-
tugal and Spain. But the considerable damages which were caused by
World War II and the following Civil War, substantially dampered the
momentum of the earlier economic development. As in the other two
countries, the Greek government, assuming the responsibility for
reconstructing the economy, intervened largely in factor and product
markets as well as in foreign trade. It continued to rely on import
substitution, but provided less protection and more incentives to ex-
ports, particularly manufactures, than Portugal and Spain did LEllis
et al. , 1964, pp. 180 f. ; Tsekouras, 1971; Katsos, 1975, Ch. 2j.
Industrialization proceeded along less distorted lines and as a result
faced less severe foreign-exchange shortages.
Overall economic growth accelerated somewhat in all three coun-
tries during the 1950s. Yet the structural deficiencies in agriculture
and industry, all reflected in a serious lack of international com-
petitiveness, prevailed. The governments in the three countries had
to recognize that an acceleration of economic development on a sus-
tained basis and with a real chance of catching up with the more ad-
vanced Central European countries could only be expected from an
integration of the economies into the world market. The need for a
fundamental policy reform was especially urgent in Portugal and
Spain where economic nationalism had been pushed to extremes for
so many years. Ultimately, the imminent danger of a complete eco-
nomic collapse tempered ideological postures.
c. The Gradual Re inte gr ati on into the World Econ-
omy
Around 1960, the three countries reshaped their development poli-
cies, making them more outward-looking and more flexible domesti-
cally. In Spain, the policy reform was initiated in 1959 with the se-
vere Stabilization Plan. Its immediate aim was to stop runaway infla-
tion and to correct the huge balance-of-payments deficit, but the gov-36
ernment was aware of the fact that the devaluation of the peseta to-
gether with a restrictive fiscal and monetary policy would not be
enough to revitalize the economy. Hence, quantitative restrictions
on foreign trade were removed to a large extent, the dispersion of
import tariffs was reduced, export-promotion measures were im-
plemented, foreign tourism was stimulated, rules on foreign direct
investment became very liberal and the industrial sector was gradual-
ly de-regulated [Donges, 1971; 1976b]. In Portugal, the turning point
for the opening-up of the economy was the accession to the EFTA in
1960. Afterwards, legislation was changed to attract foreign capital
for the venturing of a number of infrastructure projects, to liberal-
ize somewhat the then prevailing industrial licensing system and to
stimulate the development of the tourism sector [Baklanoff, 1978,
pp. 105 ff. J . As to Greece, its detachment from (relative) isolation
was marked by the signing of the 1961 Athens Agreement which con-
tained the association of Greece with the European Economic Com-
munity of the Six and which became effective in 1962. It allowed Greek
exports to the Community under equal conditions of access as those
of EC members. Greek imports from the EC were to be liberalized
gradually over a period of twelve years in general, the period being
twenty-two years for a number of "sensitive" products only. More-
over, the agreement envisaged the harmonization of agricultural pol-
icies, an adjustment of Greek tariffs on imports from third countries
to the Common External Tariff (GET), the free movement ob labour
and capital in principle, and financial assistance to Greece by the
Community [Kalamotousakis, 1976; Tsoukalis, 1981, pp. 28 ff. J
1.
The policy reforms on which Greece, Portugal and Spain embarked
during the 1960s, though more rational in economic terms than the
preceding ones, remained suboptimal. Tariff protection still was
high compared to that of the EC, and the structure of nominal tariffs
led to escalating rates of effective protection in favour of consumer
rather than intermediate or capital goods. Non-tariff protection like
quantitative restrictions or indirect taxes was not completely abol-
ished. The anti-export bias of the protective measures was not neu-
tralized. The governments did not totally disengage themselves from
the control of the economy. Moreover, they turned towards indica-
tive development planning, emulating France's "planification", and
involving substantial public investment. Private investors in se-
lected industries and regions enjoyed numerous fiscal and credit in-
1 As a reaction to the military coup of the colonels in April 1967 the Com-
munity froze the full implementation of the agreement, especially with
regard to its agricultural and aid provisions.37
centives. Agriculture remained a field for far-reaching government
intervention and regulation. And direct state participation in indus-
try continued to be rather active, particularly so in Spain, where the
Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI), originally created as an instru-
ment of autarkic development, adhered to its tradition of extending
its activities across the board and taking over unprofitable companies
rather than divesting itself of its ownership of the numerous enter-
prises which did not require public support to expand [Schwartz, Gon-
zalez, 1978] . Consequently, the new strategies did not only retain
considerable differences in the domestic resource cost of saving or
earning foreign exchange but also distorted cost structures and dis-
economies of small-scale production.
Table 5 - Compound Rates of Growth





























































































































Source : OECD [cl . - Own calculations and estimates.38
Nevertheless, the impact of the new policies was remarkable in
terms of economic growth, structural transformation and trade ex-
pansion. During the 1960s, real GDP increased at an average annual
rate of 7 percent in Greece and about 6 percent in Portugal and Spain
(Table 5); annual growth rates in the EC accounted for only some 4. 5
percent in that period. This outstanding growth performance was in-
Table 6 - Compound Rates of Growth
a of Gross Fixed Capital Forma-
tion and Its Components'
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dustry-determined. Manufacturing value added rose faster than GDP,
so that its contribution to GDP increased considerably, while it stag-
nated or even declined in the Community. There was a significant
decline in the share of the agricultural sector while the tertiary sec-
tor followed a mixed pattern (see also Tables 9 and 10). Market pen-
etration by foreign suppliers was rapid since accelerated industrial-
ization and the rising standard of living called for larger quantities
of foreign intermediate investment and consumption goods. At the
same time, manufactured export expanded fast. Inthatperiod, Greece,
Portugal, and Spain made a leap forward in their economic develop-
ment, became prominent members in the group of "newly industrial-
izing countries" (NICs) [OECD, 1 979 J and considerably increased
their attractiveness for private foreign investors
1.
Underlying the rapid economic growth during the 1960s was a strong
expansion of investment, particularly in the production capacities of
the manufacturing sector (Table 6). Though the GDP ratios of invest-
ment did not significantly exceed those observable in the EC 9, the
three Southern European countries were able to achieve higher growth
rates out of their investment, since the lowering of the average age
of the capital stock, resulting in a smaller depreciation rate, led to
considerably high capacity effects, an experience which these coun-
tries shared with other NICs. The strong expansion of productive ca-
pacities, however, did not increase employment opportunities as rap-
idly as required, thereby forcing a large portion of the labour force
to emigrate (mainly to the Community). At the same time, the higher
capital endowment per worker gave rise to labour productivity, which
allowed wages to increase remarkably (Table 7).
d. Economic Crises During the 1970s
The end of the period of fast economic growth and trade expansion
was marked by two almost coinciding events in all three countries:
the 1973-1974 quadrupling of oil prices and the world recession of
1974-1975 on the one hand, and the internal political transition from
dictatorships to representative democracies (set in motion in April
1974 in Portugal, in July 1974 in Greece, and in December 1975 in
Spain). The external shocks almost immediately affected the external
1 There is an extensive literature with empirical analyses on the effects
of the changed development policies. See, for instance, Katsos [1975] ,
Donges [ 1976b ], Baklanoff [1978 ] and Tsoukalis [ 1981 ] , and the ref-
erences contained therein.40







































































At current prices and exchange rates. - 1961. - Estimates under the
assumption of a six-days-week and an equal number of hours worked as in
non-agriculture. Since the number of hours worked most certainly is
higher in agriculture than in non-agriculture, hourly wages are likely to be
considerably below the estimated figures. - ^1971. - eMinimum rates.
Source : ILO [ var. iss. ] . - Own estimates.
sectors of the three countries adversely, which by then had become
quite important compared to the early 1960s. The terms of trade de-
teriorated, foreign demand for these countries
1 exports slowed down,
tourist revenues, foreign direct investment and emigrant workers'
remittances all declined. Hence, the catching-up process was bound
to face renewed balance-of-payments constraints
1.
1 Mateus [1981] has estimated for Portugal that the combined adverse
balance-of-payments' impact of external shocks amounted to 3.8 percent
of GDP in 1974 and increased up to 10 percent in 1977. There are no com-
parable estimates available for Greece and Spain,.but the orders of mag-
nitude might be similar, resembling the experience of other NICs [Ba-
lassa, 1981 ] .41
The political transition compounded the problem: On the one hand, it
was accompanied by fierce distributional struggles in the labour mar-
ket, since the trade unions, after a long period of repression, were
keen on correcting what they regarded as the major injustices of the,
previous regimes, and they considered aggressive behaviour as an
adequate way of increasing the number of their respective affiliates;
on the other hand, the governments, particularly in Portugal and
Spain, also attached priority to income redistribution, thereby try-
ing to consolidate the political democratization (which turned out to
be a difficult task as the succession of government crises in both Ibe-
rian countries, including the failed military coup in Spain in Febru-
ary 1981, revealed). Wages in manufacturing increased sharply, while
productivity growth slowed down markedly in a climate of spreading
strikes, lock-outs and workers' absenteeism. As a result, unit la-
bour costs, which had been relatively stable during the 1960s, rose
rapidly in the three countries and exceeded the rate of increase ob-
served for the Community during the same period (Table 8 and Fig-
ure 1).
Under these circumstances, the international competitiveness of
Greek, Portuguese and Spanish producers on both the domestic and
the world market could not help but suffer. However, some relief
came from the higher valuation of West European currencies vis-a-
vis the US-$, especially those of the Community which is the most
important export market of the new entrants. At the same time,
Greece and Portugal allowed the drachma and the escudo to devalu-
ate gradually, though not sufficiently enough to eliminate the differ-
ences between domestic and international cost increases; Spain, by
contrast, even let the peseta appreciate in nominal terms (from 1977
to 1979) in order to bring down the oil bill. On the whole, investment
was discouraged (Table 6); outflows of capital, entrepreneurial tal-
ents and skilled labour began to appear to a significant extent; and
marginal, inherently inefficient firms, which had been able to sur-
vive during the preceding boom, now went bankrupt. Expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies pursued by the governments only suc-
ceeded in maintaining inflationary pressures at a high level.
None of the three countries undertook the structural adjustments re-
quired to resume rapid economic development under changed world
economic conditions. On the contrary, the economic-policy move-
ment towards greater internal liberalization and outward orientation,
as initiated in the 1960s, reached a deadlock. State ownership of en-
terprises increased (in Greece only with regard to public utilities)
and so did public consumption. Price controls, minimum wages, im-Table 8 - Indexes of Hourly Wages and Unit Labour Costs in Manufacturing for Greece,
Portugal, Spain and the EC 9
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Figure 1 - Development of Unit Labour Costs in Greece, Portugal,
Spain and the EC 9, 1960-1980
1960
°/n local currencies.
1965 1970 1975 1980
Source : Table44
port restrictions and subsidies to structurally ailing industries were
reintroduced, inefficient import substitution was increased and ex-
ports were most severely discriminated against.
This policy reversal was particularly evident in the case of Portugal,
where the Left seized power in the aftermath of the April 1974 Revolu-
tion and held it until November 1975
1. About two hundred enterprises
were nationalized, affecting transportation, the energy sector, the
banking and insurance system as well as major enterprises in steel,
basic chemicals, mining, cement and beer. Many firms were illegal-
ly taken over by their workers. There was also wide-spread nation-
alization of large farms and revolutionary land occupation in the south
of the country. In all these cases, dispossessed owners (nationals or
foreigners) were not compensated. The rules concerning foreign di-
rect investment became rather restrictive, ambiguous and unstable
over time {Balassa, 1977, pp. 241 f.; Donges, 1980a, pp. 272 ff. j .
Thus, the successive governments created substantial uncertainty,
even with regard to their own policies, thus hardly creating a cli-
mate in which productive investment, be it domestic or foreign, can
flourish
2 . It was not until the late 19 70s that more moderate forces
came into power, but the profound distortions caused by the revolu-
tionary policies and turbulences have not been fully removed yet.
The decolonization of Portugal's African territories (in 19 75) may
have put another severe restraint on the Portuguese economic devel-
opment. Portugal lost important markets for its manufactured ex-
ports and significant sources of primary-commodity supplies. More-
over, it suddenly found itself destitute of a considerable amount of
capital that Portuguese had invested in Angola and Mozambique dur-
ing the preceding ten to fifteen years. More important, however,
about 800,000 repatriates from the colonies (roughly one-tenth of
Portugal's population in 1973) had to be integrated into the economy.
On the other hand, Portugal was also released from the heavy finan-
cial burden, which both the colonial warfares and the execution of
infrastructure projects had entailed for the small "mother country".
1 See Balassa [1977, pp. 229 ff. ] ; Esser et al. [1977, pp. 150 ff. ] ; Bak-
lanoff [1978, pp. 156 ff. J .
2 Greece may follow a similar pattern under the newly-elected socialist
government. Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou promised'during the
1981 election campaign that a number of basic industries would be na-
tionalized in addition to banks, insurance companies and foreign-trade
firms.45
3. Changes of Economic Structure
a. Sources of Distortion
As we have seen, the three countries had a late start into modern
economic development, proceeding at only a slow pace for a long
time, which seems to have been due to a large extent to severe ob-
stacles to structural adjustment, rooted in excessive government
interventionism. Excessive interventionism means that competition
was not allowed to act as a "creative destructor" of antiquated struc-
tures (in the Schumpeterian sense). Foreign price and quality com-
petition was more or less ruled out over long periods. Domestic com-
petition was also weak for at least two reasons. One is that poor
transportation and communication systems had led to a fragmenta-
tion of the internal markets. The second reason is that the industrial
licensing systems, so widely used during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s,
restricted the entry of new producers into the markets. Licenses
were normally granted either on the first-come, first-served prin-
ciple or on the grounds of the bargaining power of the would-be in-
vestor and the closeness of his connections to the administration.
Lack of a competitive environment has allowed a great number of
extremely small enterprises, run in quite an outmoded manner, to
survive. Greece is the most outstanding case in point among the
Three [Kartakis, 1970] . Most of Greece's small manufacturing en-
terprises are family-owned, and their leaders are artisans rather
than entrepreneurs. They rest content with "sufficient" profits rath-
er than aspiring to earn as much as would be possible if production
were run efficiently. Selection of the most efficient supplier scarce-
ly occurs. These firms produce standardized products for narrow
local markets with backward technologies and high labour intensi-
ties. A number of larger private enterprises, which also developed
in the sheltered markets, are family-owned, too, and show similar char-
acteristics. Their organization is paternalistic with an insufficient
delegation of responsibilities and a low degree of specialization. They
do not attach any importance to economies of scale and the mentali-
ty of their managers is not much different from that of the owners
of the small firms. For a long time, moreover, managers of large
firms were preoccupied more with negotiations with the public au-
thorities on the approval of production and investment plans than with
the efficient execution of these plans and the search for new profit-
able investment opportunities. Such inefficiencies, which can also
be easily found in Portugal and Spain, hinder economic growth, of
course. The rate of equity capital within the enterprises remains46
small, because profits are, quite often not reinvested in the enter-
prises but spent on real estates, government bonds and so forth.
In addition, the financial markets were subject to a number of re-
strictions imposed by the governments. Maximum interest rates
on private deposits and loans were typically fixed far below the an-
nual inflation rate. Interest ceilings naturally subsidize borrowers,
discourage potential depositors to place savings in banks and other
financial institutions and sooner or later require credit rationing
1.
In fact, the three countries are good examples of the distortive ef-
fects caused by financial repression: In these countries there has
been excessive investment in buildings and luxurious installations
until recently; established large firms were favoured over medium-
sized and small firms as well as over newcomers; promising op-
portunities for innovative investment were foregone for lack of finan-
cial support; production became unduly capital-intensive and the cap-
ital-output ratio in the economy was biased in an upward direction.
Under such conditions, which have been improved only partially in
recent years, economic development and structural change could
not make all the progress that would have been possible if financial
markets had been allowed to operate efficiently.
Public enterprises, most notably in Spain as has been argued above,
are another source of structural distortions and inflexibility. Based
on dubious market-failure arguments as well as ambiguous social
and political objectives, the State retains its control over the invest-
ment patterns in manufacturing industry through public ownership
of a great number of enterprises. After the INI was reorganized in
1974, its main objective was to play a leading role in the develop-
ment of industries which produce sophisticated technologies, such
as electronics and aeronautics. In practice, however, numerous
INI-controlled enterprises have continued to be inefficient and to sac-
rifice economic risk-taking to political expediency. They have ex-
erted strong pressure on the government to get protection and sub-
sidies. And by reducing effective competition they have attenuated,
throughout the economy, the efforts for cost reductions, structural
change and technological progress [Schwartz, forthcoming] .
Interventions of the sort we have discussed affect sectoral and in-
dustrial structures, either because this is the intention of the poli-
cies pursued or because there is an unintentional adjustment to poli-
1 For an analysis of the important role of the financial system in economic
development, see McKinnon [l 973 ] and Shaw [ 1973 ].47
cy-induced parameter changes. It can be attempted to evaluate such
structural distortions by comparing the actual production and employ-
ment structures of the three countries with what might have been ex-
pected if these countries had followed a "typical" pattern of economic
development, i.e. one that reflects "normal" circumstances, oppor-
tunities and obstacles. Deviations from this pattern, which are not
induced by natural resource endowments, comparative advantages
and other peculiarities of the countries under consideration, may
then be traced to the economic policy framework.
b. Sectoral and Industrial Structures
In order to obtain patterns of a "typical" economic development, hy-
pothetical structures have been computed. As is well known from the
Chenery-Syrquin models [1975 ] , these hypothetical structures are
to show the "normal" sectoral breakdown of GDP and employment at
a given level of development (measured as per capita income), ac-
cording to international cross-section patterns of growth
1. The esti-
mate is based on data from the OECD countries for 19 75 and covers
the three major economic sectors (agriculture, industry and services)
on the one hand, and 28 manufacturing branches at the three-digit
ISIC-level on the other, for which various types of OLS regression
functions have been tested
2 .
The findings of the inter-country regression estimates for the major
economic sectors are shown in Table 9 and Figure 2
3 . They lend sup-
1 The reader should keep in mind that the cross-section framework rep-
resents only a benchmark for the analysis. It does not tell us what struc-
tural changes should take place.
2 As a criterion for the selection of the best estimates from several dif-
ferent types of regression functions, the error of the regression stan-
dardized by the mean of the dependent variable, has been preferred to
the usual coefficient of determination R^, for the latter is influenced not
only by the deviations of the actual data from the estimated regression
function, but also by the elasticity of the dependent variable with respect
to the independent - which is of no importance for the descriptive power
of the regression function with respect to the underlying observations.
See also Hiemenz, Schatz [1975, pp. 6 ff. j .
3 One could also have included population to reflect the influence of the
size of the domestic market on the production and employment struc-
tures, working through constraints on the exploitation of economies of
scale. We have found this variable to be statistically insignificant in de-48
Table 9 - Cross-Section Regression Analysis of Value Added and Em-
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Source: OECD [a; c] . - Own calculations.
termining economy-wide structural patterns. The explanation may lie
in the fact that scale disadvantages resulting from narrow domestic mar-
kets can be overcome by integrating the production into the world econ-
omy, as did happen in reality.49
Figure 2 - Sectoral Contribution to Gross Domestic Product Accord-
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Source: Tables 9 and 10.50
port to the well known Fischer-Clark-Fourastie three-sector hypoth-
esis. This hypothesis predicts that, as a result of both demand and
supply factors (different income elasticities of demand and changes
in relative factor prices and comparative advantages), the primary
sector will decline relative to rising per capita income levels. The
secondary sector gains weight up to a certain income level (around
4,700 US-$ per capita for our sample) and then again loses signifi-
cance, whereas the tertiary sector usually exhibits an upward trend
for a wide range of income levels. These sectoral shifts over time
concern both the shares of value added and of employment.
The estimated regression coefficients have been used to compute hy-
pothetical structures of the new entrants for the years 1960, 1970
and 1979 (Tables 10 and II)
1. Comparing the actual structures with
these hypothetical ones, we obtain some considerable differences. As
to value added, Spain seems to come close to the "typical" patterns
of development (Table 10 and Figure 2). However, the service sec-
tor, which was below the hypothetical level in 1960, has grown more
rapidly than "normal", thereby exceeding the hypothetical level in
1979. Only recently has the economy become less agricultural and
less industrialized in terms of value added than might have been ex-
pected.
By contrast, the Greek economic structure differs quite markedly
from the hypothetical one. The industrial and the manufacturing sec-
tor present an increasingly poor performance measured by inter-
national standards, whereas the agricultural sector has become sub-
stantially over-sized. If one additionally takes into account that the
services sector is much larger than is "normal", Greece seems to
be an economy that displays reluctance with regard to structural
change.
Significant structural divergences from the international pattern are
observable in the case of Portugal, too. The shares of the industrial
and the manufacturing sector have been consistently above the hypo-
thetical levels. Yet the divergence decreased during the 1960s. The
1 Since the functions have been estimated separately, it cannot be ex-
pected that the percentage value added and employment shares which can
be calculated for the individual sectors from the regression results add
up to exactly 100 percent. As a matter of fact, however, there are only
slight divergences from the 100 percent value. In order to reach formal
correctness, we have adjusted the calculated shares for each sector by
distributing the divergences according to the relative sectoral weights
to yield a sum of 100 percent.51
Table 10 - Hypothetical and Actual Composition of Gross Domestic








































































































































functions based on a cross-section analysis of OECD countries in 1975. - As-
average growth rate of GDP per capita of 3 percent. -
 C1978.
Source: OECDlcl . - Donges [1976b] . - Own calculations.
shares of the agricultural sector and the services sector, which were
well below expectation in the 1960s, have come closer to the hypo-
thetical values, too. In the 1970s, however, the differences between
actual and hypothetical values have tended to increase again (Fig-
ure 2).
A more or less similar picture emerges for the composition of em-
ployment by economic sectors, for which hypothetical structures
have also been computed (Table 11). It should be mentioned, how-
ever, that in Greece the services sector shows slightly lower (rath-
er than higher) shares than one would expect of a "typical" country
with a similar per capita income. This seems to indicate a particu-
larly high productivity of this sector in Greece. In Spain, the shares
of the industrial and the manufacturing sector in 1960 were consider-
ably above the hypothetical levels, whereas the value added shares
did not exceed them so much. This might be taken as an indication
of less favourable productivity developments within these sectors.52
Table 11 - Hypothetical and Actual Participation of Economic Activi-
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Source: OECD [a]. - Own calculations.
Turning to the manufacturing industry, we have also estimated "typ-
ical" patterns of value added and employment, based on a cross-sec-
tion analysis of 28 industrial branches (three-digit ISIC). The esti-
mated regression functions are shown in Table 12. Apart from per
capita income, two additional explanatory variables proved to be sig-
nificant for some branches: One is population, which seems to affect
the demand for a number of industrial products and thereby also the
degree of labour absorption of various branches; the other variable
is the relative degree of industrialization, which indicates the effects
of complementarities and economies of scale, which for some indus-
tries seem to be important.
The cross-section analysis enables a grouping of the manufacturing
industries in four categories. The first category contains various in-
dustries (such as tobacco manufactures, textiles, pottery, glass and
other non-metallic mineral products) that decline with respect to theirTable 12 - Cross-Section Regression Analysis
8 of Value Added and Employment Shares of
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Source : OECD [a; c] . - UN [c] . - Own calculations.56
contribution to GDP and to their absorption of labour force
1 both in
relatively highly developed and in less developed countries, and which
usually lead the process of growth in manufacturing in the early phases
of industrialization only. No doubt, at a low development level these
activities show an income elasticity of domestic demand clearly above
unity; and in the course of the international division of labour they
may in fact - because of their high labour intensities - experience an
extensive growth in developing countries. However, as the develop-
ment level increases to levels of the OECD countries referred to here,
their significance is likely to decrease, at first proportionately, then
even absolutely, and other industries will take over the leading role
in the industrial development.
The second category includes activities whose shares in GDP and to-
tal employment within the per capita income range of OECD countries
reach a maximum (such as food and beverages, wearing apparel,
leather products and footwear, furniture, plastics, rubber and fab-
ricated metal products as well as "other industries", including jewel-
lery, musical instruments, sporting goods and toys). These products
are often related to higher levels of consumption. However, some of
the industries producing these goods typically are relatively labour-
intensive. Therefore, countries with a high income level will be sub-
ject to increasing competition from less developed countries, especial-
ly the NICs, which will lead to a relative decline of these activities.
Industries belonging to the third group are those which may increase
their proportion of value added and employment throughout the devel-
opment process, particularly in highly developed countries, at the
expense of all other manufacturing activities. Examples are paper
products, printed matter, non-ferrous metals and all capital goods
except fabricated metal products. One may regard them as modern
growth industries. Income elasticities of demand for their products
are high and they are relatively research-, skill- and capital-inten-
sive. Due to their factor endowments, highly industrialized coun-
tries, and therefore most EC member states, have a comparative
advantage in these industries.
1 Contrary to an earlier analysis [Krieger, 1980, pp. 151 ff. ] , the con-
tribution to value added and the share in employment have been related
in this study to the total economy and not to the manufacturing sector.
For the hypothetical structure, however, the results calculated from
the regression functions have afterwards been expressed as percentages
of the manufacturing total.57
The shaping of the fourth group is more ambiguous. Of the two inde-
pendent variables, which have been taken into consideration in ad-
dition to the development level, the degree of industrialization has
a positive (and statistically significant) impact on the production of
textiles, footwear, furniture, plastics, pottery, chemicals, rubber,
glass products, non-metal products, iron and steel, fabricated metal
products, machinery, electrical machinery and professional goods;
evidently intra-industrial interdependences support the demand for
these goods. This is particularly true for those industries whose re-
gression functions show higher B-weights for the variable "degree of
industrialization" than for the income variable, like iron and steel
producing, also the production of chemicals, glass products and elec-
trical machinery
1. By an increased demand from other industries,
such industries may be enabled to draw upon economies of scale, to
take advantage of specialization, and to strengthen their international
competitiveness. The second additional independent variable, popula-
tion size, is correlated negatively to food processing and beverages,
and to the wood industry, and positively to refineries. With respect
to these industries, the size of the domestic market obviously plays
a role. In the cases of the wood industry, the refineries and iron and
steel we find an extremely high standard deviation, indicating that
the size of these industries is shaped to a large extent by other than
the tested variables. Finally, there seems to be no unequivocal cor-
relation between the development level and the manufacturing of pe-
troleum and coal products: the independent variables show different
signs in the regression equations, according to whether one considers
value added or employment. Given the heterogeneity of relationships,
we have included those industries in the fourth category that have
proved dependent to a particularly small degree on the development
level: iron and steel, chemicals, wood manufactures, petroleum re-
fineries, petroleum and coal products.
1 The 6-weight can be taken as a measure for the relative contribution
of the various independent variables in the regression to the changes




Sx. = standard deviation of the independent variable x.. -
Sy = standard deviation of the dependent variable. -
g. = estimated regression coefficient of x..58
Tables 13 and 14 provide the hypothetical and the actual structures
of the manufacturing industries in the three countries. Analyzing the
discrepancies between hypothetical and actual structures one again
finds marked differences between the Three. The traditional indus-
tries, which are of specific importance in the early phases of indus-
trialization, have a share more or less in line with hypothetical struc-
tures in Portugal, whereas their share is larger in Greece and smal-
ler in Spain (Table 14). Within this group the textile industry is of
outstanding significance. In Portugal it accounted for 14. 9 percent
of manufacturing value added (as compared to a hypothetical share
of 14. 7 percent) in 1977, in Greece for 11.1 percent (9. 4 percent)
in 1975, and in Spain for only 6. 7 percent (8.4 percent) in 1976. Ap-
parently the relatively high (Greece) or low (Spain) importance of the
old, traditional industries can be explained at least in part by these
differences in the textile industry's significance.
The second group of industries, characterized by fast growth in less
developed, and by a relative shrinkage in highly developed countries,
shows, as expected, an actual share of value added that exceeds the
hypothetical one in the case of Portugal and Spain. In Greece the ac-
tual share was lower than the hypothetical one in 1975, but much
higher five years earlier. This seems to point out again that the Greek
industrial structure was still relatively little developed. The differ-
ential between actual and hypothetical shares is considerably high in
Portugal, mainly due to Portuguese food processing which yields a
particularly high contribution to value added, whereas Spanish food
processing already shows quite low shares.
The modern growth industries, that are of specific interest for high-
ly developed countries, are roughly in line with expectations in Spain.
In Greece, however, and more significantly in Portugal, they con-
tribute less to total value added than may be expected from the hypo-
thetical patterns. Yet in all three countries some, though not the
same, capital goods industries yield higher actual shares than would
correspond to the hypothetical structure. This seems to indicate that
the three countries do not follow quite the same pattern in their pro-
cess of industrial diversification. Apart from differences in com-
parative cost advantages, government interventions have presumably
also contributed to these development peculiarities.
For the fourth category, industries with a low correlation to the de-
velopment level, one may notice at first that they are partly char-
acterized by natural-resource intensity which may give a country
a comparative advantage, independent of its per capita income. ATable 13 - Hypothetical and Actual Composition of Industrial Value Added in Greece, Portugal
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Source : UN [c ] . - Own calculations and estimates.60
Table 14 - Hypothetical and Actual Composition of Industrial Value
Added in Greece, Portugal and Spain - Industrial Cate-
gories


























































































case in point, for instance, is the Portuguese wood industry, which
can rely on a high domestic supply of cork for processing (cork it-
self is also an important export article). Secondly, a number of ac-
tivities, in particular iron and steel, are subject to various types
of government interventions aimed at fostering their growth. Again,
one need not wonder that the development level hardly explains the
performance.
Turning to the employment structure, the hypothetical shares of in-
dustries in employment differ significantly in many cases from their
shares in value added (Tables 15 and 16). This points to divergences
in labour productivity between individual industries, which are of
course not unexpected as they reflect differences in production tech-
niques and thus unequal labour absorption. With regard to the four
industry categories mentioned above, labour productivity is lowest
in the traditional industries (first category), and roughly as low inTable 15 - Hypothetical
8 and Actual Composition of Industrial Employment in Greece, Portugal
and Spain






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source : UN [ c i . - Own calculations and estimates.62
Table 16 - Hypothetical and Actual Composition of Industrial Employ-
ment in Greece, Portugal and Spain - Industrial Catego-
ries








































































































the industries of the second category. Labour productivity is by no
means highest in the modern growth industries, which form the third
category, but in the raw-material-intensive industries belonging to
the fourth category. The ratio between the share in value added and
the share in employment ranges from around 0. 80 (in the traditional
sector) up to 1.50 (in the raw-material-intensive category); it tends
to be relatively stable across the development levels under considera-
tion.
If one compares the hypothetical patterns of productivity to the ac-
tual ones, some interesting features emerge. Spain's productivity
structure was relatively close to normal values in 1970 as well as
more recently. Greece has been lagging behind usual productivity
achievements substantially with regard to the fourth category of in-
dustries; on the whole, however, differences diminished during the63
1970s. Portugal, which showed a productivity structure close to the
hypothetical pattern in the early 1970s, has experienced a significant
deterioration with regard to the category of raw-material-intensive
industries. Of course, individual industries within the four catego-
ries diverge from these global developments in some cases. Exam-
ples are the Spanish textile industry, which proved to be more pro-
ductive, and Spain's food processing industry, which proved to be less
productive than was assumed. Another example is food processing
in Greece, which yielded higher rather than lower productivities com-
pared to the hypothetical ones.
To summarize: The analysis of industrial structures yields a picture
similar to that of sectoral structures. Both Greece's industrial and
its sectoral structures would be more typical of a country with a
lower level of development, and Portugal's of a country with a higher
level of development. By contrast, Spain on the whole fits relatively
well into "typical" patterns of development.
A major reason for the different situation of the three countries with
regard to hypothetical structures seems to be the size of their domes-
tic markets which offered quite different growth opportunities to cer-
tain industries while the integration into foreign markets was largely
inhibited. Diversification and specialization thus had to evolve isolated
from the international division of labour. The larger a domestic mar-,
ket is in such cases, the less severe are the consequences of such
isolation. Thus in the case of Greece its small size was particularly
influential on the shaping of its economic structures. Portugal
1 s do-
mestic market is also quite small. The large industrial and manufac-
turing sector, unusual according to development patterns, may be
traced to the fact that Portugal was able to enter a process of divi-
sion of labour with its colonies, since with them trade was partially
liberalized, as Table 17 reveals. The high shares of exports and im-
ports in relation to GDP which Portugal showed as early as 1960,
compared to those shown by Greece and Spain, were almost exclusive-
ly due to trade with its colonies. Spain has the largest domestic mar-
ket among the Three. The fact that its industrialization appeared ex-
aggerated until recently may be traced to the import-substituting poli-
cies pursued during the period of autarky, which led to a number of
new, though little efficient, industries.
Discrepancies between actual structures of production and employ-
ment and typical structures with respect to the development level, how-
ever, need not necessarily indicate allocative distortions only. In par-
ticular, endowment with natural resources - existence or non-exis-64




































































































































































































































































Source: OECD (c; d ] . - UN [a ] . - Own calculations.65
tence of raw materials, quality of soils, climate - or special skills
acquired through having a tradition in the production of certain goods
or services, may yield comparative advantages or disadvantages for
some economic sectors, and explain deviations from hypothetical
structures. This might also be the case with some branches in the
three countries. However, considering all the characteristics of the
new entrants as described above, and taking into account an often
slow pace of the restructuring process, one may guess that the dis-
crepancies between actual and hypothetical structures also indicate,
at least partially, the consequences of suboptimal policies
1. With the
entry into the Community a number of those government interven-
tions and restrictions that still (or: again)~ exist, in spite of the pe-
riod of liberalization during the 1960s, will have to be abandoned.
This will represent a new challenge to the three economies, and the
hypothetical structures suggest that Greece and Portugal, too, are
perhaps less fit to cope with it than Spain.
4. Outlook
The hypothetical structures do not only reveal distortions of resource
allocation, but may also help to shed some light on future develop-
ments, in particular those induced by the accession of the three coun-
tries to the Community. On the one hand, the accession itself will
require these countries to undergo profound structural adjustments.
On the other hand, the process of economic growth within the EC 12
will naturally imply further changes of the structure of production
and employment. Greece, Portugal and Spain are still expanding with
respect to industry and manufacturing, in contrast to most EC 9 coun-
tries, in which these sectors are already relatively declining. Spain's
industrial share, however, may soon stagnate and within the next ten
years may perhaps even gradually enter the phase of decline [see also
Donges, 1981a] . The services sector, of course, will expand, too,
in the three countries. By contrast, agriculture should experience
a remarkable decline, provided that new national or EC market reg-
ulations concerning Mediterranean goods do not exert an influence
to the contrary.
According to the "typical" patterns of development, the agricultural
sector in Greece should lose about one half of all persons presently
1 For more detailed analyses of the process of structural change, partic-
ularly in industry, see Humment 1977 ] , Esser et\l. [ 1977 J and Donges
[1976b] .66
engaged in it until 1990. In Portugal, the respective figure should
amount to about a quarter of today's employment in agriculture, and
in Spain to more than one third (Table 11; see also Krieger [1980,
pp. 157 ff. ] ). This surplus of rural labour should be absorbed in
Greece in the first place by the industrial sector, and in Portugal and
Spain mainly by the services sector. Some pressure for emigration
will remain, however.
As we have said before, the growth patterns reflect an average de-
velopment, as it may result from the international division of labour.
By this process, each country specializes in activities for which it
holds comparative advantages - provided it is not prevented by ad-
ministrative interventions from doing so. At a very low level of de-
velopment, comparative advantages lie in the abundance of cheap la-
bour, and thus labour-intensive techniques should prevail (apart from
cases in which a country is well endowed with natural resources).
When development preceeds and labour becomes relatively scarcer
and more expansive, production processes tend to become more and
more capital-intensive, i.e. the amount of physical capital per em-
ployee increases. In highly developed countries another factor be-
comes critical, namely skills of different kinds or human capital
1.
Greece, Portugal and Spain are at a medium level of development.
Labour-intensive techniques are still quite adequate in several ac-
tivities, but as wages rise - and the accession to the EC could easi-
ly give wages another push - labour productivities and thus capital
intensities will also have to rise, in order to maintain the competi-
tiveness of the economies (in particular vis-a-vis the developing
countries). As far as this has already happened in a sector or indus-
try which should decline according to international patterns, the de-
velopment prospects based on inter-country patterns must be quali-
fied. By the same token, if a sector with "typically" high growth
prospects proves to be traditionally little productive in a given coun-
try, we may assume that it will grow only slowly in this country,
unless productivity increases as much as is necessary to attain in-
ternational competitiveness
2 .
1 A comprehensive empirical analysis of the changing pattern of com-
parative advantages in the process of economic development is given
by Balassa [1979] .
2 Of course, there is a third possibility: productivity differentials within
an economy can be maintained if there is a corresponding differentia-
tion of wages (this was observable so far in the case of agriculture in
all three countries, cf. Table 6). In the course of the development pro-
cess, however, such remainders of a dualistic economy tend to disap-
pear and wages of workers whose productivity increases little or not at
all tend to rise at the same pace as wages related to rapid productivity
growth.67











































































Source: Tables 10 and 11.
Table 18 shows that the agricultural sector yields the relatively
lowest labour productivity/highest labour intensity in Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain, a performance that fits with the predictions based
on the hypothetical patterns. The industrial and the services sec-
tor, which have an average and an above-average labour productivi-
ty, respectively, in Greece and Spain, are also "typical" in this re-
gard. This is different in the case of Portugal, however, where the
industrial and - even more pronounced - the manufacturing sector
exhibit a particularly high labour productivity, which may result
from a high capital intensity. This may be at variance with the still
high underemployment and high unemployment rates prevailing in
Portugal.68
Within the manufacturing sector, the traditional industries, which .
would be expected to decline according to the inter-country patterns,
show astonishingly high capital intensities in some cases, as for ex-
ample tobacco manufactures in Portugal and Spain and, to a lesser
extent, glass producing in Greece and non-metallic mineral products
in both Iberian countries (Table 19). One might expect these indus-
tries to be run at X-efficiency levels that are high enough to with-
stand competition even from countries in which wage levels are sig-
nificantly lower. By contrast, the quite important textile industry is
likely to decline, not only because of the "typical-pattern" effect,
but also in view of the high labour intensity which, at prevailing
wages, will put many firms under increasing competitive pressure
from abroad.
The second category of industries (those that are still growing at the
development level of the Three, but are declining in higher devel-
oped countries) in many cases display below-average capital intensi-
ties. Wearing apparel, footwear, furniture and fixtures and the "oth-
er industries" are cases in point. We might assume that these in-
dustries are not very likely to stimulate the development process in
the three economies - contrary to what one would expect in "re-
presentative" countries where these industries would be more la-
bour-intensive. However, plastic and rubber products and, in the
case of Portugal, metal products as well may succeed in becoming
expanding industries even under free-trade conditions.
Several of the so-called modern industries still show below-average
capital intensities, particularly in Greece and Spain, measured by
a national yardstick. This suggests that these industries are still
far from EC 9 standards, all the more so, since the average capital
intensity in the industry of each of the new entrants might lie con-
siderably below the EC 9 average. Thus the growth prospects of
these industries are quite uncertain, especially in the case in Greece.
Their situation is more favourable in Portugal and Spain, where at
least human capital intensities exceed the national average, in some
cases even considerably.
Needless to say, that the future path of development of individual
sectors will be influenced to a significant extent by the economic
policies which both the new-member governments and the EC pursue.
If economic growth, and for this matter structural change, is to
take place at a reasonable rate, the authorities will have to refrain
from intervening selectively in the market with the aim of rescuing
declining and inherently inefficient industries (as has happened soTable 19 Capital Intensities in the Manufacturing Industries
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often in the past). Only if structural adjustment is permitted and en-
couraged, will the dynamic industries increasingly generate employ-
ment opportunities at rising real wages in the future. The economic
policies will also have an impact on the pattern of specialization with-
in the enlarged Community, a subject to which we are now turning.71
III. Patterns of Specialization in an Enlarged Community
In the manufacturing sector the EC 9 has come closest to the concept
of a common market as envisaged by the Treaty of Rome. The south-
ern enlargement will evidently increase the size of the market. This
chapter tries to assess changes in the division of labour in manufac-
tured goods within the Community of the Twelve
1. The first section
briefly reviews major trends in manufactured trade of the applicant
countries and the EC 9. Next, the structure of specialization and in-
ternational competitiveness is analyzed. This is followed by an eval-
uation of potential trade and growth effects for the new entrants. The
final sections assess future adjustment needs and opportunities and
discuss policies which support changes in the division of labour with-
in the enlarged Community.
1. Trade in Manufactures: The Overall Picture
Both in the applicant countries and the EC 9 foreign trade is domi-
nated by manufactured goods. Reflecting the differences in the levels
of per capita income and industrialization, manufactures account for
a larger share in total exports and imports of the EC 9 than in those
of the applicant countries (Table 20). In the combined manufactured
exports of the new entrants the most important product category con-
sists of consumer goods (39 percent of the total in 1979) which are
largely raw-material-intensive or which require much unskilled and
semi-unskilled labour, whereas there is a preponderance of chem-
icals as well as sophisticated machinery and transport equipment
(55 percent), products which generally embody physical and human
capital, in the manufactured exports of the EC 9. As to manufactured
imports, a major proportion falls within investment goods (again 39
percent) in the new entrants as a whole; the EC 9 concentrates its
imports on chemicals (11.5 percent) and also on investment goods
(36 percent). One may already infer from these broad shares that
trade in manufactures tends to be more of an inter-industry nature
in the new entrants, while it assumes a typical intra-industry dimen-
sion in the case of the EC 9 (more about this later).
1 Manufacturing trade according to the UN International Standard Indus-
trial Classification (ISIC); figures have been obtained by converting
trade data reported in the UN Standard International Trade Classifica-
tion (SITC) into three-digit ISIC.72
Table 20 - Share of Manufactured Goods in Total Merchandise Trade















































Source : Calculated from data in UN [a] .
Between 1970 and 1979, the Three shifted their export structure
from traditional primary commodities (mainly food) to manufactures,
thereby confirming a tendency which appeared during the prior de-
cade and which parallels the familiar long-term pattern in the com-
modity composition of world trade. This shift was also policy-deter-
mined. After long periods of import substitution in manufacturing
within the shelter of severe protective barriers, most notably in
Spain, there was a gradual opening to the world economy during the
1960s
1. Since then, domestic and foreign-controlled firms have
found it profitable to produce for the world market, too. After the
first oil-price explosion in 1973 and 1974, when demand conditions
in most industrialized countries became less buoyant than they used
to be, the relative position of manufactured exports deteriorated
slightly in Portugal and more sharply in Spain, whereas it continued
to improve in Greece. As the share of manufactured products in
the Community' s total exports declined during the period under con-
sideration, the overall picture shows the industrial content of the
export assortment to have been more similar between the Three and
the Nine at the end of the past decade than it had been at the begin-
ning.
On the import side, the effect of the two oil-price explosions (in 1973
and 1974 and in 1979) is also discernible. The shares of manufac-
tures were lower in 1974 than in 1970 in the three applicant coun-
tries, which are net importers of oil. For the EC 9, such a move-
For details see Chapter II and the references given there.73
ment does not appear in the statistics because the sharp spurt in oil
prices also inflated the dollar value of imported refined petroleum
(ISIC 353) and other manufactures of petroleum and coal (ISIC 354),
which accounted for 16.1 percent of total manufactured imports in
1974 as compared to 8.4 percent in 1970 (and 14.6 percent in 1979).
In 1979, the relative importance of manufactured imports was lower
than in 19 70 everywhere, though in Greece and Spain still above the
levels of 1974. The recent rapid growth of real GDP in Greece (an-
nually 5. 2 percent in the years 1974 to 1979) also induced a rapid ex-
pansion of the demand for largely complementary foreign manufac-
tures. By contrast, the observed trend in Spain, whose economy ex-
perienced a relatively slow growth during the same period (2 percent
per year), partly reflects a deterioration of the competitive position
of numerous Spanish import-substituting industries as the result of
accelerated inflation and sharp increases in labour costs in the post-
Franco period.
As Table 21 illustrates, the combined manufactured exports of the
new entrants expanded at faster rates than those of the EC 9 and than
world exports. The Three as a whole reported $ 17. 91 billion in man-
ufactured exports in 1979, compared to $ 2. 71 billion in 1970. After
adjusting for world inflation (11.7 percent per year if measured by
the rise in the dollar-unit value index of total manufactured exports
of developed countries), the pace of (real) export expansion remains
notable for the Three combined (averaging 10.4 percent between 1970
and 1979) as well as for Greece and Spain (averaging 12.8 and 11.8
percent, respectively). Portugal's record is much poorer (both in
value and volume terms), which is largely due to the absolute decline
of manufactured exports in 1975 and 1976 that accompanied the dis-
ruptions in production in the aftermath of the Revolution of April
1974
1. More important, however, than the rates of export growth,
is presumably the ever-lengthening list of new industrial exports,
particularly in the case of Spain. Many of the new export items still
account for negligible amounts only (earning not more than $ 1 mil-
lion each), but most of them belong to commodity groups in which
world trade has been expanding relatively fast. Taken together, they
can all be regarded as indications of the potential of the applicant
countries to further diversify their export structure after becoming
members of the Community.
As to the trade relations between the applicant countries and the EC 9,
Table 22 shows that the present Community is not only one of the
1 For an analysis of that period, see Balassa [1980, pp. 640 ff. ] ; Krug-
man, Braga de Macedo(l98l] .74






























Source: Calculated from data in OECD [d] and UN [a I.
most important markets for the Three' s manufactured exports (ab-
sorbing around 49 percent of their total in 1979), but also one of the
main sources of supply of imported industrial goods (with a continued
share of nearly 48 percent). On the other hand, the applicant coun-
tries, taken individually or as a whole, play a minor role both in the
export and import of manufactures of the EC 9 (3 and 2 percent, re-
spectively, in 1979), with Spain being the least unimportant trading
partner among the Three. These discrepancies suggest that the en-
largement of the present Community might affect (adversely and fa-
vourably) the import-substituting and export-oriented industries in
the applicant countries more than those of the EC 9. An additional
indication of the expected differences in the force of the impact re-
sulting from mutual trade flows is given by the fact that each of the
1
new entrants has consistently experienced a deficit in manufacturing
trade with the EC 9. However, these trade deficits are not neces-
sarily bad, as is frequently stressed. Provided that the new entrants
do not pay higher prices for industrial goods imported from the Com-
mon Market than for those available elsewhere, the trade deficits
reflect the extent to which the EC 9 transfers resources to the South,
thereby also improving the division of labour between the Nine and
the Three.75
Table 22 - Manufacturing Trade Relations between Greece, Portugal,
Spain and the EC 9, 1970-19 79 (percent)



























































Source: See Table 20.76
Table 22 also illustrates some other interesting relationships. To
begin with, manufactured goods from the EC 9 lost relative weight
in the Three's import basket throughout the period under considera-
tion, the average share declining from 52.5 percent in 1970 to 47.9
percent in 1979. For the combined exports of the Three, however,
the Common Market has become relatively more important, as the
average share rose from 42.2 to 49.2 percent during the same period.
As overall manufactured imports of the Three have expanded at a rate
similar to that of world imports, the first trend reveals that suppliers
from third countries have become more competitive on the Southern
European markets than manufacturers from the EC 9, particularly
in the case of labour-intensive products. By the same token, indus-
trial exports of the Three have gained shares in the Common Market
at the expense of third countries. Thus, looked at from the viewpoint
of the exporters of the EC 9, manufacturing trade with the Three ap-
pears to have undergone a process of disintegration; as seen by the
exporters of the Three, however, trade with the Community has fol-
lowed a path of increased integration.
Moreover, the trade "matrix between the EC 9 and each of the new
entrants shows different features. The most striking one is the declin-
ing share of the Common- Market in the manufactured exports of
Greece. Given the 1961 Association Agreement between the EC and
Greece provided for an abolition of the Community's CET on and non-
tariff barriers against Greek manufactured supplies, one would have
expected this country's exports to the EC 9 to expand at least at the
same rate as those to other (more protected) economies. This did
indeed happen during the 1960s [Kalamotousakis, 1976, pp. 153 ff. ] .
But the positive impact of the abolition of the Community's trade bar-
riers on Greece's manufactured exports seems to have largely evap-
orated during the 1970s.
By contrast, Portuguese and Spanish manufacturers were able to ex-
pand exports into the Common Market more rapidly than exports to
the rest of the world. A reasonable explanation for this is that both
countries took advantage of preferential trade agreements concluded
with the Community more recently: Portugal, a former member state
of the EFTA, was granted free access to the Common Market in the
industrial field after the Community, in connection with its first en-
largement, had set up a far-reaching free-trade area with the remain-
ing EFTA bloc in 1972 [ Silva Ferreira, 1979] . As far as Spain is
concerned, many industrial exporters obtained improved terms for
penetrating the Common Market, though less generous ones than the77
Greek and the Portuguese have, as a result of a bilateral preferential
trade agreement which became effective in 1970
1.
2. Structure of Specialization and International Competitiveness
In or-der to better assess similarities and peculiarities in the manu-
factured trade ot the Three and the EC 9, it is necessary to take a
less aggregated, and thereby a more "technical" view of the recent
trade performance. For this purpose, the-manufacturing trade sec-
tor has been broken down into 28 three-digit commodity categories
of the ISIC. Three questions are then raised:
- Where do the new entrants, and where does the EC 9, exhibit com-
parative advantages and disadvantages in trade with specific prod-
ucts ?
- To what extent do manufactured exports and imports overlap at the
industry level?
- How does the foreign-trade structure of each of the applicant coun-
tries compare with that of the EC 9?
a. Revealed Comparative Advantages
It is usually recognized that the disaggregated exports of a country
indicate where the domestic industries display international compet-
itiveness, while a country's imports pinpoint where it lacks such com-
petitiveness. Taking___exp.o.rts. and imports .together, a positive (neg-
ative), trade balance may reflect, a^cpmjDaratiye _adyantage..(.disadvan-
tage) in international'trade. Hence, the empirical calculation of the
export-import Balances is properly defined as "revealed compara-
tive advantages" (RCA) in distinction to actual comparative advan-
1 See Donges [1976a, pp. 222 ff. ] for an evaluation of the concessions
made to Spain by the Community. The gradual reductions in the CET
on Spain's manufactured exports, phased over six years, were inter-
rupted when the first enlargement of the EC did not lead to an amend-
ment of the agreement.78
tages and disadvantages as predicted by theory
1.
In fact, RCAs describe the trade patterns that have taken place, but
they cannot tell whether these patterns are optimum ones. It is pos-
sible to infer from them what the countries under consideration have
been able to do in the field of international specialization, not what
they should do on theoretical grounds. For instance, actual trade
flows may differ from those predicted by the theory of comparative
advantage due to distortions originating in import protection or in
export incentives. If one of the applicant countries restricts imports
of certain goods, the RCA of the industry in question might be biased
in an upward direction; by the same token, it might look worse than
it deserves if the EC 9 or other countries impose barriers to Greek,
Portuguese or Spanish manufactured exports. It should also be noted
that the lack of reliable data does not allow an interpretation of RCAs
on the basis of differences in export prices, protective measures,
transport costs, taste structures, traditional ties and the like.




RCA =m(ii : ^—) • 100
1 2 M
. ., l
where X and M denote exports and imports, respectively, and the
subscript i refers to an industry at the three-digit ISIC level. The
higher (lower) the RCA index is, the more (less) successful is the
trade performance of the industry in question.
RCA indexes have been computed for 1970 and 1979, thereby obtain-
ing the longer-term tendencies; for the new entrants, RCAs in trade
with the world have been distinguished from RCAs in trade with the
1 The methodology was originally developed by Balassa [1965] and re-
fined thereafter. The criticism made by Hillman [1980 ] from a theo-
retical point of view is somehow misplaced because those who have been
calculating and analyzing RCAs have never claimed that they were iden-
tifying with certainty actual comparative advantages (which in any case
might be impossible to do in a conceptually and statistically sound way).79
EC 9. The findings, which are shown in Tables 23 and 24, exhibit
in broad terms several notable features:
- the new entrants appear with a strong competitive position in con-
sumer goods industries (particularly beverages, textiles, clothing,
footwear, wo_od_p_rod^cts), and with a comparative disadvantage in
most intermediate and investment goods industries;
- this pattern applies to both trade with the world and trade with the
EC 9, and although there are some differences in ranking according
to RCA values these have become smaller in the case of Portugal
and Spain (where Spearman's rank correlation coefficients were
0.84 and 0.71, respectively, in 1970, and 0. 96 and 0. 87 in 1979),
whereas the differences widened in the case of Greece (reducing
the rank correlation coefficients from 0.94 to 0.87);
- the structure of the new entrants' industries according to RCAs
in world trade has not changed greatly between 1970 and 19 79, the
Spearman's rank correlation coefficients being 0.92 for Greece,
0.89 for Portugal and 0.84 for Spain; however, in trade with the
EC 9, more pronounced changes in the ranking have occurred dur-
ing the same period, reducing the rank correlation coefficients to
0.83, 0.70 and 0.69, respectively;
- the EC 9 seems to be particularly competitive with regard to fab-
ricated metal products, machinery, iron and steel and processed
chemicals, whereas the picture is mixed within the consumer goods
industries; the sectoral ranking has experienced some shifts dur-
ing the 1970s (r = 0.74)
1.
A closer look at the RCAs of the new entrants shows, however, that
apart from the similarities just stated, important differences among
these countries exist. To begin with, the initial international com-
petitiveness of Greece in world trade has increased in seven indus-
tries (food products, textiles, clothing, wood products, diverse non-
metallic mineral products, iron and steel, other industries) and de-
clined in five (beverages, tobacco manufactures, leather products,
footwear, non-ferrous metals). Not surprisingly, many of these prod-
ucts fall into the labour- and/or raw-material-intensive category.
The first group of commodities mentioned above accounted for 50. 6
percent of the Greek manufactured exports in 1979 (43. 1 percent in
1970), the second group for 16.0 (34.8) percent. In trade with the
EC 9, however, the changes in international competitiveness have
1 All rank correlation coefficients mentioned are statistically significant
at the 0.1 percent level of confidence.Table 23 - Revealed Comparative Advantages
a of Greece, Portugal, Spain and the EC 9 in














































































































































































































































































































Source : See Table 20.Table 24 - Revealed Comparative Advantages
8 of Greece, Portugal and Spain in Manufacturing


















































































































































































































































Source : See Table 20.82
run in the opposite direction in the case of food products, diverse
non- metallic mineral products and leather products; for iron and
steel Greece even reveals a distinct comparative disadvantage. On
the whole., Greece resembles quite well the typical pattern of a still
less industrialized, labour-abundant economy. Accordingly, invest-
ment goods accounted for only 9.3 percent of this country's overall
manufactured exports in 1979 (two percentage points above the share
in 1970).
By contrast, neither Portugal nor Spain provide the clear-cut picture
of a developing country whose export structure in the field of manu-
factures is dominated by traditional labour- and raw-material-inten-
sive branches. This is particularly noteworthy as far as Portugal is
concerned, since its per capita income is lower than that of Greece.
Portugal also exhibits international competitiveness in world trade
mainly in the consumer goods industries, though not always in the
same branches as Greece does (food products, tobacco manufactures)
but partly even in different branches (paper products, glass prod-
ucts). It seems, however, that Portugal has advanced more in the
up-grading of consumer goods. For instance, in contrast to Greece,
the competitive advantages are distinctly greater in clothing than in
textiles, and while in leather and leather products even a disadvan-
tage exists, the shoe industry appears to be extraordinarily competi-
tive. The latter industry has achieved an almost uninterrupted in-
crease in competitiveness, as well as paper products and rubber man-
ufactures. Clothing, footwear, paper and rubber accounted for 27.1
percent of total manufactured exports in 19 79 as compared to 20.2
percent in 1970. It is also interesting to note the change from neg-
ative to positive RCAs which the Portuguese electrical machinery
has undergone in world trade as well as in trade with the EC 9, ad-
ding another 7.2 percent to total manufactured exports in 1979 (6 per-
cent in 19 70). The inflow of private export-oriented direct invest-
ment from abroad (mainly from the United Kingdom, Germany and
the United States) made an important contribution to this develop-,
ment [Donges, 1980a] and may explain, at least partly, why Por-I
tugal, in spite of its lower per capita income, seems to be indus-
trially more advanced than Greece, which did not attract much in-
vestment of this type.
The fact that Spain is the industrially most advanced country among
the Three (Chapter II) should be reflected in its structure of RCAs.
While it is true that Spain, like Greece and Portugal, reveals inter-
national competitiveness in most consumer goods industries, these
account for a much smaller proportion of total manufactured exports.83
The "early" industries (such as textiles, clothing, footwear, and leath-
er products) have a much lower share in Spain's total (9. 3 percent
in 1970 and 1979) than they have in Portugal (19.0 and 24. 9 percent
in the respective years) and in Greece (14. 6 and 22.0 percent). More-
over, clothing, footwear and leather products have lost competitive-
ness in world trade, which in part can be traced to the rapidly rising
labour costs in Spain since 1975, which caused Spanish suppliers to
be driven out of third markets (mainly the United States) by exporters
from developing countries (particularly East Asian and Latin American
ones). On the other hand, Spain has been able to reduce an initial un-
competitiveness or to achieve competitiveness in world trade with a
number of intermediate goods (such as chemicals, iron and steel, non-
ferrous metals) and investment goods (most notably transport equip-
ment). The share of investment goods in total manufactured exports
alone increased from 30.2 to 42. 3 percent during the period under
observation; in trade with the EC 9, the Spanish investment goods in-
dustries performed even better, rising their share in total manufac-
tured exports to the Common Market from 25. 7 to 45. 6 percent. All
this is a good illustration of how a comparative advantage changes as
a result of labour becoming more expensive and human and physical
capital becoming less scarce.
As the RCA indices are based on actual export and import flows, trade
policy interventions, especially in the form of tariff and non-tariff
barriers on imports, could distort the results, whereas export promo-
tion measures are usually less significant. Following a common prac-
tice in this type of analyses, we have therefore also estimated Jthe;
structure^oXinternational competitiveness based on_relative..expjsrt
shares only. The measure used for calculating "comparative export










where the new subscripts j and w refer to the country in question and
the world, respectively. An index value above unity means that the
particular commodity group has a greater share in total manufac-
tured exports of the individual country than it has in world trade as
a whole; thus, the country in question possesses a relative advan-84
tage in manufacturing and exporting this product. The opposite holds
for index values below unity.
The results are reported in Table 25. In the case of the new entrants,
the patterns of RCAs based on export-import ratios are generally
confirmed by the CEP indices: the rank correlation coefficients be-
tween these two sets of indicators are 0. 89 (1970) and 0. 85 (1979)
for Greece, 0.8 7 and 0.84 for Portugal, and 0.77 in both years for
Spain. Thus the new entrants appear again to be in a favourable posi-
tion with regard to raw-material- and labour-intensive products and
at a comparative disadvantage in the production and exporting of
goods embodying considerable physical capital, skills and research
efforts. Whatever the impact of import-restricting devices at the
level of individual industries may be, it does not appear to have coun-
teracted comparative advantages.
We observe reasonably clear sectoral rankings at both ends of the
list of industries: Greece appears to lead in the export of tobacco
manufactures, leather products, non-metallic mineral products as
well as, in 1979, refined petroleum and textiles; glass products,
professional goods, non-electrical machinery, transport equipment
and, in 1979, printed matter are at the bottom of the list. The Por-
tuguese possess a relative advantage in beverages, clothing, textiles
and recently also in footwear and rubber products; non-ferrous met-
als, petroleum products, transport equipment, tobacco manufactures
and refined petroleum rank at the end. In the case of Spain, we find
more pronounced changes during the time period under consideration
at both the top and the bottom end of the list; only footwear, bever-
ages and leather manufactures are at the top, and only tobacco manu-
factures and professional goods rank at the bottom end in 1970 as
well as in 1979, while printed matter fell from the fourth down to
the twenty-seventh position during this period.
By contrast, no sharp picture emerges for the EC 9. The correspon-
dence between the CEP and the RCA indices is rather weak, the rank
correlation coefficients being 0.33 and 0.28 in 1970 and 1979J re-
spectively. A possible explanation for this is that the creation of the
Common Market has led to a process of industrial diversification
which embodies much intra-industry (rather than inter-industry) spe-
cialization. It is obvious that a large market combined with a com-
prehensive factor endowment and high technological standards per-
mits manufacturing and exporting almost in every field within the
industrial spectrum. The export structure then becomes quite uni-
form. Accordingly, the standard deviation of the comparative-ex-Table 25 - Comparative Export Performance Coefficients
8 of Greece, Portugal, Spain and















































































































































































































































































































Source : Calculated from data in OECD [d] and UN [a ] .86
port-performance coefficients of the EC 9 is rather low (0.269 in
1979), while it is much higher in Greece (1.840), Portugal (1. 731)
and Spain (1.083).
b. Trade Overlap
We now turn to the second question and consider the overall impor-
tance for the new entrants as well as for the EC 9 ofintra-industry
m_comparison with int_er-industry specialization in international trade
with-manufactures. For this purpose,^ country-specific "trade over-









T, (X. + M.)
1
 1
where X. and M. refer to exports and imports, respectively, of each
of the 28 three-digit ISIC industry categories i, and "min" defines
the magnitude of the total manufactured trade which overlaps in dol-
lar value terms. The coefficient can vary between 0 and +1. The
closer it comes jtcTunrfj}, the_jnorej.ntra-industry specialization pre-
dominates, i.e. the more are exports of a particular industry
matched by imports belonging to the same product category. The
lower the coefficient is, the more does trade in manufactured goods
take the form of inter-industry specialization.
The findings are presented in Table 26. As one should expect, the
TO coefficient are markedly higher for the EC 9 than for any of the
applicant countries. Of the Community's global trade in manufactured
goods, four-fifths overlap. This underlines how important specializa-
tion within industrial branches has become as a result of the~rimoval
"of intra-EC tradlTBarriers and the widening of national markets.
Among the new entrants, Spain comes closest to the TO coefficients
found for the EC 9. More than half of the value of manufactured ex-
1 For details on the methodology and its analytical applications see Fin-
ger and DeRosa [1979] .87
Table 26 - Trade Overlap Coefficients
8 for Greece, Portugal, Spain










































Source: See Table 20.
ports to both the world and the Common Market is matched by im-
ports. By contrast, Greece's trade still reflects mainly inter-indus-
try specialization, as one would expect of a country in which indus-
trial development has not led to much product differentiation yet. Por-
tugal's trade already includes a higher proportion of differentiated
products than Greece's trade, but markedly less than Spain's trade.
Thus, the TO coefficients identify Portugal as a country which oc-
cupies an intermediate position among the Three in terms of relative
industrial maturity.
It should also be noted that manufactured trade of the applicant coun-
tries with the EC 9 generally overlaps less than their world trade.
One may interpret this finding as the reflection of more distinct dif-
ferences in relative'cds'ts with regard to the Community than to the
world as a whole, where the exchange of manufactured goods also
takes place with a number of semi-industrial countries which are
quite similar to the applicant countries in many respects. The evolu-
tion of TO coefficients over time shows, however, that the new en-
trants increased their proportion of intra-trade in exports to and im-
ports from the EC 9. This is particularly evident in the case of Spain.
c. Conformity of Trade Structures
Another approach to the specialization issue is to compare the de-
gree of correspondence between foreign-trade structures in manu-
facturing (rather than between foreign-trade values). The following88
well known trigonometric formula can be used for calculating coef-
ficients of trade conformity:
28
T. X.. • M. .
cos (X.,M.) =
28 28
where X.. represents the vector of the shares of the exports of the
three-digit ISIC industry i to the region j in total manufactured ex-
ports to the region j, and M.. stands for the vector of the correspond-
ing import shares. The possible values of this coefficient of confor-
mity range from 0 to +1 , as is the case with the TO indices. When
it tends towards unity, the export and import structuresjaecome more
similar and specialization is increasingly of an intra-industry nature.
Irijturn, low coefficients of trade conformity point to dissimilarities
between the export and import structures and thus to inter-industry
specialization.
The findings, which are reported in Table 2 7, support our earlier
results regarding the magnitude of trade overlap. Four features are
particularly noteworthy: to begin with, the EC 9 and the applicant
countries have rather similar import structures in their world trade
with manufactures. The coefficients of trade conformity range from
0.855 (Greece in 1970) to 0.965 (Portugal in 1979). By contrast, the
export structures reveal a considerable degree of dissimilarity,
though a decreasing one, in the case of Greece and Portugal where
the coefficients, in 1979, were 0.546 and 0.680, respectively. All
this leads to the hypothesis that the EC 9, and even Spain, has a
greater capacity than Greece and Portugal to manufacture goods for
which both import demand and world demand is especially strong.
Secondly, there is much more similarity between the structure of
Spain's total exports and the structure of the Community's imports
from the world (the coefficients of trade conformity are approximate-
ly 0. 9 in 1979) than between the baskets of the EC 9 and Greece on
the one hand (0. 688) and Portugal on the other (0. 679). Apart from
this, the goods which the Greek and the Portuguese industries sell
in the world market are to a large extent complementary to the ex-
ports of the EC 9, i.e. they belong to those product categories in89
Table 27 - Coefficients of Conformity
8 of the Manufactured Trade




























































































Source : See Table 20.90
which the Community has comparative disadvantages (mainly con-
sumer goods). By comparison herewith, exporters of the EC 9 and
Spain compete much more with each other on the world market. Given
the structure of the Community's total imports, the enlargement could
generate trade diversion to the benefit of Greece and Portugal, whose
exports to the Nine would increase at the expense of third countries;
the scope for diverting the Community's import demand to Spain would
be relatively smaller.
Thirdly, the structure of the applicant countries' exports to the Com-
mon Market and the structure of the Community imports from the
world are more dissimilar (in 1979, the coefficients were 0. 618 for
Greece, 0.606 for Portugal and 0.865 for Spain) than the structure
of total exports of the Three and total imports of the EC 9 referred
to above. One may infer from these differences that, given the Com-
munity's import structure, the applicant countries, in particular
Greece and Portugal, could have exported more to the Common Mar-
ket than they actually did. The opposite seems to hold with respect
to the Community's exports to the Three; that export structure is
quite similar to the structure of the total imports of Greece (0. 933
in 1979), Portugal (0.926) and Spain (0.839). It is interesting to see,
however, that the coefficients of conformity declined during the period
under observation, most notably in the case of Portugal and Spain.
Presumably, these two countries have been intensifying specializa-
tion in trade with less industrialized countries and have thereby in-
creased imports from those areas at the expense of purchases in the
Common Market.
Finally, the structure of exports of the EC 9 to Greece, Portugal and
Spain and the structure of exports of these countries to the Communi-
ty are more dissimilar than the respective total export baskets. In
1979, the coefficients of trade conformity were 0. 325 for Greece,
0.491 for Portugal and 0.780 for Spain, as compared to 0.546, 0.680
and 0.920, respectively. These differences, which were more or less
as pronounced in 19 70, could be indicative of the existence of a con-
siderable, though still unexploited, potential for intra-industry trade
between the new entrants and the EC 9.
3. Potential Trade Expansion by the New Entrants
In all likelihood, the mutual removal of tariffs and other trade bar-
riers, once the agreements of accession become effective, holds the91
prospect of some trade expansion for the Three and the Nine. How-
ever, it is impossible to predict with certainty the amount of_trade
expansion. Compa'rative advantages continually shift in the context
6T~a~gfcTwing world economy and so do demand patterns at home and
abroad; there is technological progress, and the number of industri-
alizing countries increases. Moreover, trade flows within the en-
larged Community will be influenced by the way in which the enlarge-
ment is carried through, especially by the time-table for mutual re-
ductions of tariff and non-tariff barriers and for the harmonization
of the Common External Tariff; this is a matter for negotiation, the
results of which are often subjected to revision. Equally important
is the way in which the present member states of the Community, the
applicant countries and third countries shape their economic policies,
particularly with respect to sectoral development and trade orienta-
tion. Rather than attempting to forecast intra-Community trade flows
which the enlargement may imply, we therefore restrict the scope
of the analysis to the static effects of mutual trade liberalization as
perceived by the applicant countries, whose dominant buyer and sup-
plier is the EC 9.
The probable trade-expanding effects may operate mainly on the im-
port side, since the applicant countries are more protectionist than
the EC 9. Following the Viner-Meade approach to customs-union
theory, the import expansion effects can be disentangled into "trade
creation" (in which case imports from low-cost producers in the EC
9 increase at the expense of high-cost producers in the applicant coun-
try) and "trade diversion" (implying the substitution of imports from
higher-cost suppliers in the Community for imports from lower-cost
producers in non-EC countries). The quantification of trade crea-
tion (TC) and trade diversion (TD) has been made using the following
formulae
1:
TC. = My. [At. : (1 + t. )] and
l li i I
TD. = TC (M
n : 0. )
i i l l
See Baldwin, Murray [1977, pp. 32-33] . It is assumed that the appli-
cant country's production, its imports from the EC 9 as well as those
from third countries are equally substitutable; disaggregated estimates
on substitution elasticities are not available. Moreover, we compare
the full integration situation with the pre-accession one, thereby ignor-92
e n
where M and M are the pre-accession imports of the applicant coun-
try from the EC 9 and non-EC countries, respectively; p repre-
sents the price elasticity of import demand, t the initial import tariff
rate on imports from the Common Market and 0 domestic production
in the applicant country, while the subscript i refers to the industry
group.
Obviously, the potential increase of imports as a proportion of the
initial size of import trade depends on two major factors. One is the
level of tariffs prior to the enlargement, the other is the price elas-
ticity of import demand (which is assumed not to be influenced by
the accession). These two factors determine the size of price changes
following the abolition of tariffs in the process of the applicant coun-
try's full integration into the Community.
Table 28 shows the rates of nominal tariff protection for major indus-
try groups as prevailing in the applicant countries in representative
years. Reflecting the tariff reductions provided by the preferential
trade arrangements referred to above, customs duties on imports
from the EC 9 are lower than those on imports from third ocuntries.
If unweighted averages of the 28 three-digit ISIC branches are taken,
Spanish manufacturers seem to enjoy the highest protection against
imports. The weighted averages show Greece to be the most protec-
tionist country, which may be ascribed to effective lobbying of the
import-substituting consumer goods industries in this country. Por-
tugal's levels of tariff protection may be biased in an upward direc-
tion, since customs duties are specific rather than ad valorem in
this country and there has been rapid inflation in recent years. The
inflation might have considerably reduced the tariffs' incidence, al-
though import surcharges, which were introduced in May 1975 and
have repeatedly been adjusted since then, have limited the erosion
of the tariff protection.
While the tariff levels do not appear to be excessively high on aver-
age in any of the applicant countries, the scope for tariff liberaliza-
tion should not be underrated. The averages conceal the fact that
import tariffs still vary considerably from one product group to the
next; the standard deviation of tariffs is highest in Portugal and
ing the transitional period. Neither multiplier effects nor changes in
either factor endowments or the allocation of resources in the appli-
cant country, which may result from the integration, are taken into
account. Adjustments in the exchange rates that would be required to
compensate for changes in the balance of trade brought about by im-
port liberalization have also been omitted.93
Table 28 - Rates of Nominal Tariff Protection in Greece, Portugal
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Source : Calculated from the information provided by the tariff legisla-
tion in Greece, Portugal and Spain.
lowest in Greece. Moreover, nominal tariffs tend to rise with the
stage of industrial processing, thereby leading to markedly higher
effective rates of tariff protection, particularly in Spain.
As to the import-price elasticities, we have assumed that each ap-
plicant, country faces an infinitely price-elastic import supply from
the Community ("small country" assumption). The price elasticities
of import demand have been estimated by lagged double-log OLS re-
gressions on the basis of annual data for the period 1960-1977; they
have been found to range between -0.06 (rubber products) and -1.68
(beverages) for Greece, between -0.02 (other manufactures) and
-2.19 (refined petroleum) for Portugal, and between -0.03 (footwear)
and -1.79 (pottery, china and earthenware) for Spain.94
The estimated amount of import expansion, compared to the pat-
tern of imports in 1979, is shown in Table 29 for major commodity
groups
1. Several conclusions emerge from these estimates. Firstly,
Spain has to expect the greatest increase of manufactured imports
in both absolute and relative terms. The increase would amount to
5.1 percent per annum above total imports in the base year and 11. 3
percent above actual imports from the EC 9. The corresponding per-
centages are expected to be markedly lower in Portugal (3.4 and 6.4)
and Greece (2. 7 and 5. 3). In absolute terms, Portugal ranks behind
Greece. These differences in size and rate of the expected import ex-
pansion reflect the disparities in the scope for tariff reductions, in
the responsiveness of imports to theimplied price changes, and in
the import values observed in 1979.
Secondly, the distribution of the expected import expansion among con-
sumer goods, intermediate products and investment goods appears
to be most balanced relatively in the case of Greece, where the shares
are 24.5, 35.2 and 40. 3 percent respectively. Portugal's import ex-
pansion shows a greater concentration on intermediate products
(41.9 percent) and investment goods (50.2 percent). For Spain, the
lion's share of the expected rise in imports seems to correspond
to investment goods (64. 7 percent), while consumer goods and inter-
mediate products have a rather similar weight in the incremental
imports (16.6 and 18.7 percent, respectively). These estimates sup-
port our earlier findings regarding the relative importance of inter-
and intra-industry specialization of the new entrants in their trade
with the EC 9.
Thirdly, the three most important branches in the incremental im-
ports are fabricated metal products (16.8 percent), industrial chem-
icals (11.5 percent) and non-electrical machinery (9.9 percent) in
the case of Greece; petroleum products (21.6 percent), non-electri-
cal machinery (19.3 percent) and professional goods (11.5 percent)
in the case of Portugal; and non-electrical machinery (27. 2 percent),
professional goods (11.7 percent) and electrical machinery (10.6
percent) in the case of Spain. These are branches in which the new
entrants revealed a lack of international competitiveness (though
a trend towards improved competitiveness could be identified in
some instances); they are physical- and/or human-capital-inten-
sive, and the competitive position of various EC countries is known
to be strong.
1 For a commodity breakdown at the three-digit ISIC level see the esti-
mates in Donges, Schatz [1980, pp. 178-179] and, for Spain, Donges
[1980b] .95
Table 29 - Estimated Import Expansion in Greece, Portugal and Spain
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Source : Basic trade data from UN [a, 1979] . - Output data from na-
tional industrial statistics. - Tariffs as in Table 28.
Fourthly, the bulk of the expected import expansion represents "trade
creation". It accounts for 75.8 percent of Greek's total import in-
crease, for 58. 7 percent of Portugal's incremental imports and for
86.5 percent of Spain's rise in imports. The inter-country differ-
ences in tariff protection, which were reported earlier, might in-
fluence the ranking of the applicant countries with regard to the rel-
ative weight of overall "trade creation". There are two branches in
each applicant country (petroleum products in all three, transport
equipment in Greece, professional goods in Portugal and Spain) where
"trade diversion" exceeds "trade creation", affecting mainly sup-
pliers from the United States and East European countries as well96
as from Japan. According to these estimates, resource allocation
would improve in the applicant countries as a result of trade liberal-
ization, thereby resembling the experience made by the EC in its orig-
inal composition and after its first enlargement in 1973
1.
The trade-expanding effects may also operate on the export side, par-
ticularly in the case of Spain. While Greek and Portuguese manufac-
tured exports are to a large extent already entering the Common Mar-
ket free of customs duties (exceptions refer to a few "sensitive" prod-
ucts), the EC 9 still applies preferential tariffs on Spanish manufac-
tured exports (4. 5 percent on average, the standard deviation of in-
dustry-specific tariff rates being 6. 99). If the demand of the EC 9
for manufactures from any of the applicant"countries is regarded as
Infinitely price-elastic ("small country" assumption), the potential
export expansion can be estimated using the following formula
2 :
AXj = CET.X. [l +e.(l+ CET.)]
where X. represents the initial exports to the EC 9, while CET. is
the initial Common External Tariff rate on imports from the appli-
cant countries and E the price elasticity of these countries ' export
supply.
It turns out that the extent of the expected increase in exports crucial-
ly depends on, apart from the size of exports and the level of CETs
prevailing prior to the adhesion, the price elasticities of export sup-
ply. We have estimated these elasticities by OLS regressions at the
three-digit ISIC level only for Spain; they lie approximately between
+ 0.02 (leather products) and + 1. 75 (wood products), the average
being 0.46. Hence, export supply seems to be less responsive to
price changes than import demand. Presumably this also holds for
Greece and Portugal.
1 See the ex post estimates of trade effects in Balassa [1975] and Krei-
nin [1981 ] , respectively.
2 For elaboration see Pomfret, Toren[l980, pp. 48 ff. ] . The "small
country" assumption might be less justified if exports of the new en-
trants into the EC 9 are disaggregated at commodity levels. For in-
stance, Spanish canned fruit and vegetables as well as beverages and
shoes account for 7 to 9 percent of the corresponding total imports of
the EC 9.97
The estimjd^d_jjicxejusg^nj3xports amounts to US-$ 35J3_million jper
year (Table j>0), that is 5.8 percerrTabov'e the~T97*9 "size of Spain's
ma nufactured exports to the EC 9 (2. 8 percent if all destinations are
included). It is interesting to note that consumer goods are expected
to experience the largest increase both in absolute and relative
terms
1. As processed food and beverages account for 58 percent of
these incremental exports, the estimate reflects only the consequence
of what may happen once Spanish suppliers are allowed to exploit what-
ever price and/or quality advantages over French and Italian pro-
ducers they have. Free access to the Common Market will enhance
the strong competitive position which Spain is already displaying in
this sector. Another remarkable finding is that transport equipment
ranks next in importance, contributing 17 percent to the estimated
export expansion. This finding is consistent with the ongoing tendency
to integrate Spain's automobile industry into the vertical international-
ization of car production, which will entail additional exports of parts
and components as well as finished passenger cars anyway.
Table 30 - Estimated Expansion of Spanish Manufactured Exports in-




















Source: See Table 29.
As to Portugal and Greece, their entry into the EC 9 is, for the rea-
sons already stated, not likely to generate substantial sales into the
1 See again Donges, Schatz [1980, p. 180 ] for a sectoral breakdown of
these estimates. Estimates relating to Spain's export flows into any of
the original six EC member states are provided by Puig Bastard et al.
[1979, pp. 325 ff. ] .98
present Common Market in addition to the normal export expansion.
If we assume that the price-supply elasticity of Greek and Portuguese
manufactured exports is, on average, 0.5 (the EC's import-demand
price elasticity being infinite) and that the remaining CET protection
against imports from Greece and Portugal is 1. 5 percent (one-third
of the average level applied to imports from Spain), the integration
effect would increase Greece's manufactured exports by some US-$
3 million additionally and the Portuguese ones by US-$ 4 million.
These incremental exports would in both cases represent only 1.5 per-
cent of the manufactured exports to the EC 9 (all figures referring
to 1979).
It thus turns out that imports of the Three from the EC 9 will increase
faster than their exports to the Common Market. The additional im-
ports might even exceed the amounts suggested by our estimates,
once prevailing quantitative import restrictions have been phased out.
The entrants' trade positions vis-a-vis the Community would then
worsen, increasing the need for structural readjustment within the
new entrants' manufacturing industry. How heavy this burden will
actually be, depends on the time-table for the mutual tariff removal.
As it can be expected that the EC's trade barriers will be abolished
more rapidly than those of the Three, the Southern manufacturers
will initially be able to benefit from a better access to the Common
Market than the EC producers will with regard to the new markets.
The net trade impact will therefore be eased during the transitional
period. In any case, the impact of increased imports on domestic out-
put and employment can be kept the more within manageable dimen-
sions the more internal demand for the industry's products increases
(more about this later). \
The analysis has so far focussed on trade relations between the new
entrants on the one side and the EC 9 on the other. The emerging
trade patterns, however, will also be influenced by increases in the
trade between Portugal and Spain, once both countries become full
members of the Community (possibly at the same time). At present,
Portugal is still maintaining relatively high levels of nominal tariff
protection against manufactured imports from its neighbouring coun-
try (averaging about 35 percent, including surcharges). Spain is it-
self also rather protective vis-a-vis Portugal, whose manufactured
exports face an average tariff rate of approximately 17 percent. To
this figure one has to add a variety of mutual quantitative import re-
structions.
Until now, no clear pattern of revealed comparative advantages in
trade between the two countries is discernible. The Portuguese in-99
dustry seems to display a solid degree of competitiveness in bever-
ages, wearing apparel, paper and paper products, as well as rubber
and asbestos products. Its competitive disadvantage is mostpersisent
in plastic products, non-ferrous metals, non-electrical machinery,
and transport equipment [Donges, 1981a] . On the whole, Portugal's
manufactured exports to Spain accounted for 2.9 percent of the total
in 1979, whereas the share of imports from Spain was 7.3 percent
in that year. Conversely, the corresponding shares for Spain were
2. 7 and 0.5 percent, respectively. The aggregate bilateral trade bal-
ance in manufacturing has been improving for Spain over time (and
hence deteriorating for Portugal). Spain had a surplus of $ 39 mil-
lion in 1970, of $ 128 million in 1974 and of $ 269 million in 1979. It
is quite conceivable that once trade barriers between both Iberian
countries have been abolished, proximity, cost advantages, some
technological superiority and marketing expertise may favour a sub-
stantial penetration of the Portuguese market by Spanish manufac-
turers more than inroads of Portuguese producers into the Spanish
market.
4. Industrial Growth Implications
Turning now to dynamic aspects, both customs-union theory and prac-
• tical experience within the Community lend support to the hypothesis
that full integration of the Three might stimulate economic growth
in these countries through an impetus to factor productivity and in-
vestment. Although a quantification of these gains would require the
conduct of detailed industry studies, the scattered informatipn avail-
able so far
1, lends support to the view that the dynamic gains which
Greece, Portugal and Spain may reap from their integration into the
EC 9 could be significant.
Most analysts would agree that wider markets facilitate the exploita-
tion of economies of scale in given firms, that they open opportunities
for introducing large-scale production in newly established plants
(particularly those where automation is making great headways), and
that they permit increased specialization, both vertically and horizon-
tally, on an optimum scale. All this would enhance the positive trade
effects for the Three.
1 See Hummen [1977] and Nikolaou [1980 ] on Greece; Esser et al. [1977 ]
and Balassa [1980] on Portugal; Donges [1976b] and Puig Bastard et al.
[1979] on Spain.100
The relevance of the economies-of-scale hypothesis for Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain rests upon the observation that the industrial struc-
ture in these countries is dominated by a large number of very small
firms: 70 to 80 percent employ less than five people, and about 90
percent employ less than fifty people. Only a few of them have en-
tered into product specialization and/or complement larger produc-
ers. The largest firms (in terms of output and employment) lag far
behind the largest firms in the EC 9 due to their limited internal
market, though there are a few exceptions, as for instance in Span-
ish shipbuilding. Even in branches (such as the chemical industry
and machinery) where empirical studies have shown economies of
scale to be very high, the leading companies (including the foreign-
controlled ones) in general do not have the capacity size which is re-
quired to take full advantage of scale economies. To the extent that
sub-optimal plant sizes are due to the narrow domestic market, the
Common Market will provide sufficient outlet. Exports, then, would
contribute via linkages to more efficient production for the national
market on a large scale, too. Those firms, in which the minimum
long-run average costs exceed the world price by more than the CET,
will decline or even be driven out of existence by import competition,
thereby creating an adjustment problem to the applicant countries.
The other enterprises, which operate on downward-sloped scale
curves, will expand by replacing imports and increasing exports
1.
The efficiency aspect receives, by comparison, much less attention,
although it may turn out to be more important in practice
2 . We know
that in Spain as well as in Portugal and Greece the prevailing levels
of protection and subsidies have created much "X-inefficiency" at
the firm level. Among the many high-cost producers there are not
only such who would not be able to compete with imports, but also
such who could actually compete - if it were a matter of survival- by
1 The most detailed estimates of production functions which are available
refer to the Spanish manufacturing industry [Mendez Reyes, 1975, pp.
245 ff. ] . These estimates reveal that there is a considerable econo-
mies-of-scale potential in many industries. Unit costs have been found
to decrease substantially with the size of establishment in the case of
furniture, paper manufactures, printed matter, rubber tires, paints
and varnishes, perfumes and soaps, plastic materials, glass products
and machinery. For estimates regarding the Portuguese industry see
Sousa [1977] .
2 The omission of this aspect may even lead to rather pessimistic con-
clusions about the integration effects for the applicant countries, as
shown by Viaene [1980 ] .101
reducing costs. The latter firms have simply not reached the ceil-
ing of their production possibilities yet, because their managers pre-
fer a "quiet life" to profit maximization, which is an attitude they
can afford under protection and in view of the fact that domestic com-
petition does not function sufficiently well in applicant countries (Chap-
ter II). Examples can be found in all branches; and state-owned com-
panies, which have been extending their activities across the board,
also tend to perform poorly in this regard. Increased import compe-
tition from the EC 9 (and the EFTA countries) might present a chal-
lenge to the ability of such firms' management to improve the orga-
nizational and technological efficiency, to intensify the control of
quality of products and even to develop and market new goods. No
doubt this will be the case in the private sector and, hopefully, in
the public sector, too. The overcoming of "X-inefficiencies" might
also make the trade effects of the accession more favourable for the
Three, since the firms will appear more competitive in their pro-
duction of both export and import substitutes.
Improved efficiency levels and economies of scale might have a par-
allel effect on ,the volume of investment. New equipment will be needed
in order to withstand foreign competition, to achieve specialization
and to increase the scale of production. Furthermore, complete new
plants may be constructed in activities where the Three's compara-
tive advantage is particularly strong, reflecting also an inter-in-
dustry reallocation of resources, i.e. from lower- to higher-pro-
ductivity and skill-intensive sectors. It is unlikely that disinvest-
ment in the less efficient firms would cause the overall investment
volume to fall, provided appropriate government policies are pur-
sued.
The potential of the Three for attracting foreign direct investment
(FDI) is of particular interest in this context. The inflow of private
capital from abroad already made a significant contribution to indus-
trial growth, especially in Spain. As the three countries have a prom-
ising development potential and at least Greece and Portugal keep
unit labour costs below the levels prevailing in the EC 9, they should
be able to attract FDI in the years to come as well. Indeed, firms
from the advanced EC countries could regard Greece and Portugal,
and to a lesser extent Spain, too, as a natural location for re-deploy-
ing labour-intensive production. Locational changes could be a sub-
stitute for the immigration of labour from the southern to the north-
ern part of the enlarged Community, thereby increasing the rates
of overall productivity growth in both areas [Hiemenz, Schatz, 1979] .
Greece and Portugal would benefit by FDI in terms of a greater avail-102
ability of equipment, know-how and entrepreneurship which these
countries need very badly. Apart from these locational changes, the
Three could attract additional FDI from non-EC countries which may
want to invest in still relatively low-wage countries and then to sell
in the enlarged Common Market free of tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Such investments need not only originate in the United States (as they
usually did in the past) but may also stem from newly industrializing
countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Argentina, Bra-
zil or Mexico, which already are generating their own multinational
corporations. The experience of Ireland shows how fast foreign in-
vestors may be attracted by a country after it has become a member
of the Community.
If foreign private capital is to engage itself in the industry of the
Three, one necessary condition is that these countries are well-dis-
posed to FDI, which mainly means that there is a good general in-
vestment climate in the host country and that property rights are re-
spected. The prevailing legislation is rather liberal in all- three coun-
tries, mainly in Spain. The attitude of domestic businessmen and
trade unions is somewhat less open-minded, particularly in Greece.
There could be a tendency in future to exclude FDI from certain "key"
industries on political grounds. But in general it can be expected
that the governments will encourage the inflow of private capital from
abroad. The greatest efforts are currently being made by the Por-
tuguese authorities. They want to recover the reputation the country
had for generations of being an attractive host for foreign investors,
a reputation which Portugal lost during the post-revolutionary years
(1974-1975) in the wake of socializing urges and extensive expropri-
ations without compensation, suffering a strong drop in FDI as a
result [Donges, 1980aJ . That the confidence of foreign investors
is gradually returning is reflected by the fact that the recent trend
of new FDI is showing in the upward direction.
5. Prospective Adjustment Heeds and Opportunities
The preceding discussion allows us to describe the general tenden-
cies regarding the future division of labour within the enlarged Com-
munity. From the point of view of the EC 9 the greatest export pos-
sibilities will continue to prevail mainly in the investment goods sec-
tor. On the other hand, competitive pressure will increase in those
"sensitive" areas which are already experiencing a rapid penetra-
tion by low-priced supplies from third countries. Textiles, clothing,103
shoes and leather products, in addition to steel and ships, are cases
in point. The increased adjustment pressures resulting from the en-
largement will gradually cease as specialization patterns lead to sig-
nificantly more intra-trade within the enlarged Community. In the
meantime, the member governments could find themselves under
pressure from the trade-impacted interest groups to take more fre-
quent recourse to safeguard provisions (eventually in a selective way),
to "organize" extra-EC import growth (following the well known
French suggestion) or to provide (hidden) subsidies to domestic indus-
tries. If this were to happen, the accommodation of additional sup-
plies from Southern Europe would be carried out at the expense of
third countries, particularly developing countries
1.
Turning now to the new entrants, Greece should experience both more
inter- and more intra-industry trade. The country's advantages in
competitiveness and specialization reside in those industrial branches
in which the EC 9, and increasingly also Spain, tend to show disad-
vantages. These industries are predominantly consumer goods indus-
tries. Moreover, the division of labour with the EC 9 in the various
industrial branches is not as intensive as it could be in view of the
prevailing export and import structures of the EC 9 and Greece. Hence,
there is a potential for further specialization, mainly in the produc-
tion of parts and components for investment goods and for the foreign-
controlled assembly of commercial vehicles, in the production of
simple machines as well as in the building, maintenance and repair
of ships.
On the other extreme, Spain could derive gains from increased spe-
cialization in the investment goods sector. Accessories for trans-
port equipment, electronic products and machinery for special pur-
poses may gain in importance in the manufactured export assortment.
It is less likely that the consumer goods industries will be significant-
ly favoured by the country's entry into the Community. At the level
of industrial development that Spain has already achieved, consumer
goods industries are generally no longer a motor of growth. More-
over, the expansion of the investment goods industries will adversely
affect the competitive position of the consumer goods industries on
the domestic factor markets.
Portugal's chances are likely to lie rather in the field of a stronger
intra-industry division of labour in the investment goods sector (for
instance agricultural and textile machinery, machine tools) than in
an inter-industry division of labour through which the country would
1 Tsoukalis [1981, pp. 178 ff. ] argues along similar lines.104
increasingly become the supplier of consumer goods in the present
EC 9, thereby reducing the scope of the former suppliers in the Com-
munity. However, the entry of Portugal might also stimulate the con-
sumer goods industries, particularly by upgrading textile and cloth-
ing products as well as shoes. After all, for this relatively small
country the total opening of the Common Market means a significant
increase in the potential demand for products for which this country
possesses distinct comparative advantages vis-a-vis the EC 9. In any
case, there are good possibilities for specializing in assembling and
for manufacturing components and accessories for a wide range of
final goods.
Third countries frequently argue that they will suffer from "trade
diversion" following the enlargement (Chapter VI). Especially devel-
oping countries fear an erosion of the value of the EC's Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) (in operation since 1971); of the tariff-
free access to EC markets granted under the Lome Convention (signed
in 1975 and extended in 1979) to 60 African, Caribbean and Pacific
countries (as of October 1981),- and, finally, of the concessions made
by the EC to countries of the Mediterranean basin. However, it should
not be overlooked that the new member countries will have to reduce
their import tariffs, at present applied to third countries, to CET
levels; they will have to suppress their still highly restrictive im-
port quotas; they will have to adopt the GSP, and join the Lome Con-
vention. All this, as the discussion in Chapter IV shows, may lead
to "trade creation" in favour of developing countries, particularly
the industrially more advanced ones. As far as non-EC industrial-
ized countries are concerned, their entry into the Three's markets
will also be facilitated. Particularly the EFTA countries will benefit
from the Three's accession to the EC, since the new members will
have to enter the free-trade agreements which have been established
between the present EC 9 and the EFTA (Portugal will only change
sides).
6. Issues for Economic Policy
To recapitulate, full membership in the EC will give Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain the opportunity to expand their industrial trade and
accelerate their economic growth. Whether or not these opportuni-
ties materialize, lies in the hands of the national governments, that
is, depends on the conduct of appropriate policies. Appropriate pol-
icies comprise quite similar tasks for the Three and the Nine.105
Turning first to the new entrants, it should be recognized that they
all need to be disentangled from the many bureaucratic interferences
to which they have been subjected for decades. As we emphasized in
Chapter II, these interferences are far from being coherent, they are
costly to enterprises and to the economy as a whole, they frequently
lead to the creation of monopolistic quasi-rents and they usually give
wrong price signals to the individual manufacturing firms. Only if
some de-regulation of the economy is undertaken, will it be possible
for the governments to effectively pursue appropriate policies aim-
ing at securing the potential net gains from integration.
Industrial development and trade policies should be responsive to fac-
tor endowments (in a dynamic sense). This means that promotion
should be neutral between industries; its rationale would rest upon
the (presumed) externalities generated by manufacturing production.
Promotion should also be neutral between domestic and foreign mar-
kets, so that export production would have the same chance as im-
port substitution to develop further. This will require a streamlining
of the prevailing protectionist trade policies, that is, a reduction of
the levels and product-wise dispersion of tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers. As the new entrants will have to adapt existing levels of import
protection to the CET structure anyway, their trade policies will be-
come more efficient. But even in this case industries producing ex-
portable goods will not yet receive an incentive treatment which is
equivalent in terms of value added to the one enjoyed by import-sub-
stituting activities. Under EC regulations it is not possible to reduce
or neutralize the discrimination against exports resulting from the
remaining protection by outright subsidies or tariff drawbacks to ex-
porters. What is possible, however, and what would be advisable in
any case, is to provide export credits and effective export insurances
as well as financial assistance for participating in trade fairs, to an
extent comparable to actual arrangements in the EC 9.
The trade-liberalization policies should be complemented by adjust-
ment assistance in favour of trade-impacted workers, capital owners
and regional budgets. They should not provide (growth-inhibiting)
maintenance aids, however, though the governments will presumably
face powerful vested interests (created during the long period of bu-
reaucratic interventionism) pressing for such aids. Experience in
the EC 9 and elsewhere has clearly shown that maintenance aids are
an important obstacle to industrial growth. Contrary to what govern-
ment officials, trade unionists and entrepreneurs usually say, such
aids cannot by themselves transform inherent cost disadvantages
into advantages. It is difficult to see how protected, high-cost pro-106
ducers are to be encouraged to improve their methods of produc-
tion and the quality of their products. The postponement of the
structural adjustment caused by the entry into the Community will
only make the domestic industries even more vulnerable to future
foreign competition.
In shaping appropriate industrial development policies which are
to enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms following the ac-
cession, the role of government enterprises should be reconsidered.
Two issues are involved here. One relates to whether or not the gov-
ernments should plan industrial development according to particular
economic or social criteria. Apart from the fact that experience
with planning - whether centralized or indicative of the French type,
and wherever it has been pursued - is not encouraging at all, invest-
ment and production planning in an open economy is bound to fail
anyhow. With the applicant countries' integration into the EC 9 it
is hardly possible to predict accurately the extent to which domes-
tic productive capacities will be subject to import competition or
will generate additional exports; and there is little chance of mak-
ing a correct assessment of future technological changes in a "Eu-
ropeanized" industry and of how domestic consumers will react to
the integration process. Private investors may make mistakes un-
der such uncertainty, for which they will be penalized in the form
of losses. There is no reason at all why bureaucrats, who do not
run the risk of losing the invested capital, should make better deci-
sions. In addition, bureaucrats are typically risk-averters, since
they cannot earn a profit by taking risks. Private entrepreneurs
can, and this chance may encourage them to undertake investments
and to imitate products and technologies which have been success-
ful elsewhere, thereby improving the international competitiveness
of their firms. Given the existence of uncertainty, the government
authorities would probably make quite an effective contribution to
industrial development in their countries if they were to adhere to
the conventional approach of carefully formulating an industrializa-
tion strategy, of providing the private sector with information about
their policies and investment programs, and of implementing these
efficiently.
The second issue refers to the direct control of industrial firms
by the authorities, which is a particularly important issue in the
case of Spain (Chapter II). It is well known that the efficient central-
ized manageability of a wide range of enterprises is limited in prac-
tice. The more direct government ownership proliferates across
the board, the more likely it is that the government firms display107
a poor economic performance with low profits or persistent losses.
Hence, if the governments want to assume entrepreneurial functions,
they should allow the (totally or partially) state-owned companies to
operate autonomously. Good and bad performers can then be more
easily detected, thereby stimulating the managements to reduce "X-
inefficiency" and to undertake process and product innovations as re-
quired under the more competitive climate within the enlarged Com-
munity. Furthermore, the governments should divest themselves of
their ownership in such enterprises which do not require public sup-
port in order to be commercially viable (which in Portugal may also
include the return of nationalized firms to the dispossessed owners).
However the mixed-enterprise system may evolve, state-controlled
firms should not receive a more favourable treatment than private
manufacturers. Otherwise, investment by the latter would be dis-
couraged, although there is no reason to expect that the public invest-
ment, which would take place instead, would involve higher social
returns.
Further, appropriate policy measures in view of securing the gains
from the accession include
- the strengthening of competition policies in order to allow the mar-
ket mechanism to direct resources to their most efficient uses, but
encouraging at the same time the merging of firms where it seems
necessary to achieve efficient sizes of plants;
- the easing of prevailing job-tenure regulations which tend to in-
increase the real-wage cost of labour, thereby impairing the inter-
national competitiveness of manufacturing production (whereas only
the pool of labour actually employed is benefited), and the structur-
ing of real wages such that they reflect labour skills, in order to
avoid that qualified labour, which is usually mobile, immigrates to
the more advanced countries;
- the lasting containment of inflation in order to dispel the excessive
uncertainty which inflation normally generates, thereby improving
the environment for productive long-term investments which are
required in response to the expected changes in the patterns of pro-
duction and trade within the enlarged Community;
- the adherence to clear and steadfast rules on direct foreign invest-
ment, if foreign firms are to be attracted on a sustained basis and
the net benefits per unit of the desired foreign capital are to be max-
imized.108
Some reforms in these directions have already been initiated, or are
being designed by the new entrants' governments (though it is pos-
sible that the newly elected socialist government in Greece will ad-
here to a more interventionist approach). Given the risk of high eco-
nomic and political costs, especially in Portugal and Spain, policy
reversals cannot be brought about quickly. But this is not an argu-
ment for not embarking upon appropriate policies. It is rather an ar-
gument for following a gradual approach. This means a credible com-
mitment by the governments to a program that envisages a sequence
of policy reforms for several years ahead, that is sensible and real-
istic and that may therefore influence the expectations of the econom-
ic agents positively.
As to the Nine, their economic policies should also encompass firm
measures restraining inflation as well as arrangements which ef-
fectively stimulate competition both on product and factor markets.
De-regulation will become a major challenge to the governments. An-
other important task consists in resisting pressures from trade-im-
pacted industries and labour unions for selective protection, in stop-
ping and reversing the tendency of international cartelization to spread
among industries, in reducing selective subsidies to domestic firms
and in refraining from policy competition when providing public aids
to particular industries and regions.
The need of the hour is that following the enlargement the Nine take
the lead in promoting structural adjustments, so that the greater het-
erogeneity within the enlarged Community does not expose prosperity
and cohesion among the Twelve to serious strains. The main task
is to encourage companies to intensify their research and develop-
ment efforts and to become more innovative with regard to products
and production processes. At the same time, the professional and
regional mobility of the labour force has to be fostered, whereas
there should be no obstacles to the export of capital and technologi-
cal know-how to the applicant countries. Admittedly, this is easier
said than done, because of the pervasiveness of equity considera-
tions, protectionist sentiments and leisure in the present Communi-
ty. But there is really no possibility of evading policy actions along
these lines, if a fresh acceleration of private investment and eco-
nomic growth is to be achieved. The enlargement of the Community
does not require the present member countries to do things which
they would not have to undertake anyway.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that even with optimum growth
policies in the EC 9, the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish industries109
will not find an automatic, or easy, solution to their various struc-
tural deficiencies simply by joining the Community. As has been dis-
cussed in Chapter II, most of the problems which these industries
are suffering from are intrinsic to the new entrants and hence have
to be tackled internally. By the same token, it may appear sensible
to many people to provide the newcomers with long transitional pe-
riods (say, ten years and more) in order to keep adjustment pressures
within manageable orders of magnitude. But what may be considered
as an advantage at first glance could turn out to be an illusion once
the manufacturing industry postpones its adjustment efforts because
the full integration will become effective only in the distant future. A
transitional period of five years, as has been agreed with Greece,
might make the need for structural adjustment more apparent. In any
case, neither Greece nor Portugal nor Spain will have to make struc-
tural changes which would be unnecessary if these countries would not
join the Community. And in no case will the necessary structural ad-
justments be painless.110
IV. The Entrants' and the EC's Preferential Trade Policies Towards
Developing Countries
Greece, Portugal and Spain, after having become full members of
the Community, will not only have to reduce their import tariffs (at
present applied vis-a-vis third countries) to CET levels and to har-
monize their import quotas which are still highly restrictive in a num-
ber of cases. The three entrants will also have to adhere to the pref-
erential trade arrangements by which the Community has shaped its
economic relations with developing countries [Henig, 1971; Kreinin,
1975] . Of potentially great importance in this regard are the GSP on
manufactured exports of developing countries, the Lome Convention
with (as of October 1981) 60 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries, as well as the bilateral trade agreements with the Mediter-
ranean countries. The preferential treatment generally implies the
duty-free access of semi-manufactures and manufactures to the Com-
mon Market within tariff quotas, whereas the Lome Convention in ad-
dition offers both an - in principle - open-ended scheme without ceil-
ings and a considerably wider product coverage to include agricul-
tural goods
1.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the implications for the en-
trants of adopting the prevailing preferential trade arrangements be-
tween the EC and developing countries, which are beginning to worry
the entrants' governments [Langhammer, 1980b; Fernandes, 1980] .
The analysis lays emphasis on the trade effects of the GSP, which
actually represents the most significant commitment of the Commu-
nity vis-a-vis developing countries. There is also a discussion re-
lated to the ACP and the bilateral agreements with Mediterranean
countries. In addition to the trade effects, the implications of the en-
largement for the future shaping of the EC's trade policy towards de-
veloping countries are considered.
1 Though the GSP has gradually improved its product coverage in favour
of processed agricultures, the core of preferential tariff items still
covers semi-manufactured and manufactured goods. Furthermore, the
GSP options for processed agricultural products concentrate on tariff
reductions rather than on tariff exemption. For details see Murray
[1977] and Yeats [1979] .Ill
1. Export Patterns and GSP Provisions
Before discussing the consequences for the new entrants of adopting
the EC 9 commitments it seems to be appropriate to highlight the vol-
ume and structure of GSP exports to the Nine. Table 31 shows that,
in 1979, only 26 percent of the total EC 9 manufactured imports in
GSP items from developing countries received preferential treatment,
either as duty-free imports (about 75 percent) or, with regard to pro-
cessed food, in the form of tariff reductions (about 25 percent). Dur-
ing the 1970s, the sectoral pattern of GSP imports shifted from tex-
tiles, metal industries and electrical equipment to processed agri-
cultural and mineral oil products, reflecting the introduction of more
restrictive ceilings in the former sectors and an improvement of prod-
uct coverage in the latter ones.
This sectoral pattern broadly coincides with the patterns of Spanish
and Greek exports to the Common Market and to a lesser extent with
that of Portugal. In 1976, for example, about 72 percent of Spain's
industrial exports and 69 percent of Greece's industrial exports to
the EC were "matched" (in Finger's sense) by preferential exports
of the GSP beneficiaries to the Community, as compared with only
55 percent of Portugal's exports. This relatively high overlap could
be the cause of further trade-policy conflicts with third countries,
especially from the developing world, because of the predominance
of "sensitive" products in the export supply of Greek and Portugal.
In 1979, nearly 50 percent of Greek manufactured exports to the Com-
munity and more than 40 percent of the respective Portuguese ex-
ports consisted of those two sensitive categories of textiles and other
industrial products (Table 32)
1 where the rigid GSP ceilings prevent
any trade expansion incentive from being effective at the margin and
where developing countries' exports of textiles face the restrictions
imposed by the MFA
2 . The data reveal that duty-free imports from
the GSP beneficiaries amounted only about 7 and 14 percent, respec-
tively, of total EC imports from the developing countries in these
two categories.
1 To be precise, the data only refer to trade in preferential tariff items.
In the semi-manufactured and manufactured sector, however, these
items almost completely overlap with the total of tariff items in manu-
factures.
2 The GSP tariff preference margin for sensitive textiles is the highest
of all categories considered (about 14 percentage points as compared
with MFN rates in 1976).112
Table 31 - Imports of the EC 9 Countries in GSP Preferential Tariff
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Table 32 - EC 9 Imports in GSP Preferential Tariff Items from
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Any trade liberalization in favour of developing countries - whether
by eliminating or at least easing tariff quotas or by relaxing the ex-
port restraints provisions - would presumably change the relative
competitive position on the Common Market of suppliers from Greece
and Portugal vis-a-vis suppliers from developing countries to the
detriment of the former. The competitive pressure on Spain's ex-
port supply would probably be lower, since this country concentrates
its exports to the Community on a wider range of "non- sensitive"
manufactures with both low GSP preference margins and open-ended
ceilings. Any improvement of the preference system in the non-sensi-
tive categories (for example, cumulative origin rules, a less com-
plicated application procedure and a better dissemination of the scheme
among the exporters from developing countries) would probably raise
the ratio between preferential imports and total imports, but would
hardly lead to a trade diversion to the detriment of Spanish exporters.
The fact that Spain, as opposed to Greece and Portugal, is not a mar-
ginal supplier of non-sensitive manufactures - it accounted for more
than 50 percent of all developing countries' exports to the EC in this
category in 1978 - lends support to this notion.
However, prospects for a liberalization of the GSP are bleak. Since
the start of a revised GSP coincided with the accession of Greece to
the EC in 1981, it is more realistic to expect that the export interests
of this country, which obviously overlap with the highly price-elastic
sensitive products from developing countries (mainly Asian ones),
were duly taken into account when new GSP concessions were con-
sidered by the EC 9.
At the end of 1980, the EC-Commission launched some new guide-
lines for the next GSP decade [EC, 1980a; 1980b] , for instance:
- to concentrate future concessions on the least developed countries
rather than on NICs;
- to keep the number of preferential items in the agricultural sec-
tor at present levels;
- to eliminate the categories of "semi-sensitive" items;
- to keep the number of "sensitive" items constant for at least five
years;
- to establish a selective control for "sensitive" industrial goods sup-
plied by individual successful beneficiaries.
These principles evidently fit in with the new entrants' wish to main-115
tain as much protection against the NICs as possible
1. Since the ba-
sic principles of the GSP have not been changed, the applicant coun-
tries will have to provide a preferential treatment of imports from
most of the developing countries for the first time, whereas in the
past they themselves benefited from various GSP schemes
2 . Since
preferential treatment is in most cases equivalent to duty-free mar-
ket access and since none of the Three has fully adjusted its national
tariff to the lower level of the CET, the preference margin at the
moment would considerably exceed those 14 percentage points which
were mentioned above as the maximum in the EC-GSP. As was shown
in Table 28, the level of nominal protection against imports from
third countries is particularly high with regard to consumer goods.
The crux of the matter, however, is not tariffs but quantitative im-
port restrictions. Tariff barriers fail to be a precise indicator of
protection because of both frequent exchange-rate changes and the
variability of inflation rates. Moreover, even high tariffs may even-
tually be outweighed by production-cost advantages of LDC suppliers.
The governments of the entrants know that import quotas are the
most effective way of protecting marginal local producers. This ar-
gument also holds when import quotas are introduced as a remedy
for short-term balance-of-payments problems. A continuous pro-
longation - as has been done by Portugal during the last four years -
leads to a persistent protectionist effect.
2. The Entrants' Import Quotas and the GSP Beneficiaries' Export Supply-
In view of the protectionist policies of the entrant countries, based
on non-tariff barriers, it seems worthwhile to inquire into the ques-
tion of whether the system of import quotas affects those manufac-
tures (GSP tariff items) in which developing countries have expanded
their exports overproportionately and in which the entrants'domestic
producers seem to be particularly vulnerable.
1 See for a similar judgement Weston et al. [1980, p. 34 ].
2 Spain was a beneficiary of the Austrian, the Norwegian and the Swiss
GSP; Portugal benefited from the Australian, Austrian, Czechoslovakian,
the Japanese, the New Zealand and the US scheme; Greece was a ben-
eficiary of the same schemes as Portugal, except for the US scheme,
and of the Swiss scheme in addition.116
a. The Greek Case
During the association period (1962-1980) Greece applied specific
import quotas against the EC as well as against third countries. The
Treaty of Adhesion allows this quota regime to be maintained during
the transition period (January 1, 1981 - December 31, 1985) when
Greece will gradually adopt the GSP.
The Greek import-quota regime, as applied against third countries
(except socialist countries), can be characterized by a high degree
of selectivity and a low degree of repercussion on the overall manu-
facturing sector: the import quotas refer mainly to tariff sub-items
and are related to branches which contribute to the employment and
value added of the Greek manufacturing sector only to small degree
(Table 33). Electrical and transport equipment components are cases
in point. Greece's quantitative protectionism does not discriminate
between exporting countries, however; during the transition period,
imports from the EC 9 will be subjected to similar quotas as imports
from developing and socialist countries. This arrangement is to pre-
vent extra-EC imports, which are in free circulation in the Common
Market, from entering the Greek market in an unrestricted manner.
The quotas against EC 9 countries can therefore be regarded as a
substitute for the so-called non-application rule in article 115 of the
Treaty of Rome (non-application of community treatment for indirect
imports).
The economic consequences depend on whether the non-tariff barriers
will really be transitory (as envisaged by the Treaty of Accession)
or not. Since the import quotas affect branches in which Greece has
not yet exhausted its potential for intra-industrial specialization with
the EC (motor-vehicle assembly, production of spare parts and com-
ponents for capital goods etc.), maintenance of the quantitative re-
strictions beyond the transition period may not only impede third-coun-
try exports to Greece but may also consolidate the prevailing high
degree of inter-industrial specialization between the EC and Greece
(Chapter III). A spezialization based on the predominance of textiles
(and the like) in the Greek manufactured export assortment might con-
strain the scope of Greek overall export expansion because the mar-
kets for such products are growing relatively slowly. Moreover, due
to this predominance, textile protectionism within the enlarged Com-
munity is not likely to be abolished rapidly and this will obviously
harm developing countries, including those of the Mediterranean ba-
sin.117
Table 33 - Import Quota
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As far as the latter aspect is concerned, it is amazing that Greece
does not impose quantitative restrictions on the import of textiles
from developing countries or socialist countries, although competi-
tion by low-quality textiles, originating mainly in the neighbouring
socialist countries, is increasingly being felt by Greek manufacturers.
However, an equivalent of direct import quotas, which under specific
circumstances may be even more restrictive, is the provision in ar-
ticle 123 in the Treaty of Accession according to which Greece joins
the MFA as well as the "voluntary" export-restraint agreements which
the Community has concluded with major textile suppliers
1. Adher-
ence to the MFA will not only affect the level of non-tariff barriers
in Greece against textile imports from third countries. It will also
allow Greece, after having adopted the GSP, to grant preferential
treatment only to those textile-exporting countries which will "vol-
untarily" restrain shipments to the enlarged Community (unless the
prevailing GSP rules for textiles are relaxed). As already happened
in the Greek case, the EC countries' tariff quotas for sensitive prod-
ucts will be realigned in order to accomodate the entrants, thereby
continuing with the practice of splitting the Common Market into small
portions, which is bound to erode the value of the preferences for the
GSP beneficiaries.
There is the danger of further restrictions within the GSP as far as
sensitive goods, including textiles, are concerned. For example,
Greece may urge the Community to not include Bulgaria in the actual
list of beneficiaries, or to not improve the GSP product coverage for
Yugoslavia. Both countries compete with local suppliers on regional
sub-markets near the Greek border and, would therefore benefit direct-
ly from an improved access to this market.
b. The Portuguese Case
Since 1974/75 Portugal is trying to cope with persistent balance-of-
payments problems by frequent exchange-rate adjustments as well
as by the introduction of temporary additional tariff and non-tariff
barriers. Whereas tariff barriers were augmented by overall import
surcharges, new import quotas were introduced in 1976, the whole
approach thus becoming increasingly selective and affecting mainly
durable consumer goods. With a few exceptions, the list of tariff
items concerned has been renewed annually and has thus changed
the tool from a short-term balance-of-payments remedy to a medium-
1 For a general discussion see Murray et al. [1978] .119
term protectionist asset for domestic suppliers
1. To some extent
the sectoral pattern of the Portuguese import-quota regime resem-
bles that of Greece: electrical components, telecommunication equip-
ment and domestic household appliances are cases in point (Table
34). In addition, we find plastic goods, bicycles, professional goods,
furniture and toys. These are products with which developing coun-
tries have penetrated into the Common Market in spite of the low ceil-
ings to which tariff preferences are subjected. In a number of prod-
ucts, especially electrical components, Portugal already displays
international competitiveness to some degree (Chapter III). But the
government does not seem to be keen on abolishing the quotas against
suppliers from developing countries. This protectionist attitude is
reinforced by the fact that the changes introduced in the GSP for the
period 1981-1985 have upheld, and made even more selective, the ceil-
ings for most of the products listed in Table 34.
Compared with Greece, the competitive pressure of developing coun-
tries on Portuguese textile producers after the country's accession
to the Community will presumably be less perceivable for two rea-
sons. Firstly, Portugal's Asian dependency, Macao, is one of the ma-
jor Asian clothing exporters
2 , so that Portugal has already had to
adjust to some extent to the changing international division of labour
in textiles. Secondly, Portugal (representing Macao, too) joined the
MFA-Extension Agreement for the 19 78-1981 period. Thus, in the
case of textiles, there does not seem to be a considerable difference
between the pre- and the post-EC-accession period for Portugal, pro-
vided that the third renegotiation of the MFA with its voluntary ex-
port restraints in textiles is made by the same countries as in the
past and does not improve market access conditions for developing
countries' suppliers (which is most likely).
c. The Spanish Case
Among the three entrants, Spain has been particularly active in an-
nually applying import quotas to a wide range of products. While some
of the quotas were frequently liberalized later on (when originally in-
1 Since selective import quotas on a few consumer goods are hardly worth
mentioning as far as a reduction of the Portuguese import bill is con-
cerned, a protective purpose may have ruled the introduction of quotas
from the very beginning.
2 In 1978, about 4 percent of total EC clothing imports under CCCN chap-
ters 60 and 61 from LDCs originated in Macao.120
Table 34 - Import Quota of Portugal and Related EC 9 Imports from
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troduced for balance-of-payments reasons), others remained un-
changed in the medium run (and thereby clearly served protective ob-
jectives). This stop-and-go trade policy has evidently inflicted con-
siderable uncertainty upon trade and might have hampered imports
even more than the quantitative restrictions did themselves.
The presumption that the direct protective impact of the quotas has
been moderate so far, rests upon the observation that the quota ceil-
ings were allowed to be exceeded considerably in practice. In 1978,
for instance, the quota amounted to only 9 percent of the actual im-
ports in those related tariff items which accounted for one quarter
of total Spanish imports. The latter figure indicates that irrespec-
tive of whether or not the quotas are allowed to be exceeded, they
are an important tool for the Spanish government to use in interfer-
ing with import flows - when considered appropriate - by rejecting
new import licenses or by realigning them quarterly. Since the quotas
are selective, the sectoral pattern of the tariff items affected de-
notes a potential import discrimination in so far as these import
items can easily be declared non-essential when domestic import
substitutes are available.
As Table 35 shows, the 1978 list of quota items included to a large
extent such goods whose export to the Community was overpropor-
tionately expanded by GSP beneficiaries. After becoming a member
of the EC, the Spanish authorities would therefore have to give up
the option of quotas not only against the present EC member states
but also against GSP beneficiaries where quotas would then take the
form of tariff quotas instead of absolute import ceilings.
Sectoral competitive pressures by LDC suppliers can be expected
after the removal of quotas since the quota regime mainly focusses
on relatively labour-intensive branches. If the 71 product groups of
Table 35 are aggregated up to the 3-digit ISIC-level and related to
Spanish domestic production (Table 36), there is some evidence that
quantitative restrictions which overlap with the sectoral growth pat-
tern of LDC exports within the GSP centred on five industries: tex-
tiles, wearing apparel, plastic goods, transport equipment and other
industries. In each of these five industries the contribution of the
protected branches to employment exceeded that of other Spanish
branches. This relatively high absorption of local labour force by
import-competing domestic branches lends support to the hypothesis
that, once Spain has to adopt the EC trade commitments with regard
to developing countries, especially the labour-intensive branches
would face an intensified adjustment pressure, given the rapid in-
crease in wages in recent years.122
Table 35 - Ratio of Actual Imports to Import Quota in Spain and Re-












































































Woven fabrics of silk
Various textile fibre yeans
Various fibre fabrics
Carpets, mats
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Source: Ministerio de Hacienda [a. No. 35, 1978, pp. 3366-3368; a. No. 106, 1979, pp. 9984 f.; b. Parti,
Jan. -Dec. 1978] , - Banco Exterior de Espana [var. iss. ] . - Own calculations.124
Table 36 - Estimated Share of Spanish Import-Competing Manufac-
turing Branches Protected by Import Quota in Gross Pro-























































































































Source: See Table 35. - Instituto Nacional de Estadistica [a, 1978; bl.125
It is difficult to assess the extent to which demand for imports from
developing countries has been suppressed so far in Spain. But some
indication can be derived from looking at the actual LDC shares in
the imports of Italy, whose development level, as measured by the
per capita income, and economic structure, as measured by the in-
dustrial share in GDP, are reasonably comparable with those of
Spain.
Table 37 records the share of the ten leading suppliers of manufac-
tures from developing countries in total Spanish and Italian imports
in those product groups (2-digit CCCN) on which Spanish quota re-
strictions concentrate. In 1978, the major LDC suppliers had higher
shares in Italian imports than in Spanish imports for most product
groups, though the difference between the average shares of 8.0 and
4.1 percent, respectively, did not prove to be statistically significant
(t-difference test). Between 1973 and 1978, when the GSP began to
operate fully, the LDC suppliers could on average double their share
in Italian imports. That this did not happen in Spain may be ascribed
to the protective impact of the Spanish quota regime.
This is not to say that the Italian reference system displays anything
like a normal pattern of import-market penetration of countries at
a similar overall development level. Specific components like Italian
export-oriented investments in LDCs, an intensive neighbourhood
trade with Yugoslavia, one of the major GSP beneficiaries, special-
ization in transforming raw materials and intermediate products im-
ported from LDCs into finished goods, or "indirect" imports from
LDCs via other EC members may shift the LDCs' share in Italian
imports upwards irrespective of the per capita income level
1. How-
ever, it seems likely that both the elimination of quotas and the adop-
tion of the GSP by Spain would contribute to reducing the level of dis-
crimination against third countries and hence foster trade creation
and remove the tariff margins between the suppliers from the pre-
sent EC and those from LDCs. The latter could enhance trade diver-
sion in favour of LDC exports unless the enlarged Community were
to counteract the erosion of tariff margins by means of concluding
agreements on voluntary export restraints like the MFA. According
to past experiences the Community may find Spain on the side of those
countries advocating a restricted market access for LDCs, as it was
1 Grilli [1980] states that Italy, while following the general course of EC 9
protectionism, took a rather modest position towards additional restric-
tive measures against developing countries.126
Table 37 - Share of the Ten Leading LDC-Suppliers
a within the EC-
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Source: See Table 33. - Eurostat a .127
between 1973 and 1978 as a member of the MFA agreement
1.
3. Obstacles to an Improvement of the GSP
All the above-mentioned findings lead us to presume that there is a
trade-off between the enlargement and an improved preferential mar-
ket access for developing countries within the GSP. Firstly, irrespec-
tive of the entrants' demands for protection, the enlargement con-
tributes to a further splitting of the Common Market in the field of
sensitive products, due to the EC countries' tariff quotas rule which
incidentally is the most visible violation of the common market prin-
ciple as far as manufacturing is concerned. The Greek membership,
for example, has resulted in a reduction of the national tariff quota
of the United Kingdom by one percentage point (21 instead of 22 per-
cent) and of those of Italy and Ireland by 0. 5 percentage points each
(14.5 instead of 15 percent and 0.5 instead of 1 percent, respectively)
in order to assign Greece a national tariff quota of 2 percent of the
overall Community ceiling for a single product. Though some flexibil-
ity has been introduced to adjust the rigid allocation of tariff quotas
to a country's imports, LDC exports to member states with a tra-
ditionally high absorptive capacity for sensitive products (mainly
Germany) will face a reimposition of most-favoured nation (MFN)
tariffs once the tariff quota is filled. The enlargement will thus not
only make the GSP even more complicated than it has already been
in the past, but will also further reduce the real value of the pref-
erences because some national tariff quotas will remain unused where-
as others will fall short of actual imports. These limitations are ag-
gravated by the fact that the revised GSP of 1981 includes selective
quotas on the supply-side for the most competitive LDC exporters.
Secondly, the more the export supply of the new entrants and of the
GSP beneficiaries overlap, the less the enlarged Community will
agree to eliminate the GSP restrictions. New and old member states
may realize that they are in the same boat. Greece and Portugal
could take the lead in the forming of an enlarged protection cartel,
due to the high share of sensitive goods in their export assortment.
1 Spain, however, did not join the 19 78 MFA extension protocol, probably
because of the inherent obligation to restrict its own textile exports to
the EC - where a bilateral agreement provided better conditions -, and
because of the availability of national non-tariff barriers to pursue a
safeguard policy against suppliers from LDCs.128
Thirdly, apart from tariff barriers, the new entrants apply quantita-
tive restrictions on a number of import goods in which GSP benefi-
ciaries have proved to be competitive. It is therefore reasonable to
expect that they will ask for a period of grace during which they could
gradually adjust their still high tariff and non-tariff barriers down-
wards to GSP levels. However, persistent balance-of-payments prob-
lems and the overall pressure for structural adjustment to increas-
ing competition from the EC 9 might lead the new entrants to refuse
the adoption of the GSP obligations after a period of grace of, say,
five years (as has been arranged in the Greek case).
The length of the adjustment period which Portugal and Spain might
be striving for, depends to some extent on whether the opening of
the domestic markets to GSP beneficiaries will lead to intra- or in-
ter-firm shifts in resource allocation. The high degree of selectivity
in the import-quota regime lends support to the assumption that the
adjustment requirements which the new entrants will face will not
be uniformly distributed among manufacturing firms or even branches,
but will affect the producers of specific goods [Fernandes, 1980, p.
1000 ] . It is difficult to prove this assumption empirically due to the
well known incompatibilities between trade and production statistics
and to the lack of data on market prices rather than on unit values.
Yet Table 38 provides a highly disaggregated comparison between
Portuguese domestic-production unit values and EC-import unit val-
ues for selected products of which developing countries are important
suppliers. It turns out that the differences are quite substantial in a
number of sub-sectors within the same manufacturing branch.
4. The Impact of the Lome Convention
Besides the GSP, the new entrants will face a second multilateral
non-reciprocal system of concessions for developing countries, as
implemented by the Lome Convention between the Community and
the ACP countries. Measured by its scope, the Lome Convention
goes far beyond the GSP. It includes both the option of an open-ended
duty-free access to the Common Market for almost all products orig-
inating in the ACP countries and a conglomerate of resource transfer
arrangements, such as compensatory finance credits at preferential
terms to stabilize export earnings (Stabex), official development aid
and assistance in support of investments in mining and manufactur-
ing in ACP countries. These countries also have the option of claim-
ing preferential treatment either under the GSP or under the LomeTable 38 - Ratio between the Domestic Production Unit Value and the
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provisions whenever there is an overlap, though this option is in fact
only a formality, since the Lome conditions are at least equivalent
to (in the manufacturing sector for non-sensitive goods), or more
favourable for the countries concerned than (in all other cases) those
of the GSP.
In view of the considerable extent of concessions in favour of the ACP
countries the new entrants are likely to claim an adjustment period
before fully adopting the obligations concerning trade and resource
transfer. In the Greek case the adjustment period has been negoti-
ated in analogy to the GSP and to the bilateral preferential trade agree-
ments, so that Greece has to open its market to ACP products in 1986
at the latest, irrespective of the fact that the second Lome Conven-
tion expires in 1985 and will then have to be renegotiated (provided
that all parties want a renewal).
However, concerns about the competitive pressure of ACP suppliers
on domestic producers in the applicant countries may be misplaced
to a large extent. The experience with the Lome preferences up to
now show that they are redundant in most cases since the ACP coun-
tries chiefly export mineral commodities to the Community (and else-
where), which are non-dutiable under MFN conditions anyway [Lang-
hammer, 1980a, p. 249 f. ] . The share of these commodities in to-
tal ACP exports to the EC fluctuates between 60 and 75 percent and
depends on the world-market price ratio between non-dutiable min-
eral commodities and dutiable agricultural commodities (coffee, co-
coa, raw wood etc. ). With the exception of sugar, beef (partly) and
tobacco, the ACP countries do not supply agricultural products which
are subjected to the CAP regulations. In manufacturing, the ACP coun-
tries either cannot yet compete with other LDC suppliers, or simply
lack export potential (had they been more competitive the EC may
have been less generous in granting preferences !).
The pattern of ACP countries' exports to the new entrants fits into
this picture. In the period 1975-1977, eight commodities (wood, min-
eral-oils, coffee, cocoa, copper, iron ore, cotton, and hides and
skins) accounted for more than 80 percent of Spain's imports from
the ACP countries. Portugal's and Greece's import patterns were
quite similar
1. This is not to say that the structures of both domestic
production in the Three and the export supply of the ACP countries
are totally complementary. Some degree of overlap does exist, though
not so much with regard to domestic import substitutes; rather, it
1 For a painstaking analysis of trade relations between the applicants and
the ACP countries see Eurostat [1979] .131
mainly affects various agricultural exports of the Three to EC 9 coun-
tries where they compete with ACP products (for instance, bananas,
canned fruit and fish, vegetable oils). The preference margin for
these goods which ACP suppliers are at present enjoying vis-a-vis
suppliers from the applicant countries, may shrink once the latter
are granted the same duty-free access to the Common Market as has
been conceded to the ACP countries. The competitive position of ACP
countries could become even worse if the new entrants claim a priv-
ileged treatment of their products on EC 9 markets vis-a-vis sup-
pliers from the Community's associates, which is the status of the
ACP countries.
Two other aspects are worth mentioning. One is that most traditional
export products of the ACP countries may be regarded as "non-es-
sentials" by the new entrants and hence become an "obvious" target
for (even selective) import restrictions on balance-of-payments
grounds. Portugal is already applying import quotas against two ma-
jor ACP export commodities, namely bananas and coffee. And ex-
perience shows how difficult it is to repeal such restrictions, even
when they were implemented as a temporary device. Although the
Lome Convention includes a general safeguard clause (article 12),
a selective application of this clause to the sole detriment of the ACP
countries is bound to provoke trade-policy conflicts between these
countries and the Community.
Secondly, it is a well known fact that in some agricultural products
(for example vegetable oils and sugar) ACP countries compete with
Latin American suppliers which traditionally export these goods to
Spain and Portugal under tariff rates which are lower than the CET.
Once the Iberian entrants adopt the ACP provisions, substitution to
some degree of imports from ACP countries for imports from Latin
America may occur, particularly so if binding EC import guarantees
make ineffective Latin American cost advantages (which otherwise
could have outweighed the preference margin enjoyed by ACP sup-
pliers)
1. The sugar protocol in the Lome agreement clearly illus-
trates this aspect. As in the case of Greece's accession, Spain and
Portugal, which are net importers of sugar, would have to share in
the sugar import guarantees which the Community has extended to
various ACP countries. Purchases of sugar in Latin America would
decrease (or increase less) as a result.
1 Trade in CAP products may also be diverted from Latin American to
EC sources if variable levies raise the Latin American export prices
up to the Community's "threshold" price level.132
5. The New Entrants and the Mediterranean Countries
Apart from the GSP and the Lome Convention the Community has
established various other preferential trade arrangements with Med-
iterranean countries during the last two decades [Pomfret, Tovias,
1980 J . They envisage either the ultimate formation of a customs
union between the partners and hence provide that tariff barriers
are mutually and gradually eliminated in the course of an "associa-
tion period" (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, following the Greek exam-
ple) or a less close integration into the Community by so-called co-
operation agreements on trade, industrial, technical, social, and
financial affairs, which also imply mutual preferential tariff con-
cessions, though of a more discretionary nature than in the "associa-
tion cases". Such agreements exist for the Maghreb countries (Al-
geria, Morocco and Tunisia) as well as for the Mashreq region
(Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan). The 1975 preferential trade
agreement with Israel, which also envisages industrial, technical
and financial co-operation, has ultimately resulted in a de-facto free-
trade area with the Community [Pomfret, Toren, 1980 J , but has
not established for Israel the option of becoming an associate mem-
ber.
As far as the exports of the majority of Mediterranean countries
(Maghreb, Mashreq, Cyprus) into the EC are concerned, some over-
lap in the scope of preferential treatment is provided by the agree-
ments with the Community and the GSP (depth of tariff cut, product
coverage), especially for semi-manufactures and manufactures
where the preferences are on the whole equivalent. Qualitative dif-
ferences exist with regard to the agricultural sector where the bi-
lateral arrangements generally offer a higher preference margin
and a broader coverage than the GSP, except in the case of the tariff
quotas and other restrictions in the latter.
The question whether the bilateral preferences which the Mediter-
ranean countries enjoy will be seriously eroded as a result of the
enlargement of the Community is discussed in Chapter VI. Here
we ask how the new entrants may be affected if they remove their
trade barriers against Mediterranean products. The institutional
procedure will - an analogy to the Greek case - probably provide
a transition period, during which national tariffs for preferential
items will be cut down stepwise to the level of the CET. In the man-
ufacturing sector this will generally result in a duty-free market
access.133
The actual structure of the eleven Mediterranean countries' exports
to the new entrants shows a predominance of foodstuffs and raw mate-
rials, whereas the share of manufactures is rather low
1. This also
holds if - in the Spanish and Greek cases - oil imports from Maghreb
and Mashreq countries are excluded. To some extent, this structure
might reflect the fact that the trade policies pursued by the new en-
trants heavily discriminate against the import of manufactures. In
a number of cases the prevailing tariff rates are even prohibitive.
Hence, manufactured imports from Mediterranean countries are like-
ly to expand overproportionately once the new entrants adopt the Com-
munity's trade-policy arrangements leading to a cut in tariffs, pro-
vided the Mediterranean countries have built up an adequate export
potential in the industries concerned.
How reluctant the new entrants are to liberalize manufactured im-
ports from the Mediterranean countries is illustrated by the extreme-
ly selective and low tariff cuts which Greece and Spain have hitherto
undertaken within the multilateral trade negotiations among devel-
oping countries. Since this is chiefly a "Mediterranean" tariff round
2 ,
the concessions have up to now focussed on complementary trade
which would have taken place without concessions anyway. Though
Greek concessions, for example, favoured some manufactured im-
ports from Israel, the volume of preferential imports in one single
commodity (namely unwrought lead from Tunisia and Yugoslavia) ex-
ceeded the total of preferential imports in manufactures from Med-
iterranean countries by far. Moreover, the generally granted pref-
erence margin of only 20 percent of MFN tariffs underlines that Greek
tariff cuts were far from being substantial, except for the restric-
tion of product coverage. Spain's concession schedule reveals sim-
ilar shortcomings, especially as far as the very limited product cov-
erage is concerned.
It is not unreasonable to expect that, in the case of tariff cuts by the
new entrants, imports from neighbouring (Mediterranean) countries
will respond rapidly. There are no other major trade barriers which
could neutralize tariff-cut effects (transportation costs, lacking in-
stitutional and cultural links and the like). Hence yet another situa-
1 In 1977, the share of manufactures (SITC 5 to 8 minus 67 and 68) in to-
tal imports from the Mediterranean countries amounted to 5. 1 percent
in Greece, 3.1 percent in Portugal and 1. 9 percent in Spain. The lion's
share (60 to 70 percent) was by Israel.
2 In 1975, preferential trade between Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia, Turkey,
Tunisia and Israel amounted to about 60 percent of total preferential
trade [Langhammer, 1980c] .134
tion arises in which the new entrants' authorities will try to maintain
protection against Mediterranean suppliers as long as possible. Pro-
tectionist pressures will probably be concentrated in the manufactur-
ing sector. In the agricultural sector, minimum import prices have
already been established in the various bilateral agreements for var-
ious products, such as wine, olive oil, canned sardines and certain
fruits and vegetables, and thus provide a protectionist tool for the
new entrants who might claim its maintenance in order to avoid com-
petitive pressures from other Mediterranean suppliers [Fernandes,
1980, pp. 1007 ff. ] .
6. Policy Outlook
It can be taken for granted that - in analogy to the Greek case - Por-
tugal and Spain will have to adopt the EC trade-policy commitments
with regard to third countries in general, and developing countries
in particular, only after a transition period of tariff adjustment.
Whether the entrants will afterwards continue to claim protection,
namely, the non-application of the common external trade policy,
critically depends on the Community's future shaping of trade pref-
erences for developing countries, i.e. on whether they will become
more generous or more limited.
Recent experiences with the renegotiation of multilateral conces-
sions and bilateral agreements have not been encouraging. High lev-
els of unemployment and gloomy expectations as to the future econom-
ic growth in the Community have led to concerted actions of produc-
ers and trade unions against sensitive imports, whereas the CAP con-
tinues to discriminate against suppliers from the Third World
1. Pref-
erential treatment of developing countries may suffer considerable
erosion in connection with the enlargement. The new entrants will
presumably not refrain from their practice of shifting preferences
away from successful suppliers to least developed countries which,
due to supply bottlenecks, cannot effectively utilize the preferences
(the so-called differentiation principle). This shift will be effected
by establishing selective ceilings for successful suppliers of sensi-
1 Examples for the continuation of EC discrimination are the voluntary
export-restraints agreement with Thailand concerning tapioca (Novem-
ber 1980) and the Argentine refusal to renegotiate the 1970 bilateral
trade agreement with the Community because the market access con-
ditions for certain Argentinian meat products were to be deteriorated
(November 1980).135
tive products and by freezing them. Moreover, the so-called gradua-
tion principle, which envisages reciprocal concessions for EC ex-
ports by successful suppliers in due time, might be invoked by the
enlarged Community to curtail preferences in the future whenever
today's beneficiaries face severe balance-of-payments problems and
therefore switch to a new import-substitution policy, thereby resist-
ing reciprocal concessions. A number of Latin American countries,
above all Brazil, may be treated this way.
Furthermore, trade restrictions shifted from tariff to non-tariff bar-
riers of all kinds during the last decade. If average tariff barriers
continue to decrease over the long run and/or become increasingly
ineffective because of real exchange-rate appreciation, national au-
thorities will resort to non-tariff barriers which provide the "advan-
tage" of being more sophisticated, less transparent and more close-
ly related to national peculiarities. The maintenance of the existent
import restrictions in the Community's multilateral and bilateral
agreements taken for granted, the new entrants need not worry about
the effects of tariff preferences after the transition period is over.
The escape and emergency clauses in the Founding Treaties of the
Community, combined with an already well developed set of national
non-tariff barriers, will help to retard the adjustment in the Southern
European economies once the adoption of tariff preferences for devel-
oping countries really leads to "disruptions" on the domestic mar-
kets of the new member states.136
V. The Common Agricultural Policy Impasse
In Greece, Portugal and Spain, where agriculture is of much greater
importance than on average in the EC 9, high hopes are being created
as to participation in the CAP. Obviously the continued orientation
of the CAP towards the interests of the producers of agricultural
goods gives rise to expectations of sizeable benefits accruing from
an integration of the Three, especially since the levels of self-suf-
ficiency for many Mediterranean products are still relatively low in
the EC 9 and the rate of protection (mainly of French and Italian pro-
ducers) is much higher than in the applicant countries. Such benefits
are not only presumed to come from the comparative advantages in
producing these products but also from the fact that after their entry
the new entrants themselves cnn influence the CAP by vetoing and thus
raise the rate of protection for Mediterranean products further. Such
expectations seem to indicate that the new entrants are not fully aware
of the crisis the CAP is already involved in. Even a continuation of
the present EC without an enlargement would require a reform of
the CAP. Expectations based on the continuance of the hitherto exist-
ing CAP, therefore, will surely lead to disillusionment. In this chap-
ter, we shall first summarize the shortcomings of the CAP before
moving on to an analysis and discussion of the effects of an enlarge-
ment on agriculture and agricultural policy. The chapter concludes
with some reflections about ways of reforming the CAP within the
framework of the EC 12.
1. Deficiencies of the Present CAP
For a long time the CAP had been regarded by many as the most prom-
ising instrument to pave the way for a (politically) United Europe.
Nowadays, however, it must be regarded as having contributed de-
cisively to weakening the European unity, i.e. today the CAP proves
to be an obstacle to the process of integration. As a matter of fact,
the idea of a United Europe is running the risk of being drowned in
seas of milk and wine and being crushed by mountains of butter and sugar
and other surpluses of agricultural products. And the EC's com-
mon budget is threatened with rupture because of the growing expen-
ditures needed for taking surpluses "out of the market", storing or
denaturing them, or dumping them on the world markets (Chapter
VIII), thereby preventing the Community from devoting scarce finan-
cial resources to other common objectives.137
The Treaty of Rome laid much emphasis on agriculture itself and on
trade with agricultural products in the Common Market. The aims
laid down for a CAP are
- to raise agricultural productivity;
- to secure a reasonable standard of living for the agricultural popu-
lation;
- to stabilize the markets;
- to ensure regular food supplies to consumers;
- to maintain fair consumer prices.
In order to achieve these aims, the CAP has been developed on three
fundamental principles: First, to establish one single market, so
that free trade with agricultural products inside the Community on
the basis of common prices becomes possible; secondly, to provide
terms of preference for Community production over supplies from
third countries; and thirdly, to constitute the solidarity among the
member states necessary for financing all expenditures entailed by
the CAP. Beginning in 1962, an ever-increasing number.of common
market organizations came into operation, which ensured that EC
farmers were protected from imports and world market fluctuations
by means of a system of minimum ("threshold") import prices, vari-
able import levies, and export subsidies ("restitutions") and which
used, in pursuit of the objective of raising incomes in agriculture,
price-support measures as well as an unlimited sales guarantee to
farmers (under the responsibility of the European Agricultural Guid-
ance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)). In 1980, the common-market-
regulating organizations covered about 90 percent of the EC 9 agri-
cultural production (as compared to 50 percent of the EC 6 produc-
tion in the early 1960s).
The external protectionism and the internal suppression of market
forces, both salient features of the CAP, have received extensive
criticism from inside and outside the Community
1. There are major
concerns about striking misallocations of resources and the retard-
ing effects on the overall economic growth of the Community. Non-
member countries complain about being seriously harmed by trade-
diversion in CAP-related (mostly temperate-zone) products, by de-
pressed world-market prices (resulting from the Community's re-
1 See, for example, Thorbecke, Pagoulatos [1975 ] ; Koester [l977a ] ; Ro-
demer[l980]; Sachverstandigenrat [1980, ch. 4],138
strictions of imports and increases in exports) and by larger short-
term price fluctuations on the world markets (due to the systematic
"export" of internal shifts in production or consumption). These harm-
ful effects are particularly worrisome with regard to developing coun-
tries in which the agricultural sector has a large economic weight
in terms of value added, employment and trade. Thus the CAP dis-
courages the expansion of agricultural production in these countries,
even where they possess a comparative advantage. It is true that the
EC has granted preferences to developing countries and groups of
countries in numerous trade agreements (Chapter IV and VI), but
these concessions have hardly cushioned the adverse effects of the
CAP. On the other hand, such quasi-compensatory measures have
given rise to bilateralism in world trade and carry a considerable
potential for trade-policy conflicts between the Community and devel-
oping countries, especially so in connection with the enlargement.
The high protection of agricultural production within the EC, sup-
plemented by the administrative support of high internal-producer
prices, has caused more productive factors to remain in agriculture
than would have been the case under a more market-oriented policy,
which would have led to a lower common price level for agricultural
products. Although the shares of agriculture in employment and in
GDP have declined strongly in all EC countries during the last twenty
years (Table 39), there are still more people employed and more cap-
ital invested in this sector than is required to provide the given popu-
lation efficiently with foodstuffs. The consumers of food are thus sub-
sidizing, via higher prices, the farmers within the Community, and
they suffer an additional loss in real income dut to the higher taxa-
tion required to finance the excessively bureaucratic system of the
CAP. In the general discussion of the issues these aspects dominate,
especially surplus and budget problems, but the costs for the econ-
omy as a whole are substantial as well.
Persistent over-production of a number of agricultural products is
a consequence of using price policy as an instrument to improve the
farmers' income. When producers are guaranteed prices consider-
ably above free-market levels and are not subjected to production quo-
tas (as in the case of sugar), they will increase production as much
as they can, and certainly faster than consumption increases. Initial-
ly, the EC Commission could caution these adverse developments by
blocking imports from third countries. But soon excess supplies in
the member countries became a major problem for the Community.
The degree of self-sufficiency increased substantially already during
the 1960s in the EC 6. Then the first enlargement of the Community139
Table 39 - Basic Data on the Importance of Agriculture
















































































s value added at
gross value added in





























factor costs in current
Source : Eurostat [c] . - Bundesministerium fur Ernahrung, Landwirt-
schaft und Forsten [var. iss. ] .
brought temporary relief because of high demand for imports in agri-
cultural products from the United Kingdom. But the further expan-
sion of agricultural production at a higher rate than that of Commu-
nity consumption soon caused aggravating surplus problems in the
EC 9 as well (Table 40). Without the various measures to promote
marketing within the Community, EC consumption would presum-
ably have been substantially lower and the degree of self-sufficiency
higher than the figures in Table 40 reveal.
The embarassing surpluses are taken out of the market by various
instruments
1. One corner-stone is minimum intervention prices,
at which public agencies have to undertake support-buying of agri-
cultural products; these prices are to be found in the market orga-
1 The EC has implemented more than a hundred different measures for
intervention and for promoting marketing within the scope of the Com-
mon Market organization. For details, see EC [1981 ] .Table 40 - Degree of Self-Sufficiency
3 in the EC 6 and in the EC 9 by Product, various years
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nization of milk, cereals, beef and veal, olive oil and sugar. For sug-
ar this minimum price is limited to a previously fixed quota; with
regard to the Common Market organization of pork, intervention is
optional. Support-buying is carried out by producer organization in
the case of fruits and vegetables as well as of fish, with financial as-
sistance from the CAP authorities. The producer organizations have
to make use of the quantities taken out of the market in a way that
does not disrupt normal sales. This means in reality that surpluses
of fruits and vegetables are destroyed to a large extent and fish is
processed into fish-meal. The market organization of wine also pro-
vides for denaturation in that surpluses of production are used for
destination, though care has to be taken that the market of ethylal-
cohol is not disturbed and the production of wine of low quality is not
stimulated.
The disposal of surplus production is pursued in various ways by the
CAP authorities. A sizeable share is exported to third countries, the
most publicized actions being the deliveries to centrally planned econ-
omies of Eastern Europe, especially to the Soviet Union and, since
early 1981, to Poland (in this case under preferential conditions). As
the EC-internal prices are normally above world market prices, the
farmers receive export subsidies from the EC's common budget, en-
abling them to bring the price of their commodities down to competi-
tive world-market levels. In the Community itself, efforts are also
being made to encourage the use of production surpluses (e.g. pre-
miums and assistance for feeding purposes, and marketing assis-
tance). Butter sales, for instance, are promoted by offering a cheaper
quality ("dairy" butter), by reducing purchase prices at certain times
("Christmas" butter), or by selling to certain consumer groups (ar-
my, recipients of social assistance) or for specific uses (butter as
an input for producing bakery goods, ice cream, pure butter fat). In
some member countries the governments, instead of cutting prices
at certain times, provide continual assistance for butter consump-
tion. Furthermore, there are programs for supplying pupils and stu-
dents with subsidized milk out of production surpluses. The EC also
subsidizes the procurement of skimmed milk and skimmed milk-pow-
der to be used in the feeding of calves, pigs and poultry with liquid
skimmed milk, in the production of casein and as additives for live-
stock fodder. At the same time, there are attempts to reduce sur-
plus production by giving premiums to the farmers who give up milk
production.
This hypertechnicalized system of Common Market organizations
has placed ever-increasing financial demands on the common bud-142
get, solely for removing the surpluses. From 1973 to 1979, expen-
ditures on the Common Market organization of agricultural products
increased at an average annual rate of 19 percent as compared to
12.6 percent for the combined GDP in current market prices. This
rapid growth of the financial requirements for the CAP has not only
nearly emptied the EC coffers (Chapter VIII). It has also sorely
strained the financial solidarity and relationships between the mem-
ber countries, because in practice it has resulted in uncontrollable
financial net transfers within the Community which are unrelated to
the relative strength or the weakness of particular economies [Koe-
ster, 1977b; Thoroe, 1981b] . Member countries which succeed in
specializing in highly protected goods and in producing surpluses pay
less in terms of import levies into the EAGGF than they receive in
terms of export refunds (France, Denmark, Ireland), while the op-
posite holds for member states with low levels of self-sufficiency in
food and therefore a high dependence on imports (Italy, United King-
dom).
The enforcement of agricultural objectives has not only involved con-
flicts with other policies, it has even violated fundamental elements
of the Treaty of Rome by giving in to diverging national interests. A
common market for agricultural products in the sense of unrestricted
trade within the Community, based on the principle of price unity,
actually existed for a short time only. Ever since 1969 a system of
so-called "monetary compensatory amounts" has allowed the member
states, in the event of exchange-rate adjustments, to unlink domestic
prices for agricultural products from the common price level. Coun-
tries with a depreciating currency grant subsidies on imports and
charge the same amount for exports, whereas in the case of countries
with an appreciating currency the system works through export su-
sidies and import levies. Thus the adjustment of the "green" exchange
rates, as applied in agricultural trade, to the currencies' market
value can be postponed by member-state governments according to
what they regard as their "national interest", be it the defence of
domestic consumers against inflation (in the case of currency devalua-
tion) or the protection of domestic farmers against import competi-
tion (in the case of currency revaluation). The system of "monetary'
compensatory amounts" has not only increased the differences in
agricultural price levels between the member countries considerably
- temporarily even beyond the differences existing before the incep-
tion of the CAP -, it has also exposed the cohesion of the Community
to serious strains, as is vividly demonstrated by recurrent disputes
among the member governments, and between these and the EC Com-
mission, over the amounts of border payments and charges to be ap-143
plied in concrete situations and over the intra- Community distribu-
tion of these amounts.
One may argue, in retrospect, that failures of the CAP were neither
embodied in the Treaty of Rome nor are they necessarily to be de-
rived from decisions on the main principles of the CAP. Nonetheless
it cannot be overlooked that the agreements made by the original Six
at the Stresa Conference (1958) in fact contained a considerable poten-
tial for neglecting fundamental economic rules on the efficient use
of scarce resources in market-oriented economies. The ill-conceived
provision for a "Community preference" was an invitation for abuses
of different kinds; the principle of unlimited "financial solidarity"
gave every member government the possibility to commit the partner
states to the co-financing of national agricultural policies [Koester,
1977a] . For instance, while national measures to improve agricul-
tural structures usually involve strong production-increasing effects,
the costs of getting rid of excess production do not have to be borne
alone by the country which carries out these measures, but by all
member countries according to their shares in financing the common
budget.
The operation of a system of market organization as envisaged by the
Treaty of Rome would have required that all groups affected by the
CAP were adequately represented in the decision-making process.
Moreover, the policy of market organization would have had to be
co-ordinated more closely with policies in other areas, especially
with national policies of structural reform in agriculture [Schmitt,
1978] . However, the common market organizations were shaped in
a way which gave more weight to farmers' interests than to con-
sumers' interests; and the interests of third countries, which the
Treaty of Rome acknowledges, were not taken properly into account
either. It was foreseeable that by giving the Council of Ministers of
Agriculture the responsibility for deciding on"common" agricultural
prices, the producer bias of the political system in representative
democracies would invariably be reinforced, even more so as farm-
ers enjoyed from the outset of European integration a political in-
fluence on legislators and governments which was disproportionate
to their number. The prevailing rules of the GATT were not forceful
enough to prevent the Council from implementing a protectionist mar-
ket organization that only benefited the farmers. Nor did the con-
sumers effectively organize an anti-protection lobby, for which the
incentive is always small when the losses caused by the CAP protec-
tion are spread over large numbers of individuals. The consumers
in the EC countries being unable or unwilling to counteract CAP pro-144
tectionism, third countries have been deprived of the possibility of
bringing their interests to bear .
The institutional shortcomings at the Community level, which fa-
voured the development of a distorting CAP, are even greater. The
General Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which originally
was conceived as an instrument for guidance and co-ordination inline
with the decisions of the Heads of State or government, makes only
little use of its powers. In the European Commission, too, there is
a lack: of representation of diverging interest groups in decisions on
agricultural policy. The General Directorate for Agriculture can dis-
pose freely of large financial funds (through the EAGGF) and has a
specialized staff not only to run the Common Market organizations
but also to deal with competition, foreign trade, customs and legal
matters. Thus the decisions in agricultural policy mainly reflect the
attempt to settle only differences in national agricultural interests
and this is achieved far too often by finding the lowest common de-
nominator: When proposals of the Commission are deliberated on by
the Council of Ministers, as a rule an individual member country will
criticize the proposal and announce that he would be able to agree only
if certain national demands were admitted to the package for deci-
sion. This will be the starting signal for the other countries to pre-
sent their demands as well. All countries' claims are then integrated
into the Commission
1 s recommendation and the proposal thus modi-
fied is finally passed unanimously
1. In this manner, each member
country pushes through its national claims, and presumably acqui-
esces that in due course it will have to accept the national interests
of the partner states as well. Such logrolling could have been pre-
vented from emerging if the member countries had been prepared
to take Council decisions by (qualified) majority, as the Treaty of
Rome indeed permits on many questions. But the French government
has always resisted this idea (most ferociously during the period in
the de Gaulle era, known as the "empty chair" crisis, when it even
boycotted Council meetings, so that the unanimity requirement has
become the rule (Chapter I).
2. Problems Posed by the New Entrants
The entry of three further countries into the Community will in itself
represent a substantial burden, given the present institutional frame-
1 The process of decision making in the Council of Ministers of Agricul-
ture is vividly described by Eisenkramer [1980 ] . See also Koester [1981 ] .145
work. There will be a greater dispersion of national agricultural in-
terests and possible difficulties of conciliation may contribute to para-
lyzing Community policies. It must be feared that the ensuing further
fragmentation of the decision-making process will continue to pro-
mote economically inefficient decisions. These apprehensions result
from the fact that Greece, Portugal and Spain will want to find their
agricultural interests reflected in the CAP decisions in which they,
of course, will be participating as fully fledged members. The agri-
cultural sector in these countries is much more important than on
average in the EC 9. And the effects of the CAP in these countries
will not be of an only marginal importance to the agricultural mar-
kets in the enlarged Community. In the EC 12 there will be almost
50 percent more agriculturally used land than in the EC 9 (Table 41).
Land use in the applicant countries is substantially different from that
in the EC 9 on average, primarily due to geographical and climatic
factors. In the EC 9, "northern" temperate-zone products dominate
(wheat, barley, sugar-beet, beef and pork). By contrast, the entrants
mainly produce Mediterranean commodities; their agricultural struc-
tures are quite similar to those in Italy and Southern France. The
share of permanent crops (citrus, olives, fruit, wine) is far above
the average of the EC 9. For intensive land use, irrigation is needed
in wide areas of these countries. A considerable part of land is left
fallow: about 15 percent of arable land in Greece and one third in Por-
tugal and in Spain. In 1978, only 13 percent of the arable land (includ-
ing permanent crops) in Spain, 25 percent in Greece and 17 percent
in Portugal were intensively irrigated [Balz et al., 1981, p. 501 ] . In
each of the new entrants the share of livestock production in agricul-
tural GDP is far below the EC 9 average. Marked differences between
the new entrants exist with regard to permanent pastures, which are
used in a largely extensive manner and are dispersed over the coun-
try. Their share in the total agriculturally used area amounted to
58 percent in Greece in 1976, the corresponding figures for Spain and
Portugal being 35 and 13 percent, respectively.
The share of small holdings in the applicant countries is dispropor-
tionately high compared with the EC 9, while at the same time in Por-
tugal and especially in Spain there are astonishingly large-scale hold-
ings as well (Chapter II). In Portugal, for instance, 45 percent of the
total agriculturally used land was cultivated in 19 76 on holdings with
more than 100 ha (about 0.5 percent of the total number of farms),
85 percent of these holdings being located in the south of the country.
In Spain, holdings with more than 100 ha (about 2.5 percent of the to-
tal number of farms) made up nearly 60 percent of the total agricul-146
Table 41 - Agricultural Structure in Greece, Portugal, Spain and the
EC 9, various years
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Source : Balz et al. [1981, pp. 502 ff. ] . - Eurostat [c, 1978] .
turally used area. By contrast, Greece's agriculture is clearly dom-
inated by small holdings, particularly so with regard to privately
owned arable land including permanent crops. If pastures are includ-
ed, which are mainly municipally owned and cultivated in an exten-
sive manner, the picture changes slightly and the average size of
holdings increases from 3.4 ha to 8.5 ha [Burberg, 1977] .
Even if the technological backwardness, the inefficient land-tenure
patterns and the low land-use intensity in the new entrant countries,
as compared to the EC 9, are taken into account, it is not unreason-
able to expect that Greek, Portuguese and Spanish producers will be
responsive to price and income incentives eventually provided by an
extended CAP which will give more support to typical Mediterranean147
commodities. From this it follows that in future the financial and so-
cial costs which the CAP imposes on all member countries could
mount even faster than they have in the past. In order to avoid such
developments it is necessary to take notice of possible changes in the
levels of self-sufficiency for agricultural commodities in an enlarged
Community, an issue, to which we turn our attention next.
3. Production and Self-Sufficiency
Looking at the production and consumption of agricultural products
in the EC 9 and the applicant countries, one sees that the supply situa-
tion differs from commodity to commodity.
In crop production the degree of self-sufficiency in an enlarged Com-
munity would presumably be substantially higher than in the EC 9
(Table 42). This is not so much the case for cereals; here the new
entrants partly have a considerable demand for imports, especially
for feed grain, so that they may be considered an outlet for EC 9 sur-
pluses. The same is true of sugar, where the degree of self-suffi-
ciency could even decline somewhat (still remaining excessively high,
however). The Three are already producing surpluses of the typical
Mediterranean crops. With the exception of apples and pears, the
levels of self-sufficiency are likely to rise, particularly so in olive
oil, wine, peaches and citrus fruit. As a corollary of the increasing
self-sufficiency, and due to the principle of preference of Communi-
ty production, considerable trade diversion may occur, particularly
to the detriment of non-candidate Mediterranean countries (Chapter
VI).
In livestock the new entrants are net importers, particularly of beef
and veal as well as of milk products (Table 43). On these markets
the common budget would be relieved from the need to finance the
uses of production surpluses, provided that the current supply situa-
tion in the applicant countries prevails in the future. However, con-
sumption as well as production of animal products is relatively low
in the applicant countries compared with the EC 9. The degree of
self-sufficiency in the EC 12 would therefore be only slightly lower
than in the EC 9 under conditions of the status quo.

















































































































































































































































































































Source: Eurostat [a; 1980b]. - FAO [b, 1 978 and 1979) . - National Statistical Service of Greece 1b, 1978]. - Office National de Statistique de Grece (Oct.-Dec. 1977 and 1978] , -
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (a, 1977 and 1978] . - Ministerio de Hacienda [b, 1977 and 1978] . - Instituto Nacional de Estatistica [d, 1977 and 1978] .Table 43 - Supply Balance Sheets for Livestock Products in Greece, Portugal, Spain and in the






















































































































































































































Source: Soe Table 42. - Eurostat [1980a). -FAOlb, 1978 and 1979 ]. - National Statistical Service of Greece [b, 1978].150
the markets in an enlarged Community
1. It should not be forgotten
that the new entrants have to adhere fully to the CAP after a transi-
tional period following their accession [Pasca, 1978] . The modus
operandi agreed upon for Greece
1 s entry into the EC shows that it
is attempted to solve the transitional problems in a way similar to
the one practiced in the first enlargement: On the one hand, the new
member countries assume the CAP, including the system of Common
Market organizations and the instruments contained therein, the very
day they enter; on the other hand, problems of adaptation are miti-
gated by transitional regulations. Thus Greece did not adopt Com-
munity price levels at once, but is doing so stepwise. Gaps between
the prices of agricultural products in Greece and EC prices are
bridged by so-called "accession compensatory amounts". Numerous,
still existing national subsidies have to be abolished or to be adjusted
to EC regulations during the transitional period, which in the case
of Greece is five years in principle, and seven years for some "sensi-
tive" products like tomatoes and peaches as well as manufactures
thereof. As to Portugal and Spain, transitional periods of five to ten
years are being discussed.
Once the Common Market organizations come into force in the new
entrant countries, considerable distributional effects will arise.
These countries will then no longer be allowed to import agricultural
commodities at world market prices but will have to pay (higher) EC
prices. At the same time they will receive EC prices for their pro-
duction surpluses, too, irrespective of whether the surpluses are ex-
ported to EC members or to third countries. Under present supply con-
ditions the new entrants would face substantial positive distributional
effects in the market for Mediterranean commodities, whereas these
effects would be negative with regard to milk products, and partly
also to cereals. Calculations of these distributional effects, based
on supply conditions and differences between Community and world
market prices from 1976 to 1978 on average, show positive effects
for Greece and Spain amounting to 50 and 150 million ECU, respec-
tively, and negative effects for Portugal amounting to 25 million ECU
[Kirschke, 1981] .
1 See also the analyses by Roque Amaro [1978] , Solbes Mira [1979] and
Josling [1979, pp. 345 ff. ] .151
4. Possible Supply and Demand Shifts
Of greater relevance for the CAP are the reactions of production and
demand in the applicant countries following the accession. These ef-
fects can hardly be estimated in detail, but an indication of the inten-
sity of the adjustment process can be gained from the differences be-
tween domestic agricultural prices and Community prices. Obviously
even such a comparison of prices is beset with difficulties, as the
price structures differ very much between the new entrants and the
EC 9 as well as among the applicant countries themselves. Further-
more, the statistically reported prices in the applicant countries are
difficult to interpret because the producer prices are often not identi-
cal with the market prices due to consumption or production subsi-
dies or to the impact of other instruments [Grosskopf, Tangermann,
1981] . Finally, there are considerable variations in prices from
year to year, so that price differences observed in single years may
not correctly indicate those gaps that are relevant for allocative deci-
sions, especially not when the price fluctuations are due to exchange-
rate variations.
If we only compare producer prices, we can classify agricultural
commodities in different categories, as shown in Table 44. In gen-
eral, the price level for Mediterranean products is much lower in
the applicant countries than in the EC 9. The difference amounts to
between 25 and 33 percent [Goeman, 1981, p. 372] and is consistent
with the trade position of the new entrants, notably Spain, as net ex-
porters. With regard to "northern" products, the new entrants reach
the Community price level in most cases and even exceed it in a few
instances.
As far as domestic agricultural prices are adjusted in an upward di-
rection (to meet Community levels) one would expect the demand for
farm products to decrease in the entrant countries. But due to the
typical low price elasticities of demand for food this decline will not
be strong. On the other hand, population growth and rising incomes
will presumably lead to an expansion of demand for food. Comparing
demand projections for selected commodities which the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) made for 1990 and assuming that
the new entrants will keep up their national agricultural policy and
adopt, at the same time, the CAP price devices, one finds that the
enlargement would have a distinct depressing impact on demand in
the cases of feed grain and rice in all three countries, of beef and
veal in Greece and Portugal, of mutton and lamb in Portugal and
Spain, of oranges in Greece and Spain, and of pork, poultry and man-152
Table 44 - Summary Overview of Price Differences
8- between Greece,
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Spain (S). -
 cExcept peaches and grapes. -
 dExcept cauliflower.
Sour ce : Josling [1979] . - Grosskopf, Tangermann [1981153
darines in Spain (Table 45). When compared with total demand in
an enlarged Community these demand-decreasing effects would be
only of minor importance. The same holds for the demand-increas-
ing effects, as observable for wheat, milk or lemons.
Table 45 — Enlargement-TSffects on Demand of Selected Agricultural
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S ource : FAO [a] . - Own calculations.
With regard to the effects on the supply side, there is wide-spread
agreement among agriculturalists, including the experts of the EC
Commission, that the new entrants possess a considerable potential
for increasing their agricultural production. Nothing in their soil and
climate conditions, as unfavourable as they may appear in some re-
gions, suggest that production per unit of land and labour should rank
lowest among the West European countries. Of course, agriculture
in the new entrant countries suffers from several institutional, struc-
tural and technological constraints, which can only be redressed over154
the medium and long run, provided that appropriate government poli-
cies are pursued. But it could be possible in the short term already
to increase output considerably by intensifying land use, as would re-
sult from a reduction of fallow areas, a fuller utilization of the instal-
led irrigation capacities and a more wide-spread use of fertilizers.
In the case of Mediterranean products, to be sure, rapid yield in-
creases are quite likely after the accession, especially since price
differences between the new entrants and the EC 9 are especially
large for these products.
For Mediterranean products the new entrants exhibit comparative ad-
vantages in trade with the present EC members. To what extent and
at what point of time displacement of production within the EC (notably
in France and Italy) will take place and how much the levels of self-
sufficiency will change, ultimately depends on the shaping of the tran-
sitional arrangements and upon how the common market organization
will be run. To quantify the enlargement-induced changes in produc-
tion for these markets seems hardly possible due to the lack of suf-
ficiently disaggregated statistical data. Moreover, there is a wide
range of policy devices according to product-specific peculiarities,
seasonal factors and market situations. However, it can be safely
said that the adoption by the new entrants of the present EC regula-
tions for Mediterranean products will generate serious troubles, such
as the following ones.
Competition on the Common Market for vegetables and processed veg-
etables (above all for winter vegetables) will become more severe
due to the enlargement. This will be felt most by farmers in Italy and
Southern France; but even the production of vegetables in greenhouses
in the northern member countries may come under increasing adjust-
ment pressure. Excess production resulting from administrative sup-
port-buying is to be expected to a considerable extent for tomatoes
and cauliflower. Likewise, serious surplus problems have to be reck-
oned with for processed tomatoes, thereby causing sizeable financial
burdens to the common budget, if production aids, which were intro-
duced in 1978, are continued.
Surplus problems have to be expected for the fruit and processed fruit
markets, too. Large increases in production are likely above all for
apples, pears and peaches
1. Substantial burdens for the EAGGF can
1 The extent to which intervention will occur can hardly be estimated be-
cause this would require detailed information about the qualities pro-
duced as well as about harvest times, information which is not avail-
able.155
be anticipated in the light of the aids for processed fruit introduced
in recent years (e.g. for pears and peaches). The CAP authorities
would also have to increase their interventions on the market for cit-
rus fruits once the new entrants adopt the present EC regulations. The
FAO estimates that the price-induced growth of production in the ap-
plicant countries would be 3 percent for oranges and 10 percent for
mandarines [FAO, a, p. 155] . Substantial financial burdens would
also arise for the Community, if the present system of market aids
for citrus fruits at present applied in Italy would be extended to the
new entrants.
Incentives for increasing wine production can be anticipated, too. In
particular for Spain the FAO shows a substantial expansion of pro-
duction following the adjustment of the domestic price level to the
higher EC one. The already existing wine surpluses in the Community
would be raised considerably. According to these projections pro-
duction of table wine would exceed demand in 1990 by nearly 25 per-
cent [FAO, a, p. 146 J . Other experts project the future wine sur-
pluses to be even higher. Thus it seems quite reasonable to assume
that by the 1990s nearly one fourth of the wine production in the EC
12 would be brought to subsidized destination.
Substantial financial burdens for the EAGGF would also result from
applying the Common Market organization for olive oil to the new en-
trants, which together produce nearly 50 percent more olive oil than
the EC 9 does. In the EC 9 olive oil is protected by aiding produc-
tion and consumption; in the applicant countries it is protected by
discriminating against competing oil seeds. Although the EC's pro-
duction assistance is limited to the harvest from trees which were
planted before October 1978, the mere extension of this scheme to
what output nowadays would be in an EC 12 would require financial
resources of 630 million EUA [Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 1980, p.
36 ] . An increase in production has to be expected even if the planted
area is not expanded because the Community limits assistance to
plants in existence before 1978. Price differences between the EC 9
and the applicant countries are substantial, and adjusting to the EC
level would give strong incentives to the producers to use all their
means to increase yields. At the same time domestic demand for
olive oil in the applicant countries would presumably decrease sub-
stantially because the liberalization of oil seeds, which is due after
the accession, might cause considerable substitution of oil seeds for
olive oil. If this is to be avoided, the Community's aid to the con-
sumption of olive oil would have to be raised.156
As to the "northern" agricultural commodities, the outlook is more
mixed (Table 46). The new entrants might face raising prices for
most feed grains, which would involve a considerable deterioration
in the profitability of livestock production. This could be partly com-
pensated by adjusting the feedstuff mixture to the price structure of
the EC, but at present the feedstuff industry in these countries is not
yet ready for such restructuring. There is a lack of productive mills
and feedstuff plants near deep-water harbours, to which low-priced
cereal substitutes could be shipped. Under these circumstances the
production of pork and poultry could decrease in the applicant coun-
tries. Domestic beef and veal production may also decrease, where-
as mutton and lamb production can be "expected to increase consider-
ably because only little concentrated feed is used here. Finally,
available projections indicate that the new entrants may increase the
production of cereals and tobacco following the accession.
In total it can be expected that the implementation of the present CAP
in the entrant countries would seriously aggravate the problems of
production surpluses, of third-country exports displacement as well
as of budgetary burdens. And indeed, an unmodified application of
present CAP regulations does not seem to be sensible. For some
Mediterranean products, for instance, specific instruments are
aimed at strengthening the competitive position of farmers in Italy
and Southern France mainly vis-a-vis competitors from the applicant
countries [Goeman, 1981 ] . An extension of these measures to Spain,
Greece and Portugal would erode the competitive advantages of Ital-
ian and French farmers who would then claim compensation, thereby
causing high financial burdens to the EC. Therefore, the transitional
agreements should provide rather for a gradual reduction of assis-
tance measures in the EC 9 than for their stepwise extension to the
new entrants. A reduction of premiums for processing fruit and veg-
etables and a relaxation of regulations for fresh products would seem
to be particularly urgent. Furthermore, a close scrutiny should be
made of the various instruments for limiting production which may
impair an efficient allocation of resources in an enlarged Community
[Goeman, 1981, pp. 385 ff.; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 1980, pp.
45 ff. ] .
But chances for carrying out such changes of the CAP in the course
of entry negotiations are not favourable. The new entrants expect
gains for their agriculture from entering the EC and they will strong-
ly resist efforts to lower the protection of exactly those products which
they can produce most advantageously. Thus it has to be feared that
demands for lowering CAP protection will not come through, while157
Table 46 - Enlargement-Effects on Production for Selected Agricul-
tural Products
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Source : See Table 45 - Own calculations.
claims to strengthen the protection of Mediterranean products will be
successful. Italy has already complained of protection being higher
for "northern" products than for Mediterranean ones in the EC. De-
mands to adjust the degree of protection of Mediterranean products
to that of the northern ones have not been successful so far, but they
will gain more leverage through the accession of three Mediterranean
countries. If the CAP is continued along the lines of the present mod-
el, the increased power of the producers of Mediterranean commodi-
ties will no doubt prevent the level of protection from being reduced
to the relatively lower one of Mediterranean products or even to a level
at which production surpluses would be eliminated and conflicts with
traditional partners in external trade relations avoided. More likely,
however, such an agreement will be reached which will be the least
painful to the farmers in all EC countries in the short run. This
amounts to saying that the level of protection for "northern" products,
which is already too high in the EC 9, will guide the Community's
price policy for Mediterranean products.158
Due to increasing differences in national interests it has to be feared
that maintenance of the present institutional framework in the EC 12
would lead to an even more inefficient CAP. For a transitional period
there still is the opportunity to consider elementary national interests
via transitional regulations. But once the transitional period comes
to an end it will become necessary to take into account those diverg-
ing interests in CAP decision making. The present system allows for
a certain degree of national autonomy in agricultural price policy only
by using the instrument of "monetary compensatory amounts". But
even if this instrument were to be used intensively, which is likely
to be the case in view of the prevailing inter-country differences in
inflation rates and thus of the recurrent need for exchange-rate ad-
justments, the principle of unanimity for Council decisions might
make the temptation to agree on the lowest common denominator in
an enlarged Community even greater than it was in the EC 9.
An effective limitation of the increase in CAP expenditures, both in
an enlarged Community as well as in the EC 9, can presumably only be
expected when the Community has totally exhausted the revenues avail-
able. In the EC 9 the resource constraint has almost been reached
and has already caused intensified reflections on a reform of the CAP
[Sachverstandigenrat, 1980, pp. 1976 ff. J . If such an effort is not
directed mainly at satisfying agricultural producer interests, it seems
quite obvious that agricultural politicians cannot expect financial re-
strictions to. be eased. This would mean that all financial obligations
emerging from decisions taken by EC institutions would have to fit
into the given framework of the Community, which is delineated by
its own limited revenues. That the availability of own resources
would remain limited has been confirmed by the Council on several
occasions
1. In any case, plans to raise own resources through a
greater share of value-added tax (VAT) have to be accepted by all
member countries (Article 201 of the Treaty of Rome) in compliance
with their national constitutional provisions, which normally means
that a ratification by national parliaments is required. Striving for
raising the EC's VAT share would therefore be a very time-consum-
ing procedure, let alone the fact that it seems very doubtful whether
such a procedure could be completed successfully at all
2 . If the over-
1 For instance by the Council of Ministers of Finance (February 1980),
the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (May 1980) and the Euro-
pean Council (June 1980).
2 The German Federal Parliament made it clear unanimously that it would
not agree with a possible increase of the existing VAT revenues [Gens-
ke, 1981 ] .159
due reform of the CAP is to be enforced it is imperative that the Com-
munity
1 s own revenues should remain restricted and that this re-
striction should not be relaxed in connection with the enlargement.
Thus the aggravation of the agricultural problems by an enlargement
of the EC would make a reform of the CAP inevitable.
5. Reshaping the CAP
A common agricultural policy is an integral part of the Treaty of
Rome. A fundamental reform of the CAP does not, however, neces-
sarily mean that the Treaty itself is being questioned, but rather that
priorities have to be considered and reoriented and that the under-
lying objectives have to be pursued in a different institutional man-
ner [Sachverstandigenrat, 1980, pp. 187 ff. ] . A reshaping of the CAP,
if done appropriately, would represent a contribution to reducing con-
flicts between the basic aims formulated in the Treaty and the actual
policies with their implications.
The Rome Treaty calls for a common market for agricultural prod-
ucts. This principle - as already pointed out - has not dominated the
conduct of the CAP. Only for a short time between 1967 and 1969 did
a common agricultural market in the sense of free intra-Community
trade with agricultural products exist. Until the beginning of this pe-
riod the highly different (national) agricultural price levels had been
brought to a common level step by step. Following 1969, free intra-
Community agricultural trade has again been restricted by the "mon-
etary compensatory amounts". This compensatory system has in es-
sence worked like a system of tariffs and subsidies and thus has led
to distortions in intra-Community agricultural trade, thereby ag-
gravating price differences between the member countries. On top
of this, intra-Community trade in agricultural products is hindered
by a host of national regulations (above all health and hygiene pre-
scriptions and veterinary restrictions), i.e. impediments which can
hardly be reduced in the course of reforming the CAP. They are ele-
ments of different national legal systems, so that they probably can
be dealt with in the course of a general harmonization of legal regula-
tions only.
Preference for Community production is the second main principle
formulated in the Treaty of Rome for CAP; Community preference,
however, does not mean self-sufficiency. To attempt autarky con-
tradicts another principle aimed at contributing to a harmonious de-160
velopment of world trade and to a stepwise abolishment of interna-
tional trade restrictions. These principles of the Rome Treaty have
to be weighed against each other, and according to the differences
in individual country preferences the resulting package of objectives
may differ. However, given continuous over-production of numerous
agricultural products, the principle of Community preference can
hardly be upheld. The same is true for the principle of solidarity in
financing the CAP which still belongs to the golden rules of the Rome
Treaty. Financial solidarity can hardly be invoked to finance excess
production, for a CAP which leads to lasting surpluses was not agreed
upon.
A reform of the CAP based on the Treaty of Rome would have to be
directed above all at liberalizing intra- Community trade in agricul-
tural products, thereby restoring a degree of integration that would
be appropriate to a customs union. It would also have to guarantee
that the Community will behave in a less protectionist manner in agri-
cultural trade with third countries and that it will no longer dump pro-
duction surpluses on the world markets. Being the world's largest
trade block the EC would thus live up to its responsibilities for a func-
tioning world trade order.
Such a policy would above all require a consequent, market-oriented
price policy. Agricultural prices would have to better reflect the de-
velopment of supply and demand in the EC and on the world markets.
A precondition for achieving this would be to relieve Community price
policies from the task of securing EC farmers a suitable develop-
ment of their incomes, a task actually not assigned to price policies
by the Rome Treaty. According to that document reasonable living
standards for the agricultural population were to be guaranteed by
increased productivity in agriculture. Moreover, evidence abounds
that a common price policy is not at all able to generate the expected
income effects. Common price decisions lead neither with certainty
to equal incomes nor to equal increases in income nor to increases
in income equal to those in the average national income. Due to pro-
nounced national differences in facilities for and techniques of pro-
duction, in the size of holdings and in the product mix, common price
increases lead to very different effects on agricultural income in indi-
vidual member countries. Furthermore, since income targets of agri-
cultural policies are embedded in divergent national social prefer-
ences, agreements on income-oriented price decisions can be very
difficult to reach, as experience with the present CAP has demon-
strated time and again. To relieve common price policies of the duty
to pursue income-supporting goals would mean to allow price policies161
to be oriented towards market conditions of supply and demand.
Such a price policy would in principle be compatible with the exist-
ing system of..market organizations. It would, however, have to be
institutionally anchored if the agricultural policy decision-making
process is not to run counter to the proclaimed aims. Such an institu-
tional arrangement could be reached by prohibiting, after a transi-
tional period, the destruction or denaturization of production sur-
pluses with the aid of subsidies, both in EC markets and in world mar-
kets. In order to prevent storage capacities from being exceeded due
to the obligation to intervene, all such obligations would have to be
cancelled simultaneously. Administrative intervention should be con-
fined to cases in which excessive price fluctuations in the internal
market appear, provided that intervention agencies operate in a way
which covers the costs of stabilizing prices.
For the new entrants such market-oriented price policies may seem
less attractive than the present CAP, especially in the light of com-
pulsory intervention being abrogated. They would no doubt prefer a
more carefully directed expansion of agricultural production with min-
imum prices guaranteed by the CAP. The removal of compulsory in-
tervention and the prohibition of subsidized destruction of excess pro-
duction would mean that price guarantees would be eliminated even
for such products which can be produced efficiently in the applicant
countries (mainly Mediterranean products), because they cannot be
stored for a long time. Such a proposal inherently means, therefore,
that the Community would, in order to prevent potential misuse, be
forced to renounce measures for stabilizing internal markets. The
risks accompanying price fluctuations would no longer be socialized
but would have to be borne by the producers. Although expectations
of the new entrants would be disappointed in this respect, strictly
market-oriented price policies can bring advantages for the applicant
countries. For instance, the EC 9 has permanently been generating
production surpluses in those commodities which the new entrants
import. Therefore the applicant countries would gain from strictly
market-oriented price policies because the procurement of "northern"
products would be cheaper and the contributions to the EC budget,
which are necessary to finance the CAP, would be lower.
The institutional reform of the CAP should also provide for less pro-
tection against supplies of non-member countries. This would mean
that within the Common Market organization the Community would
have to reduce the threshold prices at which agricultural imports may
enter the Common Market. In the short run it may be politically dif-162
ficult to reform the CAP on both lines simultaneously, i. e. to re-
duce excess production and to improve the market access for third
countries at the same time. If this were the case it would be advis-
able to postpone the liberalization issue until the pressing surplus
problems have been considerably mitigated. In the meantime the third
countries could take advantage of the improvement of sales prospects
on world markets which would result already from a suspension of
EC subsidized exports. However, the Community should at least prom-
ise in a credible way that market entrance of trade partners will not
be blocked arbitrarily and unforeseeably, as is currently done by
safeguard clauses. As concerns the enlargement, a more specific
problem of external trade relations and external trade policy will
arise, namely concerning the specific arrangements of the European
Community with the Mediterranean countries. As is shown in Chapter
VI, these contracts would be substantially eroded by the enlargement
of the EC 9, especially due to the entry of Spain. The possibility of
preventing these contracts from becoming meaningless and of defend-
ing the Community against far-reaching claims for compensation are
discussed in the follwing chapter.
A fundamental reform of the CAP presumably is feasible only if car-
ried out gradually rather than abruptly. In order to prevent a perma-
nent continuance of the present CAP under the label of a "transitional
regulation" institutional precautions have to be taken. One purposeful
way would consist of fixing a ceiling for CAP expenditures, combined
with the commitment by all member-state governments not to over-
use the financial solidarity clause [Sachverstandigenrat, 1980, p.
188] . The establishment of a ceiling for the CAP expenditures would
involve ensuring that the Council of Ministers of Agriculture could
no longer burden the Community with liabilities to pay without itself
assuming the responsibility for financing the expenditures.
Obviously a substantial obstacle to such a reform would be the risk,
very real in the short run, that farmers within the Community would
be exposed to sizeable income losses. In the long run it is to be ex-
pected that the farmers will share in the overall development of in-
comes, once the structural adjustments, which the lower levels of
protection will induce, have been carried out. Without a temporary
income setback the process of structural adjustment would hardly
be possible. This does not necessarily mean, however, that one should
dispense with income policy for agriculture altogether; rather, that
experience has shown how inefficient an income policy via price poli-
cies with uniform measures all over the EC works.163
The market divergences resulting from uniform EC policies for a sec-
tor within an otherwise incomplete economic union already sought
and found an escape value under the present CAP with the implementa-
tion of the "monetary compensatory amounts". Therefore, the re-
sponsibility for income policies should be left to national authorities
[Thoroe, 1980 ] , as has been the case with regard to income policies
for other groups. The EC should merely limit itself to constituting
a framework for such national activities, not forgetting thereby that
the Treaty of Rome indeed does allow such assistance provided it is
neutral vis-a-vis production. A reform of the CAP need not fail due
to the distributional interests of those member states who profited
the most from transfers from the common budget or from the intra-
Community trade in agricultural products under the present CAP.
Such transfers can be structured much more efficiently than those
linked to agricultural surpluses, as will be discussed in Chapters
VII and VIII. Since in an enlarged Community the problems expounded
above will even worsen, and so will the chances for finding a solu-
tion, the reform of the CAP should be initiated immediately.164
VI. Challenges to the Global Mediterranean Policy
As pointed out in Chapter IV, the EC has established a highly dif-
ferentiated net of bilateral trade relations with most Mediterranean
countries [Henig, 1971; Tovias, 1977; Pomfret, Tovias, 1980].
Greece, Portugal (including Macao) and Spain were included in the
Community's so-called Global Mediterranean Policy- (GMP), though
each with differing arrangements with regard to both coverage and
ultimate aims. The entry of the Three into the EC will evidently pro-
vide them with a competitive advantage over the exports of the other
eleven GMP countries which will not become member states, namely
Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco,
Syria, Tunisia, a.nd Turkey. It is unlikely that, after the completion
of the southern enlargement, the non-candidate Mediterranean coun-
tries will be granted the same conditions of access to the Common
Market for their agricultural products that the new entrants will en-
joy. These countries are therefore much concerned about the even-
tual erosion of GMP preferences in trade with the Community. The
purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the potential impact of the en-
largement on such preferences. The first section deals with trade
in agriculture, the second one with trade in manufactures. Questions
relating to the future of the GMP are discussed in the concluding sec-
tion.
1. Trade in Agricultures
a. Export Similarities
One way of assessing whether or not the Mediterranean countries
will face relative access disadvantages in agricultural products after
the enlargement is to consider the degree of similarity of their agri-
cultural export supply to that of the new entrants [Tovias, 1979, pp.
24 ff. ] . Table 47 gives an overview of the five most important agri-
cultural imports (at the six-digit CCCN) of the EC 9 from each of the
eleven non- candidate GMP countries and of the corresponding com-
peting imports from each of the new entrants in 19 78. The shares
of the sample goods in total EC 9 agricultural imports from the in-
dividual countries range, from 42 percent (Morocco) to 100 percent
(Jordan) and hence represent a sizeable scope in total MediterraneanTable 4 7 - EC 9 Imports of Major Agricultural Products
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agricultural export supply. The lower corresponding shares in the
Community's imports from the new entrants (between 21 and 44 per-
cent) indicate that the degree to which the two groups of countries
are affected by the enlargement differs: In the hypothetical event that
the eleven Mediterranean countries were to become members of the
EC while the new entrants were left outside, the latter group would
be less seriously affected than the group of eleven is in the actual
case of the prospective southern enlargement. The reason is that the
export supply of the new entrants is less concentrated on a few items
and that it seems to be more complementary to, rather than substitu-
tive of, the export assortment of the GMP countries. It should be
noted that 47 percent of the Community's imports of the selected agri-
cultural commodities from the fourteen countries considered is sup-
plied by the GMP countries and 5 3 percent by the new entrants, of
which one, Spain, accounts for the lion's share (two thirds). Thus,
the two groups have proved to be almost equivalent exporters of agri-
cultures into the EC 9 under the pre-enlargement tariff conditions.
This overall pattern may, however, conceal considerable inter-Med-
iterranean-country differences in the export overlap with each of the
new entrants. In order to find out whether or not this is the case, we
have calculated, in analogy to the trade overlap index discussed in
Chapter III, coefficients of "export similarity" (ES), using the fol-
lowing formula [Finger, Kreinin, 19 79] :
ES(ab,c) = 100 [ I min (X. (ac), X (be))]
where X(ac) denotes the agricultural exports of the Mediterranean
country a to the Common Market c, X(bc) represents Greece's, Por-
tugal's or Spain's competing exports to the Common Market c, and
i refers to the five most important agricultural exports (at the six-
digit CCCN level) of each single country (Table 47). The coefficient
can range from 0 to +100 and expresses the percentage of exports
of one country which is matched by another country's exports to the
same market. The closer the coefficient comes to 100, the greater
is the degree of export similarity between the two countries.
The results obtained are reported in Table 48. It is noteworthy that
- Mediterranean agricultural exports compete largely with Spanish
substitutes in the Common Market;167
- Portugal's accession would affect only two countries (Algeria and
Syria) to a considerable extent because of its complementary rather
than substitutive export supply;
- Algeria, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey face the highest export sim-
ilarity (more than 70 percent each) with, and hence competition
from, Spain;
- Algeria is the only country which reveals a high degree of export
similarity with each of the new entrants;
- by contrast, Jordan's total agricultural exports, although negligible
in absolute terms, do not overlap at all with the exports of either
Greece, Portugal or Spain;
- all Mediterranean countries but Jordan exhibit considerable levels
of export similarity, particularly with regard to Spain and to some
extent also to Greece, which implies that the Mediterranean coun-
tries themselves are competing with each other as exporters of
agricultural products to the Community
1.
High levels of export similarity in agricultural exports may, then,
be one of the roots of trade-policy conflicts between the Community
and the Mediterranean countries in the aftermath of the southern en-
largement. Only if the share of agricultural products in the total ex-£
ports of an individual Mediterranean country is low and / or if the mar-
ket access conditions for this particular country do not deteriorate
in comparison with those for the new entrants, can a conflict of in-
terests be avoided. As it is, however, there are several countries
which seem to be quite vulnerable to the consequences of the enlarge-
ment in that they have, compared with this group's average, an over-
proportionate share of agricultural products in total exports to the
EC 9 and an overproportional agricultural export overlap with at least
1 A recent empirical analysis by Pomfret [ 1981 ] tends to confirm our re-
sult, but at the same time differs with regard to some details. For in-
stance, Algeria appears as being less vulnerable to the Greek or Por-
tuguese membership, Lebanon seems to be less threatened by Spain's
competition and Morocco is shown as being more affected by the entry
of Greece and Portugal than our calculations would suggest. These dif-
ferences result mainly from the fact that Pomfret has used a different
product coverage to include all the EC's agricultural imports from the
Three and the non-candidate Mediterranean countries at the three-digit
SITC level (classes 0, 1, 2 and 4). The Finger-Kreinin index obviously
is sensitive to both the choice of product coverage and the level of dis-
aggregation.168
Table 48 - Indexes of Similarity between Agricultural Exports of the
Mediterranean Countries and Greece, Portugal and Spain


















































Source: Calculated from Eurostat [a, 1978] .
one new entrant. The sensitive countries are Lebanon, which is a
small supplier, Cyprus as a medium-sized exporter and most notably
Turkey and Morocco which are the second and third largest exporters
of agricultures among the non-candidate Mediterranean countries
1.
The picture becomes even gloomier inasmuch as the enlargement is
likely to lead to reversals in existing tariff preferences, which are
discussed in the following.
1 Using additional indicators of vulnerability Tovias [1979, pp. 56 ff. ] in-
cludes Egypt and Malta in this group of countries.169
b. Reversal of Tariff Preferences
The empirical analysis of the Community's tariff treatment of major
Mediterranean agricultural exports and of competing exports from
the new entrants yields, to begin with, an unexpected result (Table
49): Already prior to the enlargement, hypothetically competing ex-
ports from Greece enjoyed a more favourable treatment than the ac-
tual exports of most Mediterranean countries (the exceptions are Al-
geria and Tunisia). This is remarkable indeed, because the majority
of the sample items were included in the concession schedules of the
bilateral trade agreements which the Community concluded with the
Mediterranean countries concerned. It appears that the EC 9, on the
basis of the 1962 Treaty of Association, had considerably lowered
the tariffs on agricultural imports from Greece by the end of the
1970s, regardless of the fact that the Mediterranean countries were
supplying similar products. Whereas all Mediterranean countries
(except for Jordan) enjoyed a preference margin above that of the
MFN tariff, their preferences vis-a-vis Greece were eroded before
Greece's accession to the Community. Hence the Greek entry might
not cause serious additional trade discrimination against Mediter-
ranean countries.
The picture changes with respect to Portugal and Spain. In the case
of Portugal, only Algeria and Syria may be vulnerable, since the ex-
port similarity is high (Table 4 8) and so is, for Algeria, the pref-
erence margin (Table 49). But the non-candidate GMP countries would
suffer most from the reversal of preferences vis-a-vis Spain, once
this country becomes an EC member state. Both the export similarity
and the preference margins in favour of the Mediterranean countries
(with the exception of Lebanon and Turkey) prevailing at the end of
the 1970s were considerable. The preference margins reflect the well
known reluctance of the Community to open the Common Market to
Spanish agricultural products. After Spain's (and for that matter Por-
tugal's) accession to the EC the comparatively better tariff treatment
of non-candidate Mediterranean suppliers is bound to worsen con-
siderably. Morocco and Cyprus which were already identified as par-
ticularly sensitive on the grounds of overall export similarity and
agriculture-intensive export baskets, will suffer again, because in
1978 they still enjoyed fairly high preference margins vis-a-vis Spain.
Morocco will regard the fact that its major agricultural exports to
the Community are overproportionately subjected to duty-free ceilings
as especially harmful. The other two relatively vulnerable countries,
Lebanon and Turkey, may not be exposed to additional discrimina-
tion, since their preference margins in relation to Spain were already
fully eroded by the late 1970s.'170
Table 49 - EC Preference Margins of Mediterranean Countries vis-a-
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See for the breakdown of major agricultural exports Table 47, Tariff Rates have been
weighted by the EC import values recorded in Table 47. Specific tariffs have been con-
verted into ad valorem rates. - bAverage tariff rate imposed under the assumption that
the EC 9 imports the same amount of Mediterranean country major agricultural goods from
the new entrants. -
 cThe agricultural exports of this Mediterranean country partly face
variable levies. As a proxy for the variable levies in 1978, the difference between the
intra-EC import unit value and the extra-EC import unit value for the product concerned
has been applied.
Source: See Table 47. - EG [ 1978a ].
Furthermore, the adjustment shock of a suddenly discriminatory
treatment would be intensified wherever the system of variable levies of
the CAP would be extended to include Mediterranean agricultural prod-
ucts (in addition to the northern temperate-zone commodities). In this
event, the new entrants would benefit from shifting the lower extra-
EC (Mediterranean) prices for competing agricultural products up to
the level of protected intra-EC prices to which the entrants could ad-
just after the accession. Since, in 19 78, variable levies were still171
imposed on agricultural imports from both the new entrants and the
non-candidate Mediterranean countries, the preference margins
shown in Table 49 do not reveal the prospective impact on these mar-
gins of a variable-levy system from which the new entrants would be
exempted
1. However, the high average tariff level of Egypt, Lebanon,
Malta and Tunisia (Table 49, Column 1), which export CAP products
subjected to variable levies, suggests that the scope for protecting
domestic farmers in Greece, Portugal and Spain at the expense of
suppliers from the other Mediterranean countries may be consider-
able.
Apart from the full erosion of preference margins and the protective
effects of the variable-levy system, there is an additional source of
discrimination against non-candidate Mediterranean countries. It af-
fects the suppliers of non-CAP exports who only enjoy preferential
treatment by the Community if they sell at pre-fixed minimum prices
(Morocco's exports of canned sardines are a case in point). The
link between concessions and minimum prices makes the preferential
treatment redundant after the enlargement. In any case the new en-
trants will enjoy an essential tariff advantage in the Common Mar-
ket resulting either from the CET at a MFN level without minimum
prices or from the preferential tariff plus minimum prices. As the
GMP-related trade agreements provide for frequent adjustments of
the minimum prices (so that the Community can neutralize cost ad-
vantages of the beneficiaries) they mean a more effective privilege
to the new entrants (and presumably greater inefficiencies in agri-
cultural resource allocation) than the sole reversal of tariff pref-
erence margins.
The discussion so far leads to the conclusion that the enlargement
will especially jeopardize the tariff concessions made by the Com-
munity to the non-candidate Mediterranean countries with regard
to agricultural products which are subjected to variable levies or
minimum prices. What remains to be settled is the question of how
the enlargement may affect the tariff concessions for those imports
on which only duties are levied. Much will obviously depend on the
cost differentials between the new entrants and the other Mediter-
ranean countries. Unfortunately, data on suppliers' prices at a suf-
ficiently high level of disaggregation are not available. We can there-
fore only make an attempt to assess the value of tariff concession
1 One Maltese product (grape juice) was subjected to duties plus variable
levies instead of only to variable levies, as was the case for the com-
peting Greek product. This explains the high negative preference mar-
gin of Malta vis-a-vis Greece.172
indirectly and approximately. For this purpose a comparison is made
between the cif-import-unit values (instead of between the market
prices) of agricultural imports of the EC 9 that originated either in
one of the new entrants or in one of the non-candidate Mediterranean
countries, differentiating between an import under MFN tariff condi-
tions (i.e. under the CET) and under conditions of preferential tariff
treatment. The following formulas have been used to calculate the im-
port-price differentials (IPD):
IPD = ( M^M -
1 >•
 10°
IPD = „ -1 • 100
where P and P stand for the unit value of EC 9 imports from the mm
new entrants and the other Mediterranean countries, respectively,
M M
whereas t . and t represent the CET and the preferential tariff
mfn pre
rate, respectively, which the Community applies to its imports from
Mediterranean countries (all imports at the six-digit CCCN). The ref-
erence situation is that of a duty-free access of the new entrants to
the Common Market.
The results for six selected Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt,
Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) in 1 978 are shown in Table 50
1.
1 Agricultural imports which are subjected to EC's minimum prices have
been excluded from comparison because of the inherent distortion of the
corresponding unit values of imports. Undetectable distortions may
remain to the extent that there is scope for monopolistic pricing by in-
dividual suppliers of single commodities or that exports are controlled
by governments or that importing firms possess some monopsonistic
power.173
Table 50 - Impact of EC 9 Tariff Preferences for Mediterranean Coun-
tries on Import Price Differentials
3 between Competing
Agricultural Products from Selected Mediterranean Coun-
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ook place in 1978. For
Source : See Tables 47 and 49. - EG [1978b] .176
Four major features are noteworthy: Firstly., there is again a clear
indication that the Mediterranean countries compete with Spanish sub-
stitutes in the Common Market als'd'with regard to agricultural prod-
ucts for which they have claimed and obtained preferential treatment.
As competitors of the Mediterranean countries Greece and above all
Portugal evidently lag behind Spain's position.
Secondly, the evidence is mixed as to the question of whether import-
price differentials (before tariffs) between agricultural commodities
supplied by both groups of countries become smaller or larger when
the Mediterranean countries are granted tariff preferences and their
competitors, the new entrants, enjoy a duty-free access to the Com-
mon Market. For instance, take the Community's imports of pre-
pared capers and olives (CCCN 2002.60) from Morocco. This coun-
try would appear less competitive than Spanish suppliers if the MFN
tariff rate were imposed on its imports; thanks to the preferential
treatment, the price disadvantage is transformed into a price ad-
vantage for Moroccan exporters of this product. Vis-V-vis Greece
and Portugal, the preferential treatment of Moroccan suppliers even
widens their price advantage which already exists under MFN ac-
cess conditions. This latter pattern also appears in Algeria (pre-
pared capers and olives, orange juice), Egypt (dried garlic) and Tu-
nisia (prepared capers and olives, other prepared fruits). On the
other hand, the figures presented in Table 50 bring out numerous
cases in which price disadvantages faced by Mediterranean suppliers
under MFN access conditions (negative sign) are only partially nar-
rowed through preferential treatment.
Thirdly, if we exclude from the sample those products for which im-
port-unit value differentials exceed 100 percent (in the one or the
other direction) so that effective price competition can be assumed
to be low, unit values of EC 9 imports from the new entrants appear
to be generally lower than those under MFN access conditions from
Mediterranean competitors. This is also the case if preferential
rates are applied to imports from the Mediterranean countries in-
stead of MFN treatment. To the extent that the ratio of unit values
reflects the import-price ratio, existing price advantages of the
new entrants would only be partly offset by the Mediterranean pref-
erences. Exceptions from this general pattern refer to the Com-
munity's imports from Algeria and Egypt which compete with Spanish
substitutes, as well as to the imports from Algeria which compete
with Greek goods. In these cases preferences do affect the average
price differentials by shifting the price advantages from the new en-
trants to the Mediterranean countries when preferential tariffs, rath-
er than MFN rates, are imposed upon their exports.177
Fourthly, price differentials (before tariffs) in favour of the new en-
trants do not exceed 25 percent at the maximum, as measured by the
total average of the six Mediterranean countries' combined products
vis-*a-vis that of each entrant country, and they shrink to 16 percent
at the maximum after preferential tariffs have been applied
1. That
means that given an average concession rate of customs duties of
about 30 percent of the MFN rate for Mediterranean agricultural prod-
ucts eligible for preferential treatment, zero tariffs on imports from
both origins would cut down that average price differentials to about
12 percent (vis-a-vis Portugal and Spain) and hence contribute to mit-
igate the accession-induced tariff discrimination against Mediter-
ranean suppliers. In the case of the Mediterranean sample countries
competing with Greece, price differentials would even disappear al-
most completely if the tariff discrimination were eliminated.
All in all, and even though a significant part of agricultural trade be-
tween the Community and the Mediterranean countries remains out-
side the preferential treatment and numerous preferential items are
subjected to ceilings, it seems that the enlarged Community could
still provide considerable trade assistance to those countries by abol-
ishing the tariffs on preferential Mediterranean supplies. The ob-
served relatively low average price differentials between imports
from the new entrants and the non-candidate Mediterranean countries
should make such a trade policy quite effective from the point of view
of the latter.
c. Higher Levels of Self- Suf f icienc y
However, this conclusion rests on a short-term static analysis of
tariff-rate changes and their incidence on import prices. It neglects
to take into account that, irrespective of tariffs, the post-accession
price ratios will probably differ from the pre-accession ratios if the
new entrants succeed in receiving the same EC-internal transfers
and subsidies for their agricultural commodities as the northern mem-
ber states do for their main temperate-zone products. In this case,
the domestic prices will be fixed above world-market price levels by
means of quantitative import restrictions, minimum import prices,
variable import levies, guaranteed producers' floor prices and ex-
port subsidies, all corresponding to measures employed within the
framework of the CAP which harmed the Mediterranean countries
1 Calculated from Table 50. The products for which price differentials
exceed 100 percent are disregarded.178
already in the past [Marsh, 1976 ] . In Chapter V we have shown that
the adoption of the CAP by the new entrants is likely to result in ad-
ditional surpluses and higher levels of self-sufficiency. It should be
noted here that whenever the CAP encourages the production of goods
of which the new entrants are net exporters or in which the degree
of self-sufficiency in the EC 9 is high already, the enlarged Com-
munity will presumably consider the restoration of import restric-
tions against agricultural supplies from the Mediterranean countries.
Thus Mediterranean tariff preferences are likely to be subjected to
lower ceilings. The Mediterranean suppliers will then find it increas-
ingly difficult to benefit from their attempts to reach and maintain
international price competitiveness.
As can be seen in Table 51, the levels of self-sufficiency will rise
after the enlargement for the majority of agricultural products in
which the new entrants and the Mediterranean countries compete with
each other (assuming the 1978 trade flows and production values will
prevail). The two exceptions refer to cereals and sugar, where both
the new entrants and the Mediterranean countries are net importers.
But for this very reason there is no scope at all for increasing Med-
iterranean exports of these two products. As to the other commodi-
ties, note should be taken of the pre-enlargement levels of self-suf-
ficiency and the extent of their increase in the EC 12. The most spec-
tacular increases - and hence the worst news for the Mediterranean
countries - will be achieved in oranges, grapefruits and other citrus
fruits as well as in raisins and dates
1. These are products which,
prior to the enlargement, Mediterranean countries could export to
the Common Market without facing excessively restrictive ceilings.
The high accession-induced increase in the degree of self-sufficiency
for these products gives rise to serious doubts that this status quo
ante will be maintained in future, too. If the enlarged Community im-
poses tighter ceilings and other restrictions on imports of these goods
from the Mediterranean area, it will adversely affect Morocco and
Israel the most.
The perspectives of market access after the enlargement seem even
worse for the Mediterranean countries in the case of wine than for
citrus fruits. The reason is that domestic production exceeded ap-
parent consumption already in the EC 9 (Table 51), so that the Com-
munity authorities have resorted to severe import barriers via ref-
erence prices and ceilings for individual sub-items of wine irrespec-
1 For further analyses of changing levels of self-sufficiency in an enlarged
Community, see Kersten et al. f 1978 ] and Guth and Aeikens [l981 ].179
Table 51 - Estimated Share of Domestic Production in Apparent Con-
sumption
a in the EC 9 and in the EC 12 for Selected Agri-




































































































Domestic production plus extra-EC imports minus extra-EC exports. Changes in
stocks have not been considered.
Source: Calculated from: FAO [b, 1978]; Eurostat [a, 1978]; Min-
isterio de Hacienda (b. Part I, 1978]; Instituto Nacional de
Estatistica [b, Vol. IV, No. 12, 1978]; Office National de
Statistique de Grece [Oct.-Dec. 1978] .180
tive of the enlargement. As the domestic production of wine in the EC
12 would exceed internal apparent consumption by more than 20 per-
cent (given the 1978 data) extra-EC 12 imports are likely to be in-
creasingly restricted, the effects of which will be felt in particular
by Cyprus, Tunisia and Algeria. These countries will also be affected
in third markets in case the Commission disposes of wine surpluses
by dumping them outside the enlarged Community (as is common prac-
tice for a number of CAP goods).
2. Trade in Manufactures
For at least five Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,
Malta and Syria) EC trade preferences for agricultural goods are of
little relevance as a negotiation topic, because the share of these
goods in their total exports to the EC 9 is small (less than 6 percent
at the end of the 1970s). Agricultural exports of the other countries
of the region have also gradually lost in relative importance, so that
in 1978 the maximum share of agricultural products in a country's
total exports to the Community was held by Cyprus with 50 percent,
followed by Turkey (4 3 percent) and Morocco (4 2 percent). Hence, im-
proved market-access conditions for semi-manufactures and manu-
factures (CCT chapters 25-99) are at least as important an issue from
the Mediterranean countries' point of view as that of trade policy with
regard to agricultural products. Not only do the present export sup-
ply patterns of these countries make for a continued interest in an
open Common Market after enlargement, but also the stated devel-
opment objectives which imply profound structural changes towards
export-oriented industrialization in years to come.
At first glance, Mediterranean countries do not seem to face any se-
vere EC trade barriers even after the enlargement because most of
their manufactured exports to the Common Market (textiles express-
ly excluded, however) are already non-dutiable either under the bi-
lateral trade preferences or under the multilateral non-reciprocal
trade concessions of the GSP [ Yannopoulos, 1977] . Indeed, the Med-
iterranean countries enjoy the option of claiming preferential treat-
ment under either system and of choosing the more favourable one,
which for most of the products is the bilateral trade arrangement be-
cause of its open-ended character and of its more liberal rules of
origin [Borrmann et al. , 1979, pp. 175 ff. ] . However, all this should
not lead to the view that the market-access issue is, with regard to
manufactures, not likely to pose serious strains on the trade rela-181
tions between the enlarged Community and the Mediterranean coun-
tries left outside.
To begin with, irrespective of the sectoral structure of Mediterra-
nean manufactured exports, the preferences will generally be eroded
once the new entrants benefit from duty-free supplies to the Common
Market in all groups of manufactures, whereas some of the compet-
ing Mediterranean exports will still be dutiable or subjected to ceil-
ings. Secondly, Mediterranean preferential exports face rules of or-
igin and hence minimum requirements as to local value added con-
tent; such restrictions do not exist within the Community. Thirdly,
and this is the most important aspect because of its trade-deterrent
potential, the new members may claim the same non-tariff protec-
tion for their domestic industries against "excessive imports" as the
old members did against imports from NICs.
The existing barriers against textile imports from Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia illustrate this latter point. These countries did not join
the MFA (neither in 1973 nor in 1978), so that quasi-voluntary ex-
port self-restraint provisions were imposed on them in order to
"protect" the MFA signatories. The same provision was even ap-
plied to Israel, Egypt and Turkey although these countries subscribed
to the MFA; Turkey's status of association did not rule out EC re-
strictions on its manufactured imports either. Once they reach full
membership, Greece, Portugal and Spain will change sides, shift-
ing from export-restricted countries to export-restricting countries.
We know already that Greece joins in EC 9 arrangements within the
MFA as well as the corresponding bilateral export self-restraint
agreements, extended now to Greek imports from third countries
including the Mediterranean textile exporters. Moreover, Greek ex-
ports to the EC 9 will be released from quantitative restrictions after
the accession is completed; thus the quasi-voluntary export self-re-
straint provisions against Greek textiles which the Community im-
posed in 1978 for four sub-markets (France, Italy, the United King-
dom and Benelux) will disappear. Portugal and Spain might try to
reach similar agreements. Whereas restrictions of the access to the
Greek, Portuguese and Spanish markets do not imply new elements
of protectionism because of the various national quantitative restric-
tions which the new entrants have been applying for years anyway
(see Chapter IV), the removal of restrictions between the EC 9 and
the Three clearly means a discrimination against Mediterranean sup-
pliers of textiles versus competitors from the new member countries.182
The extent to which individual Mediterranean suppliers of manufac-
tures are likely to encounter an accession-induced discrimination
depends mainly on the overall degree of protection in the enlarged
Community, on the competitiveness of their export supply and, again,
on the overlap with sensitive manufactured exports from the new en-
trants. Sensitive goods face quantitative restrictions (apart from rel-
atively high MFN tariffs), whereas non-sensitive products do not.
Semi-sensitive goods, as envisaged by the GSP during the 1970s, are
intermediate cases often subjected to import surveillance and abrupt
interventionism by the customs authorities. Table 52 provides a break-
down of EC 9 imports' from Mediterranean countries into those sensi-
tive, semi-sensitive and non-sensitive manufactured goods which are
covered by the GSP
1.
Compared to the total of developing countries (entitled to GSP treat-
ment) the Mediterranean suppliers of manufactures are more sus-
ceptible to the risk of quantitative restrictions imposed by the EC 9
because of the higher share of sensitive products in their manufac-
tured exports (about 40 percent as compared to 2 3 percent in the
case of all GSP beneficiaries). Countries such as Cyprus (75 percent),
Tunisia (62 percent), Malta (60 percent), Turkey (58 percent), but
also Egypt (56 percent) and Morocco (4 7 percent) exceed the Med-
iterranean average considerably and would therefore be affected most
adversely by EC protectionist measures in sensitive sectors. To
what extent such measures would be accession-induced depends on
whether the new entrants also concentrate their manufactured ex-
ports on sensitive items for which they would claim priority treat-
ment after the enlargement. Especially the Greek accession may
lead to trade-policy conflicts because the exports of the Mediter-
ranean countries Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Malta, and Syria overlap
to a considerable extent with sensitive textiles exported by Greece
which account for about 50 percent of the Greek total manufactured
exports (see Table 32).
Irrespective of the enlargement, the textile issue will in any case
be the core of trade-policy disputes between the Community and the
Mediterranean countries concerning manufactures if a renewed MFA
were to link the import increase to the rates of growth of EC inter-
nal consumption and if the Community were then to apply such a pro-
vision to its trade with Mediterranean countries. The high overlap
1 The sample resembles fairly well total KC 9 manufactured imports from
Mediterranean countries. The first six categories from Table 52 account
for about 75 percent of total EC 9 imports from Mediterranean countries
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Source : Microfiche data provided by Eurostat.184
with Greek, and to some extent Portuguese, sensitive textile exports
contributes to aggravating the disputes since vested domestic pro-
ducer interests in the EC 9 countries are supplemented by vested ex-
port interests of at least two of the new entrants.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Mediterranean manu-
factured exports, structured by different degrees of EC 9 market-
access barriers as revealed by the 1978 figures, only provide an over-
view of the protectionist tendencies which these countries faced be-
fore the enlargement. This pattern may not be simply extrapolated
into the post-enlargement period, however. It is quite possible that
the new entrants will adjust their manufactured export supply to the
improved Common Market access conditions (for instance by special-
izing in processed agricultures which were dutiable prior to the en-
largement or by attracting export-oriented subcontracting invest-
ments in metal manufacturing from EC 9 countries) and that they will
then induce the Community to establish new categories of sensitive
items. This seems more likely than a reduction of the scope of sensi-
tive items after the enlargement. Thus the 1978 break-down into
more and less discriminated Mediterranean exports may indicate a
provisional rather than an ultimate state of market-access barriers.
There is another interesting aspect. During recent years, the EC 9
has increasingly split up into two parties. One group includes the
more liberal member states such as Germany, Denmark and the Neth-
erlands; the other group is made up of France and the United King-
dom and to some extent also Italy and Belgium, which usually advo-
cate more protectionism against third-country imports iLangham-
mer, 1981] . In fact, numerous official and concealed national non-
tariff instruments are being used with the aim of delinking the coun-
try in question from the common trade policy and hence restricting
direct imports or indirect imports (via other EC member states)
from third (including Mediterranean) countries. These different at-
titudes also affected manufactured trade between the EC 9 and the
new entrants in the past. In 19 78, for instance, Germany accounted
for 70 percent of total EC 9 sensitive textile imports from Greece;
France, however, for less than 7 percent only. For all non-sensi-
tive items the proportions were a bit more favourable for France
(12 percent) compared with still 60 percent for Germany. In other
words, Germany was the Community's member country which main-
ly absorbed those Greek products where domestic vested interests
urged strict protection. On the other side, France - if at all - opened
its markets mainly towards non-sensitive goods.185
It is evident that after the enlargement France and other EC 9 mem-
ber states will have to abolish their national protectionist measures
against imports from the new entrants, so that the intra-Community
disequilibrium with regard to the absorption of sensitive goods would
become more balanced. However, the national protectionist measures
will still be effective against the Mediterranean countries left out-
side. They may even be intensified if the protection-minded mem-
ber-state governments want to keep the absolute volume of total sensi-
tive imports at the (low) pre-enlargement level irrespective of wheth-
er these imports originate from intra- or extra-EC 12 sources. In
the medium run such policies would jeopardize any common prefer-
ential trade agreements. The reason is that protectionist forces would
sweep over the more liberal partner states if the outside suppliers
were to adjust to the different degrees of openess within the enlarged
Community by concentrating shipments susceptible to protection on
the more absorptive sub-markets (as Greece did in the past).
3. Future Trade Policy Options
There is no strong dissent in literature on the overall adverse effects
of the enlargement for the Mediterranean countries and their pref-
erences, although static views prevail and hence the consequences
for agricultural exports are frequently regarded as much more se-
rious than the impact on manufactured.exports. It would be unreason-
able to expect, as some people do, that the new entrants will concen-
trate their exports on traditional or new markets outside the Com-
munity in order to avoid trade-diversion effects to the detriment of
Mediterranean suppliers. Under the given conditions, price ratios
between the new entrants' exports and their Mediterranean substi-
tutes will change in favour of the former after the enlargement, be-
cause prior to the accession many of their exports still faced duties
and ceilings which will now disappear. Exactly these changing price
ratios, however, will be clear incentives both to expand production
and exports to the EC 9 countries - notwithstanding internal subsi-
dies - and to divert trade away from third markets.
The avoidance, or at least the mitigation, of enlargement-induced
changes in the price ratios between the two regions' exports (the new
entrants and the other Mediterranean countries) is hence the basic
criterion for keeping the GMP alive (provided that this still is a true
aim of the Community). It implies that the non-candidate Mediter-
ranean countries can enjoy an improvement of their access conditions186
comparable to that of the new entrants. Such a provision is essential
for homogeneous products like agricultures where differential tariff
and non-tariff treatment cannot be as easily outweighted by product
differentiation as it is possible in the industrial sector. To a num-
ber of agricultural products such as tobacco, durum wheat, rice,
olive oil, some vegetables and fruits, both the present member states
and the new entrants apply a wide range of farm- support policies in
addition to restricting imports by tariff and non-tariff measures. A
liberalization of Mediterranean agricultural imports by the enlarged
Community would therefore affect the new entrants only in those goods
where differential tariff treatment is the only source of discrimina-
tion. Hence it should be viable to keep the discrimination of Mediter-
ranean countries in agricultural trade within narrow limits after the
enlargement.
In the area of manufactures the same argument holds with respect to
quantitative restrictions. If the new entrants have enjoyed access ad-
vantages vis-a-vis Mediterranean countries before their accession,
these advantages should be frozen, and not extended in the process
of enlargement. In practice this would probably result in the elimina-
tion of ceilings on sensitive Mediterranean exports unless the new en-
trants' exports would still face ceilings in spite of these countries
having become full members of the Community.
Up to now, however, the EC's official approach to the GMP after the
enlargement is not oriented towards the avoidance of enlargement-'
induced changes of the price ratios between the competing exports
from the two areas; nor does the EC seem to be prepared to freeze
the existing differentials in pre-enlargement access conditions. In-
stead, a policy of fiscal compensation seems to be favoured. It con-
sists in encouraging an inward-looking industrialization strategy of
Mediterranean countries by means of financial and technical aid from
the Community. If successful, these countries would become less
dependent on exports into the Common Market. In addition, an intensi-
fied complementary (rather than substitutive) division of labour be-
tween the Community and the Mediterranean countries has been sug-
gested by EC officials. Whether this sort of alternative to a straight-
forward liberalization of trade after the enlargement is a promising
one, can be questioned. Inward-looking industrialization in small coun-
tries in general fails as a development strategy and is bound to lead
to an impasse characterized by losses in real income, unemployment
and a lack of international competitiveness of domestic activities.187
On the other hand, trade diversion in the sense of directing Mediter-
ranean exports from the EC 12 to other markets in the region is an
"alternative" which simply does not exist in the short run, given the
size and demand structure of the Community. A stimulation of intra-
Mediterranean trade by multilateral tariff concessions (within the
1971 GATT scheme of preferences among developing countries) has
not really taken place. The concessions made predominantly affected
complementary raw materials which would have been traded without
concessions anyway [Langhammer, 1980c]. Hence, trade creation
among Mediterranean countries up to now has failed to foster the Med-
iterranean region as an alternative to the Common Market.
In the medium run, some oil-producing Middle East countries may
become major export markets for the Arabian Mediterranean coun-
tries. However, the Middle East is likely to increase the demand for
capital goods rather than that for consumer goods and agricultural
products. This import pattern would relate neither to the actual sup-
ply potential of most of the non- oil-producing Mediterranean coun-
tries nor to their medium-term comp'arative advantages.
Thus both inward-looking industrialization and the exploration of new
export market replacing the EC 12 are clearly inferior alternatives
for Mediterranean countries compared to the absorption potential
of the enlarged Community. It is evident that a deliberate trade lib-
eralization which aims at avoiding enlargement-induced changes of
relative market-access conditions between the two areas would have
to face very hard resistance of both the new entrants' governments and
EC officials. Mediterranean countries which either possess strate-
gically important raw materials and hence may restrict the Com-
munity's access to their supplies (the Maghreb countries, forex-
ample) or which are otherwise politically important (say Turkey),
may break the EC's internal resistance against a continued liberal-
ization of trade after the enlargement [Guth, Aeikens, 1981 ] . Israel
will have to rely on reciprocity and on its diversification potential,
whereas Malta and Cyprus, in addition to Turkey, may claim that
a further reduction of the trade barriers to their exports would cor-
respond to their status as associate countries.
The various arguments which are likely to be raised by different
Mediterranean countries indicate that due to the enlargement the
GMP will encounter tendencies of splitting up. These tendencies are
strengthened by the already visible EC policy strategies to shift the
major instruments of the GMP from trade incentives to aid after
the enlargement. Such a policy evidently meets the vested domestic188
producer interests in the new entrant countries, and in France and
Italy as well, but violates both the spirit and the letter of the var-
ious bilateral agreements with Mediterranean countries as well as
EC consumer interests, and the requirements for an improved re-
source allocation inside and outside the EC. Those advocating pro-
tectionism against the Mediterranean countries on the grounds of pos-
sible short-term vulnerabilities should be reminded that the case for
freer trade within Europe is also a case for unrestricted trade with
third countries, just as it is stated in the Treaty of Rome through the
principles of EC external trade relations. If both the present EC mem-
ber states and the new entrants would take this statement seriously,
they could reduce conflicts with the Mediterranean countries and en-
courage the development of mutually advantageous relations.189
VII. The Regional Dimension
An enlargement of the EC to include countries whose level of eco-
nomic development is far below the average of the EC 9 will sub-
stantially increase regional disparities within the Community. Al-
ready the marked regional differences in income and employment
observable within the present Community are considered to be a prob-
lem which hinders economic development and the process of integra-
tion. Moreover, the political regionalism, which has become appar-
ent in some member countries (and among the new entrants, in Spain)
has one of its roots in the highly divergent economic performance of
individual regions [Gerdes, forthcoming] . Also, regional imbalances
have been given increased attention by the new entrants' governments,
particularly after returning to democracy. Differences in income
and in employment opportunities, which are the most widely used
indicators of the extent of regional disparities, would be much higher
in an enlarged Community than in the EC 9. For instance, in the EC
9, the ratio of per capita income in the richest region (Hamburg) to
that in the poorest one (Western Ireland) amounts to nearly 6:1; in
an enlarged Community this ratio could increase to 10 : 1 due to the
backwardness of a number of Portuguese provinces. In Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain taken together, nearly two thirds of the population
live in regions, in which the average per capita income lies below
or near that of the poorest regions in the EC 9 (Western Ireland,
Mezzogiorno).
These growing regional imbalances may induce an intensification of
regional policy activities within the Community, particularly so as
the Treaty of Rome states that the European Economic Community
was founded to unite the national economies and to promote their har-
monious development by reducing inter-regional development dif-
ferences. This chapter discusses the implications of regional devel-
opment gaps within the Community for the shaping of regional poli-
cies. The first section gives a survey of the inter-regional dispari-
ties as they would appear in the EC 12. In the second section, the
aims and instruments of regional policy in the member states and
the new entrants are presented.- Finally, the third section explores
the possibilities and limitations of a common regional policy.190
1. Regional Disparities in an Enlarged Community
Economic activity exhibits a high degree of regional concentration
within the EC 9. This is already reflected in the EC's regional sta-
tistics (based on 86 regions): On the one hand, 40 percent of the gross
national product (GNP) of the EC is produced in only 10 percent of
the EC area, while, on the other hand, 10 percent of the GNP is pro-
duced in the least populated areas which correspond to 30 percent of
the total EC area [Thoroe, 1981a] . In an enlarged Community eco-
nomic activities would exhibit even higher degrees of concentration:
measured by Gini-coefficients, concentration would be 0. 68 in the
EC 12 compared with 0.34 in the EC 9 (based on 1975 data)
1. From
these coefficients one cannot infer, however, that an economically
inappropriate use is made of land.
The regional concentration of economic activities corresponds to a
concentration of population which is nevertheless not so pronounced.
Referring to regional per-capita-income data, one can see that the
activity differentials are positively correlated with welfare gaps both
within the EC 9 and in the new entrants. The centre of economic ac-
tivities within the EC 9 extends from Northern Italy through Southern
and Western Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Greater Paris
to the Southern and Mid-West regions of the United Kingdom. From
this core towards the periphery the intensity of economic activity de-
clines noticeably; likewise, regional per capita incomes decrease
with increasing distance from the centre
2 . The new entrants fit into
this core-periphery-gradient as well (Figures 3 and 4).
Such a centre-periphery-gradient could already be observed in Europe
throughout the centuries, although the West European centre has
shifted sometimes. Thus in the 16th century, with the formation of
various overseas empires and the decisive importance of natural re-
sources for national wealth, the centre shifted to the Atlantic coast.
With the decreasing economic importance of national control over
raw materials and the decline of the European empires, the Europe-
1 The Gini-coefficient has been computed as a difference between exist-
ing cumulative distribution and cumulative equalized distribution divided
by cumulative equalized distribution. For the formula of computation
used here, see Sen [1973] .
2 For the EC 9 the centre-periphery-gap can be shown as well by distance
functions. With increasing distance from Dtlsseldorf (as reference point
for the core of the EC 9) regional per capita income declines significant-
ly [Giersch, 1959; 1979; Biehl et al. , 1972).191
Figure 3 - The Regional Distribution of Economic Activity in an En-
larged Community, 19 75 (GDP/sq km)
Source: Calculated from Eurostat [b, 1 976 and 1978 ] ; Banco de Bil-
bao [b]; Institute Nacional de Estatistica [a] ; National Sta-
tistical Service of Greece [b] ; Commission Centrale d
T Ela-
boration du Plan de Developpement Economique [1968 ] .192
Figure 4 - The Regional Distribution of Per Capita Income in an En-
larged Community, 19 75 (GDP/Population)
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Source: See Figure 3.
an economic centre moved back to central Europe [ Seers et al. ,
1979].
Regional disparities within the Community have changed only little
since the founding of the EC. The concentration of economic activity
was not substantially different in 1975 from that in 1965. The Gini-193
coefficient was 0. 32 in 1965, 0. 33 in 1970 and 0. 34 in 1975 (based on
EC regional statistics). The concentration of population has changed
little, too. Though there has been marked migration from the periph-
ery to more prosperous regions, these movements have mainly com-
pensated regional'differences in birth-rates. The disparity in per cap-
ita incomes narrowed somewhat in the 1960s, but in the 1970s
it widened again [Thoroe, 1981a]. This relatively stable overall
pattern disguises some sizeable shifts, which reveal strong dif-
ferences in regional growth dynamics. Thus some former high-
income regions lost ground to new prosperous regions. But this de-
velopment is probably more due to the changing conditions in the in-
ternational division of labour than to integration within the EC. Par-
ticularly the strong competitive pressure from the export-oriented
newly industrializing countries, which was concentrated in certain
industries during the 1970s, has generated structural adjustment re-
quirements not only on a sectoral level but also for regions in which
the trade-impacted branches are located and have a high share in out-
put and employment.
One of the reasons why the sizeable regional differences in income
and in employment opportunities prevail in the applicant countries is
that in large parts of these countries agriculture is still the dominant
economic activity. The industrialization process has taken place in
only one or two regions in Greece and Portugal and in only three or
four provinces in Spain. Thus the tendency to'urbanize, which typical-
ly accompanies the industrialization process, has led to substantial
shifts in the regional distribution of population. In Greece, for in-
stance, the population in Greater Athens increased by nearly 40 per-
cent between 1961 and 1971, while in th'e other regions it decreased
by nearly 5 percent on average, and in some individual regions con-
siderably faster (Table 53). In Portugal, substantial increases in pop-
ulation can be seen in the traditional agglomeration centres of Lisbon
and adjacent Setubal, and Porto as well. In the 1960s the population
in other regions declined drastically (Table 54). A similar strong
relationship between industrialization and increase in population can
be found in Spain for the districts Basque-Navarre, Catalonia and
Valencia (Table 55). In Madrid, the Canary Islands and the Balearic
Islands, where employment is dominated not so much by industry but
by services, population increased markedly, too. In Madrid the ex-
pansion of the tertiary sector has improved employment opportunities
notably; at the same time this province has become more attractive
for industrialization as well. In the other two regions the increase
in employment is no doubt due to tourism. On the whole, the three






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Banco de Bilbao [bl. - Own calculations.197
population and population density:' the higher the density, the greater
the increase in population
1.
In the less agglomerated areas of the applicant countries (in which
more than half of the working population is employed in agriculture),
industrial activities are raw-material-oriented. The most important
industries in these regions are food processing, beverage, wood and
cork, or leather and fur. In these regions, industrialization and agri-
cultural development are therefore highly inter-related. Moreover,
the industrial activities in the rural areas are dominated by small
enterprises which use traditional technologies based on labour-inten-
sive methods of production. Large factories, applying modern tech-
niques and trying to exploit economies of scale, are concentrated in
the areas of agglomeration.
If the new entrants are to take advantage of inter-industry and intra-
industry specialization within the enlarged Community, a consider-
able amount of structural adjustment will have to be undertaken. This
means that enterprises in the applicant countries will have to intro-
duce more efficient production, organization and marketing methods.
Likewise the benefits from economies of scale and from horizontal
and vertical specialization will have to be exploited, as well as en-
suring that high quality control standards are achieved. These chances
might be seized primarily by the existing industrial (urban) centres
in which agglomeration already offers considerable advantages. In
the backward (rural) areas, however, the small-scale industries
would be exposed to increasing competition. The consequence in the
applicant countries of the structural adjustment caused by the EC en-
largement may therefore consist of tendencies strengthening the ag-
glomeration and increasing inter-regional migration. Whether or
not this will happen depends to a large extent on how economic poli-
cies, especially the regional and structural policies, respond to pres-
sures for adjustment at the national as well as at the Community lev-
el. As a matter of fact, the development prospects for the more lag-
gard areas can be influenced by the common trade policy as well as
by the common agricultural policy and the common regional policy.
As shown earlier (Chapter III), the enlargement-induced adjustment
requirements - including regional ones - can be expected to be smal-
ler in the Nine than in the new entrants. Obviously, this does not
mean that single regions within the EC 9 will not be subjected to con-
siderable adjustment pressures. This may be true, for instance, for
1 The correlation coefficients, based on data of the 1960s, are 0.88 for
Greece, 0. 90 for Portugal and 0. 75 for Spain.198
rural areas in Southern France or in Italy which are highly special-
ized in producing Mediterranean products. Producers of these goods
will be faced with sharply increasing competition from the applicant
countries, as already discussed in Chapter V. Industry in some re-
gions of the EC 9 may be affected by increasing competition from the
new entrants, too, mainly from regions in which labour- and raw-
material-intensive industries are of great importance. The enlarge-
ment would thus adversely affect those areas which are already re-
garded as "problem" regions in the sense that economic growth is
relatively slow and unemployment is comparatively high.
In the EC 9 two entirely different groups of "problem" regions have
appeared in the 1970s. One group encompasses the periphery re-
gions which are still strongly oriented towards traditional activities.
Although in these regions industrial employment had risen during the
1950s and 1960s very much, this trend did not continue into the 1970s.
In some cases the share of industrial employment even declined con-
siderably. As opposed to these regions, the other group consists of
old industrial areas which formerly belonged to the advanced high-
income regions. Industrial development of these regions has been
based primarily on the availability of raw materials, which can now-
adays be imported at much lower prices from abroad. In the last
decade the problems associated with the highly agglomerated regions
have influenced regional policies of the EC as well as those pursued
directly by member governments.
2. An Evaluation of Regional Policies
In both the Nine and the Three manifold attempts to influence the re-
gional development have beenmade, whereby the policies were aimed
at reaching efficiency as well as attaining distributional objectives.
Policies aiming at efficiency have tried to promote economic growth
and employment creation in the regions and to mobilize factors of
production not yet fully utilized, so that overall prosperity in the
nation increases. Distributional goals have encompassed policies
to reduce regional differences in income and in employment opportu-
nities. Efficiency and distributional objectives may complement one
another. This would be the case if those regions needy of promo-
tion would at the same time be worthy of it from the point of view
of overall economic growth. But frequently these aims conflict with
each other. From the growth standpoint it would be most efficient
to concentrate factors of production in those regions where the larger199
contribution to increasing the wealth of the nation can be expected.
These may be not the regions most urgently needing assistance from
a redistributional point of view. In the regional policies as pursued
by the member countries these aims are weighted variously; but it
is safe to say that more importance has been attached to the distribu-
tional goals. The right to pursue a regional policy has always been
officially justified in terms of reducing imbalances between areas of
the national territory; and a low standard of living (measured by in-
come per family or per head) is used in all member countries but
France as a criterion to delimit areas entitled to be subsidized by
regional policy measures [ Courbis et al., forthcoming, Chapter III] .
This dominance of distributional aims-is not so clear-cut if other pol-
icies which have a regional impact are taken into account. For in-
stance, government measures which are intended to improve infra-
structure, to promote housing construction or to stimulate research
and development, usually benefit high-income regions much more
than low-income regions. Furthermore, problems of unemployment
in traditionally high-income regions have frequently induced mea-
sures whose impact runs counter to targets for regional redistribu-
tion. Such measures are sometimes implemented within the frame-
work of regional policy, but often by structuring sectoral programs
to interface with certain regions [Adlung, Thoroe, 1980 ] .
If one compares the various regional policies of the member coun-
tries, it turns out that regional assistance has been concentrated on
industry. Even those incentives not explicitly limited to manufac-
turing activities tend to be applied almost exclusively in that sec-
tor. Services and other sectors have usually been neglected. Only
France, Ireland and the United Kingdom have implemented regional
incentives schemes which try to promote the service sector in prob-
lem regions. Within manufacturing activities there seems to be no
discrimination in regional assistance at all, though Italy is an excep-
tion to the rule. There the "Cassa per il Mezzogiorno" (a national
development agency of "extraordinary interventions" in the South of
Italy) provides grants for priority sector projects whose amount ex-
ceeds normal grants by one fifth. Implicitly, however, regional pol-
icy discriminates between industries in the other member countries
as well. This results mainly from the fact that the amount of finan-
cial regional aid is generally tied to investment (rather than to the
number of jobs created by that investment), thereby favouring cap-
ital-intensive industries. Furthermore, the discretionary elements
in the regional policy can easily lead the authorities to discriminate
(perhaps unintentionally); the extent to which this is the case would
be hard to determine, however.200
As to the regional policy configuration in the member countries there
are significant differences with regard to the instruments chosen, the
purpose for which they are considered and the degree to which they
are subsidized (Table 56). Grants, tax concessions and public loans
at preferential terms are made available indifferent combinations and
amounts to firms located in less advanced areas and to investors who
are induced to settle there. The subsidy value of all policy instru-
ments applied in each case can be estimated by adding the subsidy
equivalents of the single measures and then relating this total to val-
ue added [juttemeier, Lammers, 1979]. Calculations of the effec-
tive rate of subsidy of regional policy measures show substantial
differences between member countries as well as between areas of
assistance within countries indeed.
By far the highest degree of regional subsidization was found in Italy
and Ireland. The effective subsidy embodied in capital grants and
loans in these countries exceeds 10 percent. But in the case of Italy
it has to be taken into account that these high effective subsidies ap-
ply for small investment projects only. The effective rate of subsidy
through capital grants and public soft loans for large projects amounts
to only 3. 7 percent. In addition to these subsidies for investment,
the Italian and Irish governments provide additional financial help
to the assisted areas. In Italy, for instance, concessions on profit
taxes and wage subsidies of limited duration are offered. The effec-
tive subsidy equivalent of these wage subsidies depends highly on the
labour intensity of production and the length of time workers have
been employed. Based on average labour intensity, the effective rate
of subsidy can be estimated to range between 2. 8 and 7. 9 percent.
In Ireland, on the other hand, the tax relief for export profits should
be mentioned as an important additional instrument which naturally
increases the above-mentioned effective rate of subsidy. In contrast,
Luxemburg, Belgium and France are at the bottom of the ranking of
effective rates of subsidies. But it should be mentioned that, in ad-
dition to the measures shown in Table 56, France provides allow-
ances in the local business tax and Belgium supplements regional
assistance with aids for the whole economy which are structured
more or less like the regional incentives. Finally, the middle group
consists of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. In these countries the effective rates of subsidy are quite
similar - near 5 percent (about half as much as in Ireland or in
Italy).
Regional policy differences between the member countries are not
limited to the variety of instruments or the effective degree of as-
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and administrative competences. In most countries, regional policy
is embedded in more or less concrete conceptions of spatial devel-
opment and spatial planning which are more comprehensive than re-
gional development and plans. The regional planning authorities usual-
ly lack the competence to make decisions about spending funds for
spatial purposes; they are basically authorized to decide on regional
policy expenditures only, provided that regional planning and spatial
planning are within the same jurisdiction. Otherwise spatial planning
is mainly dependent upon coordination between those ministries au-
thorized to make decisions on spending the money. This coordination
has proven to be very difficult in practice, even if it is institutional-
ized. The aims of overall regional development planning and those
of specific planning are in general not identical. Frequently, long-
term targets of regional planning can hardly be reconciled with the
task of individual departments having to deal with short-term prob-
lems and bottlenecks. But regional policy is dependent upon the as-
similation of targets of regional planning into the planning frame-
work of other departments, as regional goals can only be realized
with the assistance of other departments, not against their will. If
these departments insist on efficiency criteria they can somewhat
redress tendencies of the regional policy to overemphasize distribu-
tional objectives.
Another problem of coordination in member countries' regional poli-
cy consists of harmonizing conceptions and actions of all governmen-
tal authorities involved. Depending on the constitutional provisions,
the competence for regional policy is distributed between the levels
of government in various ways by the individual member states. Thus
in some countries regional policy is highly centralized (France),
while in others it is largely de-centralized (Germany). But in gen-
eral there are always several bodies of government involved in re-
gional policy and regional planning which do not necessarily have
identical targets and hence do not necessarily contribute to a harmo-
nious process of decision making on regional policy. The reason is
that the regions compete with each other for scarce resources and
(mobile) factors of production which they want to attract in order to
stimulate the welfare of their populations. If regional policy were
effectively centralized, these serious problems of coordination would
naturally disappear. But the disadvantage of such a centralization
is that the genuine interests of the regions would probably not be cor-
rectly reflected in the national plans.
Turning to the new entrants, it appears that distributional objectives
have been of lesser importance than in most member states of EC 9.
In light of the relatively low level of economic development in the203
applicant countries, general overall economic growth seems to have
been given priority. As emphasis was laid on import-substituting in-
dustrialization for a long time (Chapter II), the agricultural sector
was discriminated against, which contributed to relative stagnation
in the rural areas. The government made only modest attempts to
counteract the regional disparities which derived from these devel-
opments. Rural areas were helped by granting assistance to agri-
culture and by improving the overall infrastructure. Regionally spe-
cific assistance to industrial activities varies considerably in the
individual applicant countries.
In Portugal, for instance, there has been no direct regional subsidy
to industries; only within the framework of tax allowances (general
as well as sectoral) is a certain regional differentiation apparent. To
be sure, regional policy in Portugal has yet to be built up, and as a
matter of fact, prior to 1974 it practically did not exist [SimSes Lo-
pes, 1980] . In the years following 1974 very ambitious targets were
set for regional policies, but they have not been realized for lack of
financial resources.
In contrast, there is a more ambitious regional policy in Greece
[Kioukis, 1979] . The government tries to influence the regional pat-
terns of industrial investment by means of a differential system of
financial aids. The subsidy-equivalent of the policy instruments ap-
plied in each case can hardly be estimated because the assistance
mainly consists of allowances on tax and liabilities similar to taxes,
about which no data are available. Special depreciation allowances,
exemption from contributions to the social securtiy system and sim-
ilar institutions, reductions of the value-added tax and preferential
tariff treatment of importers are granted to five different categories
of assistance areas, depending upon the individual regional charac-
teristics. In addition to these investment premiums, interest sub-
sidies and grants for buildings are given, again differentiated for the
different types of areas. Furthermore, industrial development in
Greece is also influenced by the Greek Bank for Industrial Develop-
ment. And apart from all this, there is a myriad of laws and admin-
istrative regulations aiming at a decentralization of industry. But,
despite all these efforts, the regional concentration of industry has
increased considerably. Scarce resources available for regional pol-
icy have been widely scattered, so that the incentive to invest outside
the highly agglomerated areas was consistently too small I Kioukis,
1979, pp. 209 and 231] .
In Spain regional policy has rested on the Perrouxian growth-pole204
approach[Richardspn, 1975]. Although originally a balanced par-
ticipation of all regions of the nation was envisaged, regional as-
sistance is primarily oriented towards development poles (for ten
years at most) and towards so-called decongestion polygons. The
first development poles were established in 1964 in seven provinces
(Burgos, La Coruna, Vigo, Valladolid and Zaragoza in the North as
well as in Sevilla and Huelva in the South). Subsequently, development
poles were also established in Cordoba, Granada, Oviedo, Logrono
and Villagarcia de Arosa. For the industrial decongestion of big
areas of agglomeration (notably Madrid and Barcelona), five indus-
trial "polygons" were set up in Toledo, Guadalajara, Aranda de Due-
ro, Alcazar de San Juan and Manzanares el Real. The settlement
of industries is assisted by grants for investment (up to 20 percent
in decongestion areas and up to 10 percent in development poles), by
public loans and interest subsidies, by tax allowances, and by exemp-
tion from import duties on products not produced in Spain. In addi-
tion, the improvement of infrastructure in development poles has
priority. In general, the results have fallen short of official expecta-
tions [Donges, 1976b, pp. 125 ff. ] . Neither have the tendencies of
regional concentration been redressed, nor have the income and job
opportunities been significantly improved or serious shortcomings
in the physical infrastructure removed. Centralized regional plan-
ning was opposed by many people in the provinces time and again.
The process of political decentralization, which is currently under
way, will presumably also lead to a complete reorientation of the
regional policy framework in this country.
The Community itself supplements the broad range of activities in
regional policy in the individual member countries by a regional pol-
icy of its own, which took shape recently. Thus the Regional Devel-
opment Fund (established in 1975) contributes to the financing of na-
tional policy measures according to commonly agreed fixed quotas
for each member state. Since 1979 the EC has also been able to car-
ry out specific programs of regional development, mainly for the
benefit of problem areas (such as Southern Italy and Ireland) and re-
lated to investments in industry, the service sector and infrastruc-
ture; the financial means available for such purposes have been lim-
ited to 5 percent of total expenditures of the Regional Development
Fund
1. When the country quotas were established, considerations
1 In the 1982 draft budget the financial provisions for these programs ap-
pear substantially higher. The reason is that the Commission intends
to prevent new disputes over the United Kingdom's financial contribu-
tions by promoting specific regional programs for that country.205
about inter-country income redistribution and about the compensa-
tion for financial burdens in other fields of Community policies (nota-
bly with respect to CAP) played a major role LStrasser, 1979,, pp.
328-342] . Thus Italy and the United Kingdom were allocated the lion's
share of the resources of the Fund. These transfer and compensa-
tion considerations will be of utmost importance in Community re-
gional policy after the. second enlargement, too. Therefore, the ques-
tion might be asked whether the Community could increase its efforts
in the field of regional policy and thereby relieve the CAP of tasks
which cannot be accomplished efficiently by agricultural policies.
3. On the Scope of Community Regional Policies
In accordance with the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, which states
that through integration'the development disparities between the EC
regions should be diminshed, an enlargement will involve consider-
able tasks for the Community to solve. As shown above, the EC 12
will face even larger regional discrepancies than the EC 9. Further-
more, regional imbalances within the applicant countries can be ex-
pected to increase in the process of their economic integration. High-
ly agglomerated areas can most easily make use of opportunities of-
fered by a larger market and benefit from internal and external econ-
omies. The increase in efficiency in the centres of agglomeration
induced by integration will enhance the attractiveness of these areas
and encourage the inflow of mobile factors of production, from which
the already existing tendencies to agglomerate will gain fresh impe-
tus. It is a matter of conjecture whether such a self-intensifying pro-
cess of spatial polarization can be avoided
1. Countering the forces
which aggravate agglomeration are factors such as the limited avail-
ability of immobile factors (land, environment), which become scarce
and thus more expensive in the process of agglomeration, thereby
inducing a regional dispersion of production activities. Transporta-
tion costs which increase for centralized production in the case that
demand is decentralized can also promote this process.
As already mentioned, it is difficult to clearly determine (with avail-
able EC data) whether the spread or backwash effects in the process
of integration have dominated in the EC 9. There is some evidence,
1 Theory does not lead to unambiguous results. See, for instance, the dis-
cussion in Clark et al. [1969] , Thirlwall [1974] and Gaile [1980] .206
however, that the importance of spread and backwash effects depends
on the level of economic development of a country LJ. G. Williamson,
1965] . If one uses a stages approach and distinguishes in the period
of development between the stage of traditional society, the take-off,
the phase of maturity and the phase of aging, then the previously de-
scribed self-intensifying processes of agglomeration would be im-
portant first of all during the phases of take-off and of maturity iTho-
roe, 1981a] . During the take-off the already existing agglomeration
offers locational advantages to labour-intensive industries. More
important for the start Into industrialization, however, has been in
most countries the development of raw-material-intensive industries.
Natural resources have been main factors influencing regional devel-
opment at this stage. In the maturity stage the effects of agglomera-
tion become even more important as, in the course of an industrial-
ization which was accompanied by agglomeration, transportation and
communication systems improve, the intra- and inter-industry divi-
sion of labour deepens and innovation becomes an engine of economic
growth. This process, through which new techniques are developed
and applied and new products are turned out, is most successful
where human capital is abundant and the social atmosphere and in-
stitutional conditions are attractive to entrepreneurs and persons
willing to bear risks. Such an environment is common to buoyant
areas up to a certain degree of agglomeration.
Once the pace of the innovative progress recedes, regions enter the
stage of aging or structural inflexibility. Whenever this process oc-
curs the attractiveness for mobile production factors declines be-
cause the above-mentioned ingredients have been replaced or out-
weighted by institutional rigidities and bureaucratic impediments.
The inter-regional and international integration of factor and prod-
uct markets gives the newly developing regions the possibility of
acquiring new or complementary technologies and mobile produc-
tion factors from the formerly more advanced and now aging areas,
which will cause serious structural problems and deteriorate em-
ployment opportunities there. Many firms will find themselves driven
out by competitors from ascending regions. Likewise, new compa-
nies will find that the attractiveness of aging regions has declined
because firms and highly skilled labour have emigrated to regions
offering more favourable production possibilities and promising more
pleasant living conditions.
Transposing these thoughts to the above-mentioned types of problem
regions in the EC, the following can be noted. First of all, the ru-
ral peripheral areas lack (by nature) the agglomerational advantages.207
Secondly, the old industrial areas lack the flexibility that once made
them successful. The ascending agglomerating regions, would thus
seem to have strong competitive advantages vis-a-vis both of these
types of regions - advantages which could well be strengthened by
the enlargement. To put it another way: in principle, all regions can
benefit from advantages offered by an enlarged market. But the struc-
turally weak regions may find it hard to compete successfully with
other regions. If inter-regional competition becomes rougher, the
weak regions have to try to improve conditions to cope with struc-
tural change and attract resources complementary to those already
available in these regions. If this is not done, it can be assumed that
differences between the weak and the leading regions would at least
temporarily increase. However, given the situation where the im-
provement of internal conditions for structural adjustment is hamper-
ed by substantial endogenous resistance, it would well seem easier
to attempt to procure assistance from outside the region. Regional
policy in the EC therefore has to expect intensified demands for mea-
sures assisting the development of backward regions as well as for
measures rejuvenating old industrial regions. Such a constellation
will add to the conflict between regional policy objectives, which to
a large extent correspond to redistributional and ajdustment objec-
tives, thereby cementing the traditional advantages of old industrial-
ized regions. This conflict which already exists in some member
countries at the national level [Adlung, Thoroe, 1980, pp. 2 ff. ]
would thus be extended to the Community level.
Such conflicts between different goals of regional policy had already
heated discussion in face of the founding of the European Regional
Development Fund. While the Commission perceived the develop-
ment of rural areas as being the main task of a common regional
policy, the United Kingdom pressed for a common fund to assist old
industrial regions [Wallace, 19 77 j . In light of the discussions ac-
companying the founding of the Regional Fund it became clear, that
- at the present level of integration and given diverging national pol-
itical, economic and institutional parameters - agreement on an all-
encompassing Community regional policy could hardly be reached
[Noe, 1975J .
Greece, Portugal and Spain are joining the EC with the expectation
that they will receive assistance from the Community to promote
economic development in their countries. The Community will hard-
ly be able to refuse such assistance. Regional policy is therefore
seen as a way to reduce at least the most aggravating conflicts and
disparities within the enlarged Community. Unfortunately, however,208
the above-mentioned conflicts between national interests in regional
development policy as well as the competing interests of individual
regions substantially narrow the scope for a Community regional pol-
icy. Already at the national level experience has shown that coordina-
tion between various national authorities is at the least difficult and
often almost impossible [Adlung, Thoroe, 1980] . The problem of
coordination is not so much a technical-administrative one as it is a
problem founded in lack of similarity in aims and priorities of na-
tional and regional authorities. On the other hand, the effectiveness
of regional policy depends to a large degree on how much the objec-
tives stated by the various authorities can be harmonized and to what
extent targets of regional policy are taken into consideration in the
planning undertaken by the Ministries. That is, resources available
for regional policy are quite modest compared with other public ex-
penditures (directly or indirectly) influencing the development poten-
tial of regions.
At present the Community regional policy has avoided such conflicts
by not formulating its own aims for regional policy. A formal coor-
dination by EC and member-state authorities is reached thanks to the
procedure of financing only those projects which are integrated into
national programs for regional development, and of subjecting the
concession of funds to requests made by the member governments
(rather than by investors). This procedure implies, however, that
the Community regional policy will be internally inconsistent when
mutually conflicting strategies for regional development are pursued
in individual member countries. Such inconsistencies could be more
easily avoided if a narrowly defined Community regional strategy
were followed in granting assistance, i.e. around uniform aims and
uniform criteria throughout the Community. But this type of Com-
munity regional policy inherently contains the seeds of conflict with
regional policies at the national level.
In an EC 12, consensus on a Community development policy for rural
areas - probably the main interest of the new entrants - hardly seems
attainable in the foreseeable future. The reason for this is simply
that a solution would require a reduction of national sovereignity in
the field of regional policy and a strengthening of EC competence.
Presently the views on regional development objectives, on concepts
for regional policy, on the identification and definition of problem re-
gions as well as on the policy instruments to be applied vary largely
between the member countries. The situation is complicated further
by the fact that divergent views are not to be found at the national
level only; they prevail at the regional and municipal level as well.209
Even the awareness of what regional problems really mean seems to
be differently cultivated from member state to member state. In
France and Italy, for instance, regional differences in per capita in-
come and employment opportunities are much higher than those in
the United Kingdom and in Germany [Adlung, 1979] , but it is in the
latter that regional policies play the more prominent role in public
discussion.
To the extent that these differences reflect diversities in social val-
ues and preferences, a policy framework which is aligned to uniform
aims and uniform criteria throughout the Community runs the risk
of not reducing marked nationalism and regionalism within the EC 12
(often emphasized as being main obstacles on the path toward Euro-
pean unification), but of strengthening such developments. The ex-
perience with the CAP shows that a Community policy which deserves
this denomination cannot be enforced against highly divergent nation-
al aims and interests. Therefore it does not seem to be a very prom-
ising way to try to give new momentum to European integration by
framing a Community regional policy oriented toward uniform con-
cepts and goals. Regional policy does not only mean that assistance
is given to one group of regions; it naturally implies also that those
regions which are not elegible for assistance are discriminated
against. Inter-regional competition within the EC 12 will thus create
a serious potential for conflict, however well-intended a Communi-'
ty regional policy is shaped. For sure, regional policy would be over-
taxed if it were to assume the role of the engine of European integra-
tion. On the other hand, it could play a useful complementary role
to other Community policies, thereby providing support to the needed
reform of the CAP and easing transfer problems in common budget-
ing. Let us assume that the member states all believe that a system
of compensating transfers is required, be it for neutralizing exces-
sive burdens from CAP, for correcting the distribution of welfare
gains from integration or for assisting economically weak member
states. If the degree of political integration is not sufficient for a
general, non-tied system of financial transfers between the member
countries, then regional policy could well be an area in which trans-
fer problems are solved - in any case more efficiently than through
the CAP. Via regional policy, countries could be rewarded for an
efficient use of resources just as well as they could be compensated
for disadvantages caused by integration. In addition, regional policy
can give more efficient impetus to economic development of backward
regions than CAP would do [Thoroe, 1981c] .
In view of increasing demands for regional policy measures on the
one side and a very sceptical appraisal of the chances for an all-en-Z10
compassing Community regional policy, requiring severe restric-
tion of national sovereignity, on the other side, solutions seem called
for which would allow regional policy more scope on the Community
level without infringing too much on national sovereignity. Communi-
ty regional policy could be restricted to establishing a framework
(or "code of conduct") for national activities and to implementing
specific regional development programs under national participation.
The national authorities would have to prevent unlimited competition
in subsidizing differing regional development programs. The frame-
work created by the Community would have to regulate the size of
assisted areas as well as the amount of subsidies allowed. For ex-
ample, the area being assisted by regional policy could be limited
to 50 percent of the territory of a member state; the effective rate
of subsidies (including equivalents of other assistance measures)
would not be allowed to exceed 20 percent. Specific regional mea-
sures in a Community regional policy, for which national quotas could
be fixed in order to guarantee the realization of transfer aims agreed
upon by the Community should be coordinated with the national re-
gional policies. Whether there will be a harmonization of national
and Community regional policy beyond a mere coordination in the
sense of creating a common framework for national activities ulti-
mately depends on the headway which is made in other fields of Com-
munity policies. As it can hardly be expected that European integra-
tion will receive a new impetus from all-encompassing integration
models in the near future, steps for further integration should be
carefully executed. The slower pace in the integration process makes
it all the more urgent to find promising areas where solutions can
be jointly supported and carried out by all member countries in the
interest of the entire Community.211
VIII. Common Budgeting in an Enlarged Community
Problems of European integration and of Community policy formula-
tion are reflected to a large extent by the budget of the Community.
In the budget, the fiscal costs of the decisions in the various fields
of Community policy are recorded. Though the size of the Common
Budget in terms of the Community's combined gross national product
is quite small (less than 1 percent), the financial framework within
which the various Community policies are shaped and pursued has
now become the Achilles' heel for the further integration process.
Conflicts of national interests abound, Community policies' expendi-
tures are coming up against financing possibilities and the entry of
Greece, Portugal and Spain is not likely to reduce claims for in-
creases in EC expenditures.
In this final chapter we shall discuss how the Community's budget
not only reflects decisions on common policies but also has a deci-
sive influence on the shaping of such policies. To gain a better under-
standing of the current budgetary problems, the features of the EC
financing system will be presented in the first section. Subsequent-
ly, the potential for conflict among the member states is briefly dis-
cussed. The third section examines the possible budgetary effects
of the enlargement. The weight of member states' redistribution
concerns in the common budgeting is discussed in the fourth sec-
tion. The concluding section looks at ways of tackling the budgetary
problem.
1. Main Features of the EC Financing System
The EC financing system has been changed over a period of time.
At first, the expenditures of the Community were financed exclusive-
ly by direct contributions from each member state to the Communi-
ty. These contributions were proportional to the size of the mem-
ber countries (measured by share of population in total EC popula-
tion) and to economic potential (measured by share of GNP in total
EC-GNP). The formulas for financing the various kinds of expendi-
tures were different at first, depending on the individual sources
through which they were financed [Reister, 1975, pp. 26 ff. ] . Only
when the budgets of the individual funds were incorporated into a
global budget for the Community and when the transitional regula-212
tions for replacing contributions from the member states with a sys-
tem of "own resources" (Article 201) for the Community were im-
plemented, was the budget system of the EC made uniform.
Following a Council decision of 1970 aiming at gradually replacing
direct contributions with own resources, four sources of budget rev-
enues were made available to the Community: agricultural (CAP) lev-
ies; revenues from the CET; proceeds up to 1 percent of value-ad-
ded taxes (VAT) on a commonly agreed basis; and other levies, which
may be introduced as part of specific Community policies according
to the founding treaties of the European Economic Community and
the Euratom.
This decision on own revenues was carried out in various steps [Stras-
ser, 1979, pp. 534 ff. ] . At first (1971 to 1974), only agricultural
levies and - annually increasing - shares in tariffs were apportioned
to the EC budget as EC revenues. Shortfalls between the revenues
from these sources and EC expenditures were made up by contribu-
tions of the member states, calculated on the basis of their percent-
age share of the Community's GNP. At the same time, it was deter-
mined for this first step to the transitional period that changes in the
annual shares in the financial contribution of a member state should
be limited to deviations from the share of the preceding year by 1 per-
cent upwards and 1. 5 percent downwards, a provision which became
known as "dynamic brake" system.
At the second step (1975 to 1977), the EC budget had to be financed
by own revenues in principle. But because the tax basis for VAT had
not yet been made uniform, further contributions were drawn on in
proportion to national shares in the combined GNP. The "dynamic
brake" was retained; the permissible band for fluctuations, however,
was widened to ± 2 percent.
Since 1978, the system of own revenues is entirely applied to the six
founding states. Table 57 reports on the development of the revenue
side of the Common Budget during the 1970s. Special agreements
existed until 1980 for those countries which joined the EC in 1973,
i.e. the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland. According to these
agreements, the then new member countries had to pay an annually
increasing part of those contributions which would have been due had
these countries been subjected to the Council decision on own re-
sources. From 1978 onwards, the new members were expected to
meet this condition, though no abrupt changes in the countries' shares
in the Community's own revenues should arise. This provision was
to set off a sustained quarrel.Bibliothek des Inetitutf
Weltwirtsdmft Kiel
213


































































Source: Strasser [ 1979 ] . - Bundesministerium der Finanzen (1981 J .
In 1978, there was a change in the accounting procedures of the Com-
mon Budget. Before 19 78 the budget was stated in Units of Account
(UA). National currencies were, converted into UA by the official
parities of the national currencies reported to the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF). But after the breakdown of the old Bretton-Woods-
System in the early 1970s led to widespread exchange-rate floating,
the former IMF parities and exchange rates diverged, sometimes
markedly. Therefore, in 19 78, the adjustment in common account-
ing to flexible exchange rates was carried out by introducing Europe-214
an Units of Account (EUA)
1. This change in budgetary accounting in-
volved substantial shifts in the financial contributions of the individ-
ual member countries to the EC budget which also affected the new
members. They were opposed to it on the grounds of the above-men-
tioned non-abruptness provision, so that the nine governments had
to reach a compromise containing separate treatments for the bud-
gets of 1978 and 1979.
From 1980 onwards the Council decision on own revenues was to
be applied to all nine member countries without exceptions. But dis-
cussion on financing the budget went on, kept going mainly by the
United Kingdom. This country saw a financial burden coming upon
itself with the end of the separate treatments, which was felt unjusti-
fiable considering that its economic potential was below the EC aver-
age. Due to strong trade relations with third countries, the United
Kingdom makes a high contribution to the EC budget in tariffs and
levies indeed. Besides this, it has to bear a larger than average
share in EC VAT-revenues compared with shares in GDP. This is
mainly due to an investment rate below EC average, for investment
is exempted from VAT. With regard to EC expenditures the United
Kingdom receives less than average, mainly because of its relative-
ly small agricultural sector [Brown, 1980] . After protracted consul-
tations a new compromise was found exempting the United Kingdom
from financing some of the EC budget in 1980 and 1981. This exemp-
tion was financed by additional contributions from the other mem-
ber states.
The budget problems reflect a fundamental institutional problem of
the Community. In the past the need to finance the budget has exer-
cised little constraint over the extent of common policy actions. Con-
straint has come from limited competence at the Community level.
Common activities in the past have been restricted mainly by the
lack of willingness on the part of the member states to delegate com-
petence to the Community. This has implied that Community policies
were not required to compete against each other for scarce resources,
as the financial possibilities available to the Community allowed for
agreement at the lowest common denominator, which meant mostly
the most expensive one for the EC budget. At the same time much
1 The EUA is a "basket" unit, based on a certain quantity of each com-
munity currency, weighted on the basis of GNP and intra-community
trade of each member state. Its value is calculated daily by taking for
each currency the rates of the different community currencies on the
foreign exchange market.215
effort was made at the Community level to attract more competence
from the member states. But now, with the exhaustion of own rev-
enues in the foreseeable future, the budget constraint becomes ef-
fective at the Community level, i. e. the individual fields of common
policy have to compete against each other for scarce means at the
Community level, as they have always had to do at the national level
within the national budgets.
Hence, pressure to reform CAP now comes from the budget and while
demands for reform had been made for a long time, they had not been
taken seriously as long as the financial possibilities allowed it not
to appear urgent. Just when the reform of CAP, on account of ex-
hausted budgetary possibilities, seems to be unavoidable, the Com-
munity is faced with the second enlargement. This offers, on the
one hand, the opportunity to take into account in the reforms the new
conditions posed by the enlargement. On the other hand, there is a
danger of the strict limitation on own revenues of the EC being re-
laxed by referring to additional expenditures induced by enlargement.
Thus the pressure of imminent exhaustion of budgetary funds towards
reforming the CAP would be evaded, which would be an unfortunate
situation because it seems that fundamental reorientation can be ex-
pected only from this pressure.
2. Present Potential for Conflict
Budget problems have considerably undermined the climate for inte-
gration in the EC 9 in the last few years. Between the Council, the
Commission and the European Parliament (directly elected since
1979) there are sustained conflicts about their respective competence
with regard to the Common Budget and also over the functional com-
position of expenditures, and thereby of Community policy. Rapidly
increasing financial burdens in some fields of Community policy,
mainly that of CAP, have come in for much discussion. Greater bud-
get stringency in most member countries has hardened national pub-
lic opinion against the contributions which have to be made to the EC
budget. It also appears that the Community's own revenues will be
exhausted in the foreseeable future (provided that the present financ-
ing system prevails).
Further increases of obligatory expenditure - which results directly
from the founding Treaties or from acts adopted in accordance with
them - at a rate substantially above the growth rate of gross national216
product, as was the case in the past, would displace non-obligatory
expenditures
1. Thus there would be fewer possibilities for activities
in areas of policy deemed important for pushing forward European
integration, for example by the European Parliament. As the Parlia-
ment does not have much influence on the obligatory expenditure, it
may try to increase the non-obligatory expenditure, though the form-
er has priority. With different levels of budget powers, it would be
surprising indeed if conflicts between the Council and the Parliament
would not increase even more in the future.
A large potential for conflict is also embodied in the transfers among
the member countries because member countries do not contribute
to the EC budget to the same extent that they take advantage of EC
expenditures emanating from Community policies. Such disputes on
transfer problems have for a long time heavily paralysed the devel-
opment of a Community policy framework. The above-mentioned tem-
porary settlement reached to relieve the United Kingdom somewhat
from financial contributions did not permanently resolve the dispute.
The reason is that the transfer flows of the EC budget are not in ac-
cordance with the aims on burden sharing between the EC member
countries. The transfer positions are determined to a large extent
by expenditures on CAP. And as was shown in Chapter V, a country's
receipt of payments from CAP depends heavily on the degree of self-
sufficiency in agricultural products. Thus the resulting net trans-
fers are sometimes in complete contradiction to the financial poten-
tial of member countries and thereby contrary both to a concept of
fair burden sharing and, even more so, to that of a carefully direct-
ed financial equalization system.
As can be seen in Table 58, the expenditure side of the EC budget
is highly affected by expenditure on CAP indeed. In the early years
after the foundation of the European Economic Community expendi-
tures for the Social Fund still were dominant [Reister, 1975, p. 46
f. ] . But after the creation of the EAGGF in 1962 for purposes of
financing CAP, this type of expenditure gained in importance. After
the common market organizations came into existence in 1967, the
1 Until now the EC institutions have not agreed on an exact definition of
obligatory and non-obligatory expenditures and, by extension, not on
budgetary competence either. This problem has been left out of consul-
tations on the Common Budget again and again. But the expenditures for
the agricultural market organizations, for food aid, for the reimburse-
ment to the member states of costs of raising EC revenues as well as
for pensions and redundancy payments to EC employees are considered
obligatory.217
expenditures on CAP reached a share in total EC expenditures of
nearly 95 percent. Since the early 1970s this share has been reduced
somewhat because Community competence in other fields of policy
has been expanded, particularly in social policy, regional policy and
development aid policy. But the share of agricultural expenditures
still amounts to 75 percent of an EC budget which has greatly in-
creased in volume over the last decade. Thus from 1973 (the year
of the first enlargement) to 1979, the average annual growth rate of
the budget ran at more than 20 percent, thereby exceeding the growth
rate of the EC's combined gross domestic product by seven and a half
percentage points. The increase of expenditures for CAP in the sec-
ond half of the 19 70s has roughly kept up with growth in total EC ex-
penditure (Chapter V), but from year to year marked fluctuations oc-
cur. This is mainly due to expenditures on the Common Market or-
ganization being highly dependent upon fluctuations in harvest yield
and in world market prices. At low international prices a high ex-
port refund is required to dump excess agricultural production on
world markets; at high prices less refunds are needed.
Thus the (unexpected) tightening of the agricultural world markets
in the early 1980s has slowed down the increase in expenditures for
agricultural market organizations significantly and has contributed
to relief in the budget situation in the Community. This relief has
meant that the predictable exhaustion of the Community's own rev-
enues has not yet occurred. At the same time, controversy over the
reformulation of priorities between the various fields of Community
policy has been avoided so far in that non-obligatory expenditure has
until now not been crowded out. But it would be an illusion to think
that these developments will provide more than a short-term relief.
Worldwide shortages of CAP products are not going to persist for
ever, so that world-market prices are bound to decline again. How-
soever that may be, the 1982 draft Common Budget reckons with a
0. 94 percent yield of VAT, so that the maximum rate of 1 percent
of VAT to which the EC is entitled is now nearly reached. Already
an unexpectedly high increase in agricultural production in the EC
or a decline in world-market prices for agricultural goods could lead
to the inability of the Community to implement the 1982 budget with-
in the existing regulations on own revenues and without cutting ex-

























































































































































Source: See Table 57.219
3. Increasing Claims on the Budget
On the revenue side of the EC budget different contributions are to
be expected from the new entrants. The contribution in tariffs de-
voted to financing the EC budget depends on the amount of dutiable
imports from third countries (mainly manufactures). The ratio of
imports to GDP is much below the EC 9 average in Spain, and some-
what below it in Greece. Portugal, on the other hand, exceeds the
EC 9 average by some percentage points, as has been shown in Chap-
ter II. However, the share of manufactures in total imports is below
the EC 9 average in each of the new entrants as has been shown in
Chapter III. One may expect Portugal's and Greece's industrial im-
ports from the other EC 12 countries to be above the EC average
of intra-Community trade and Spain's imports to be below it. Taken
together, Spain's and Portugal's contributions to financing the EC
budget by tariffs can be expected to be roughly proportional to the
share of these countries in the GDP of the EC 12 combined, or a lit-
tle below that; Greece's contribution might be slightly above its share
in the combined GDP. From tariffs as source of revenues, there-
fore, few, if any, conflicts need be feared.
The picture with regard to levies and duties on agricultural prod-
ucts is quite different. All three new entrants show a high import
demand for various temperate-zone commodities, notably cereals
and livestock products, which have traditionally been supplied to a
large extent by third countries (Chapter IV and V). Therefore the
new entrants' contributions of levies to the EC budget are likely to
exceed the EC average considerably. The EC Commission has esti-
mated on the basis of the 1978 budget that the new entrants would
have had to pay nearly 20 percent of the levies in an EC 12 (doc. COM
(78)200 final 27-4-78, p. 72), while the share of these countries in
the GDP of EC 12 combined would have amounted to less than 10 per-
cent. The existence of a marked discrepancy can be shown for Greece
in the 1981 EC budget, too. It has been estimated that 4.7 percent
of total levies in the (partly enlarged) Community come from Greece,
while this country contributes only 1. 6 percent to the GDP of the EC
10 combined.
Burdens above the EC average for the new entrants can also be ex-
pected from VAT contributions (once the VAT has been implemented
there). This is caused mainly by a relatively high share of comsump-
tion in GDP in these countries. Domestic consumption typically con-
stitutes the assessment basis for VAT, while investment expendi-
tures and export proceeds are left out. Therefore those countries in220
which shares of investment and exports are relatively low have to
make above-average financial contributions in VAT; the new entrants
belong to this group.
All in all, present financial regulations lead to expected financial con-
tributions by the new entrants above their shares in the GDP of EC
12 combined. The order of magnitude of these discrepancies is shown
in Table 59. According to these estimates by the Commission on the
basis of the 1978 budget, the discrepancy between financial contribu-
tions and shares in the combined GDP is most pronounced in the case
of Portugal, but Greece follows close^behind
1. Only for Spain is the
difference of minor importance. Accordingly, the new entrants fall
into a general pattern, in which, given present financial regulations,
the relatively high-income member countries have to pay contribu-
tions below their share in total GDP, while the lower-income coun-
tries have to make greater contributions. This general pattern is
broken by greater than proportional contributions in tariffs and levies
in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, which may be due partly
to the problem of the correct allocation of tariffs on goods imported
in Belgian or Netherlands' ports but destined for other member coun-
tries. It is also broken by VAT contributions from Italy which seems
to be due to difficulties in recording and collecting taxes. These qual-
ifications made, the shaping of the EC revenue system out of harmony
with a system of fair burden sharing or even with a carefully design-
ed financial equalization system aggravates pressure for compensa-
tion on the expenditure side of the budget, as has repeatedlybeen shown
by the British example.
On the expenditure side, an application of the existing regulations to
the new entrants would cause substantial additional financial require-
ments to cope with obligatory expenditure in an enlarged Community.
The extent of such additional expenditures would depend greatly on the
situation on agricultural world markets at the time when the Common
Market organization is put into operation in Greece, Portugal and
Spain. According to the above-mentioned calculations of the EC Com-
mission, the obligatory expenditure is expected to rise by nearly 12
percent (on the basis of 1978 data). The transfers implicit in the esti-
mated compulsory expenditure would be more or less balanced between
1 Such discrepancies play into the hands of those in the new Papandreou
Administration who claim that a renegotiation of the Treaty of Adhesion
is necessary if Greece is to benefit from her membership in the EC
(there are even strong advocates within the governing Pasok of taking
Greece out of the Community).221
Table 59 - Potential Revenues and Shares in GDP in an Enlarged Com-
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Source: EC, Commission [ 1978 ]. - Eurostat [1981 ] .
the EC 9 and the new entrants as a group. But substantial differences
among the Southern countries would appear. Spain would have to make
considerable net transfers, while Greece and, to a minor extent, Por-
tugal would benefit.
This picture changes when other expenditures, most of them of the
non-obligatory type, are taken into account. In the fields of Com-
munity regional and social policy, in addition to measures aiming
at improving agricultural structures, the Commission has estimated
the expenditures to imply greater shares for the new entrants than
would be proportional. Thus the Guidance Section of the EAGGF,
which is to support reforms of the agricultural structure, would have
to spend nearly twice as much money in the EC 12 than in the EC 9
(Table 60). The same holds for the expenditures of the European Re-
gional Development Fund. This means that the balance of net trans-
fers would improve considerably for the applicant countries, par-
ticularly for Spain and Portugal. However, the Community's avail-
ability of own resources, as regulated at present, would not have
permitted such an increase in EC expenditures. Already in 1980, the
year before Greece's entry into the Community, a growth of EC ex-
penditures in volume of 20 or 25 percent, as has been taken to be
necessary in the Commission's calculations, could not have been
financed. In the 1982 estimates, the financial potential of the EC 10
appears to be nearly exhausted. Hence, the restructuring of the EC
budget, required in any case, gains in importance in view of the en-
largement.222
Table 60 - Potential Enlargement Effects on the Expenditures of the
EC Budget for 1978 (EUA million)
EAGGF - Guarantee Section
















































Source: See Table 59.
Nonetheless, the entry of Greece could be executed without such fun-
damental restructuring of Community policy and budgeting. The tem-
porary relief for the budget due to the development of agricultural
world-market prices has also given more breathing space to the tran-
sitional agreements preventing an abrupt revenue loss in Greece's
national budget as it would have happened in case this country had im-
mediately adhered to the EC decision on own revenues. For a transi-
tional period, part of the financial contributions which Greece makes
to the Common Budget will be returned to the new member at a de-
creasing rate, starting with 70 percent of the financial contribution
in 1981 and ending with 10 percent in 1985. By this agreement, it
seems that at least for the transitional period Greece will be a net
recipient of transfers from the Common Budget.
Besides Greece, the other two entrants also expect to receive finan-
cial assistance from the Common Budget. Disillusionment of these
expectations may become a grave obstacle to further European inte-
gration, because the new entrants would not behave in a construc-
tive way in the Council. Experience shows that common principles
such as financial solidarity and the decision on own revenues are ac-
cepted only as long as contradictions between payments to the Com-
munity and receipts from it compared with the economic potential of
the member countries do not become too sharp. This cannot be achieved
within the present framework of financial resources available for
the Community without a fundamental restructuring in common poli-
cies. Claims by the Portuguese and Spanish governments for transi-223
tional agreements similar to that arranged with Greece would further
reinforce the urgency of such measures.
To meet the additional financial requirements of enlargement, it is
sometimes suggested to expand the financial potential of the EC, es-
pecially by increasing the 1 percent VAT assessment basis. This
would correspond again to solutions at the lowest common denomina-
tor. At the same time, pressure would decline for reshaping the Com-
munity policies. Given the serious problems in various member coun-
tries to consolidate national,budgets and the need to cut down public
expenditures, it would be quite inopportune to give in to claims for
a larger Common Budget for the main purpose of achieving a greater
redistributional potential.
4. The Common Budget as a Redistribution System
Disputes over the financing of the EC budget show very clearly that
the principle of financial solidarity has not been accepted once and
for all by the Council decision on Community own revenues. The prob-
lem of "juste retour", of participation in common expenditures in
reasonable conformity to financial contributions, is not made an is-
sue in each single field of common policy any longer, but it is dis-
cussed in connection with the Common Budget as a whole. A trans-
fer balance, in which expenditures of the Community considered as
receipts in the member countries are compared with financial con-
tributions flowing from the member countries to the EC, does not
capture either the integration effects resulting from an intensified
division of labour within the Community or the impulses for econom-
ic development within the member states emanating from integration.
Nevertheless, such transfer balances are quoted again and again for
setting out the distribution of gains and losses of integration among
the member states, as if integration were only an arrangement of
redistribution. Little note is taken in the official mind of the fact
that the ascertainment of national net positions in such transfer bal-
ances is simply-an ephemeral exercise.
Imputing revenues and expenditures of the EC budget to member
states raises many problems. The locations of registration, on which
a transfer balance is based, are not always the locations at which
expenditures and revenues show their economic effects. Tariffs and
levies, for instance, are imputed as financial contributions to those
countries at whose border they are imposed. But economically they224
may not necessarily be borne by that country, for the burden can be
passed on to other countries by intra-Community trade in imported
products. Therefore transfer balances always show high contribu-
tions by those countries having efficient ports supplying a large hin-
terland. This is the case for the Netherlands and Belgium, as al-
ready mentioned. On the expenditure side similar problems arise.
For example, the costs of EC administration are fully imputed as
receipts to those countries in which common institutions are located,
although the administrative functions are exercised for the Communi-
ty as a whole, and it could hardly be expected that the expenditures
on administration have their only economic effects at the locations
of EC institutions.
Nevertheless, transfer balances are invariably used in the public dis-
cussion about "beneficiaries" and "financiers" of European integra-
tion. Measured by the criteria of a financial equalization system, net
positions would have to correspond to economic potential, at least
in signs of deviations from the EC average. But of the countries with
an above-average economic potential - measured by per capita in-
come - in recent years only Germany and France had a negative net
position in the transfer balance and thereby made a positive contribu-
tion towards reducing welfare discrepancies through the Common Bud-
get (Table 61). The other countries with above-average per capita
income (Denmark, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands) gained
positive net transfers from the EC budget. Among the countries with
below-average economic potential, only Ireland and Italy had posi-
tive net transfer positions. The United Kingdom shows a substantial
negative net transfer position. Taking into consideration differences
in size of the member countries by relating net transfer to popula-
tion, conflicts between existing transfer flows and aims of financial
equalization systems are brought out more distinctly. Thus Denmark,
which has got the highest per capita income within the Community,
registers the second largest per capita net transfer from the Com-
mon Budget, while the United Kingdom with the third lowest per cap-
ita income makes the second largest financial contribution.
The predominance of official thinking in terms of expenditures and
receipts ultimately reflects the weakness of an institutional agree-
ment by which the agricultural policy, the social policy and the re-
gional policy constitute fields for Community policy although little
advantage, if any, can be expected at early-stages of integration in
these fields of common activity compared to national solutions. Ac-
cording to standard economic criteria about the distribution of func-
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are suitable for assignment to the upper level in the cases of
- advantages of uniformity in arrangements,
- marked border-crossing effects,
- cost saving through centralized execution of tasks.
Measured by these criteria, the fields in which Community policies
are established at present would be ranked far behind other fields in
which there is no Community competence at all, such as defense and
foreign policy. Had Community policy been restricted to these more
classical fields for centralized activities, the question of "juste re-
tour" would probably have been of minor interest in common budget-
ing. But right from the beginning redistributional questions got a de-
cisive weight in common budgeting as well as in some fields of Com-
munity policy, thereby creating a case for "moral hazard". CAP has
been seen - and is still seen - as one instrument, among others, to
improve the standard of living in traditionally less advanced rural
areas. Regional policy was to improve conditions for accelerating
economic development in problem regions, but it had to compensate
simultaneously - in the case of the United Kingdom - undesired ef-
fects of CAP in intra-Community transfers. Questions of "just"
burden sharing are of great importance also in routine decisions in
Community policy. Due to the principle of financial solidarity, each
member state can be committed to share in the financing of policies
advocated by another member state on the grounds of national inter-
ests. Therefore, high increases in the budget seem to be institutional-
ly predisposed.
5. The Need to Solve the Budgetary Problem
The need of fundamentally restructuring and reorganizing the Com-
munity policy in the present financial framework is not yet being se-
riously discussed at the political level. And the Commission even
tries to abate such requirements. For instance, in its report on the
1981 budget, the Commission discusses various fields in which it
feels extension of supranational public activity is required for over-
coming the sustained employment and growth problems within the
Community. These fields include the industrial adjustment policy,
the energy policy, the science and research policy and the technolo-
gy policy. Thereby the impression is given that such measures would
contribute essentially to the relief of transfer problems, too. This227
may be correct in individual cases. But if common activities were
to be started on uniform criteria all over the Community, it would
be expected that the economically stronger member states would be
able to benefit much more from such activities than the weaker ones,
just as one can already observe within the member countries that pub-
lic financial means supporting private research and development pro-
grams tend to be concentrated in the higher-income regions for the
simple reason that most of the potential beneficiaries of such policies
are located there. Thus, through the extension of Community policy
to such fields, conflicts between transfers and aims of financial equal-
ization systems may even be aggravated. The question whether the
pursuit of specific tasks is to be assigned to the Community should
not be subjected to redistributional considerations. It would have to
be proven in the first place that the Community level is more effi-
cient than the decentralized national ones for pursuing more tasks.
Such a superiority is not always evident in proposals made by the Com-
mission. For example, it does not seem very conclusive
1 to demand
EC assistance for small and medium firms. If small and medium
firms are to be given a decisive role in overcoming adjustment prob-
lems, the needed public support is certain to be provided more ef-
fectively by the member country governments. Therefore, if new im-
petus is desired to promote European integration, it seems much
more urgent to develop a common framework for Community and na-
tional activities than to start costly common programs in which all
member countries will try to secure their specific national interests,
so that redistributional issues move at once into the center of inter-
est.
The Commission seems to not be fully aware of the far-reaching dif-
ferences between the member states in convictions and conceptions
on the way to overcome the prevailing employment and growth prob-
lems. In the short run, which is the typical time horizon of politi-
cians, none of the strategies pursued can claim such a striking suc-
cess that it may be assumed that all member states could be persuad-
ed to adhere to a common (Community) approach. It has also to be
recognized that in the fields enumerated by the Commission there is
already much national activity. These fields may not adequately be
provided for in the national budgets in the view of the EC Commis-
sion. But this would mean that the proposals on these grounds have
not been sufficiently successful in competing for scarce budget re-
sources against other measures which have been given greater weight
by national parliaments and governments. Member countries were
not able to agree upon common strategies for promoting economic
growth, full employment and price stability even in the EC 6, when228
national differences were much less pronounced than in the EC 9 and
many times less than they would be in an EC 12. Therefore, addi-
tional Community expenditure programs seem to not be very appro-
priate in solving existing problems in the Community. The only sure
result of an extension of financial revenues of the Community to fi-
nance additional activities would be the postponement of the needed
fundamental reforms of present EC policies.
Solving budget problems within the framework of present financial
potential may be regarded as extremely difficult because agreement
on the lowest common denominator would become almost impossible.
But there is a way forward. Instead of trying to balance one-sided
development of integration by giving more competence to the Com-
munity, as the Commission would like to see it, one could attempt to
restrict Community activity in those fields where Community policy
is most pronounced, and this would be first of all in CAP. The Com-
mission seems unwilling to consider giving up competence even in
fields where Community activitiy has been failing in its own eyes.
Thus the Commission demands an active policy of improving agri-
cultural structures which would be tailored to the specific character-
istics of the individual agricultural areas, presumably as a conclu-
sion from the failure of common activities of CAP according to uni-
form criteria all over the Community. But when for each agricultural
region specific policy measures to improve agricultural structures
are believed to be necessary, why must such a policy be carried
through at the Community level? The need to reform CAP has been
emphasized by the Commission, too, but the conviction predominates
that the experience with CAP is on balance positive. Although the Com-
mission proposes a stronger alignment of agricultural price policies
with market conditions, which would be in accordance with our pro-
posals discussed in Chapter V, nothing is said about the institutional
means for ensuring such a market-oriented policy. Declarations in
favour of market orientation have been numerous in the past on the
part of the Commission, without having been brought to reality. Fac-
ing the second enlargement of the Community, one cannot help but
regard solutions to the pressing budgetary problems as coming neces-
sarily from a far-reaching reform of CAP, as shown in Chapter V.
Reducing expenditures for CAP would provide more scope for tackling
the aims of fair burden-sharing and of financial equalization systems
more comprehensively within the enlarged Community, though the
presently reached level of integration does not seem ready to bear
not-tied transfers among the member countries. The solidarity of
European nations is not yet sufficiently pronounced for such a general229
financial equalization system, by which pure redistribution of finan-
cial resources could be achieved most efficiently. Rather, the con-
tributing countries will continue to be interested in having a say in
the use of these resources in the receiving countries. If this is the
case, such tied transfers could be undertaken for instance by region-
al policy, adequately coordinated between the Community and the na-
tional levels, as discussed in more detail in Chapter VII.
What is called for is the establishment of an overall framework for
national policies, rather than the insistence on jointly financed pro-
grams in various fields of activity. In view of far-reaching differ-
ences in national interests, it is important to find in each individual
area solutions which are commonly agreeable. Persisting in prin-
ciples which are not commonly accepted would be rather unhelpful.
Nor is it helpful to reiterate these principles when at the same time
proposals are made which contradict such principles. Thus the EC
Commission is implicitly accepting a restriction of financial solidari-
ty in CAP in proposing relief in financial contributions to the United
Kingdom based on the difference between its share in common GDP
and its share in receipts from EAGGF (Guarantee Section), because
of conflicts with the aims of financial equalization systems.
If true integration proceeds, it may be expected that the concerns
about financial equalization will be shifted to the revenue side of the
Common Budget. But the talks on fair burden-sharing are likely to
continue in the course of the enlargement. The decision governing
own revenues of the Community from VAT proceeds could very soon
become a reason for criticism by the new entrants because of their
relatively lower shares of exports and investment in GNP. As this
is an institutionalized weakness of the arrangement of EC own rev-
enues, the adequate avenue for avoiding a major upheaval within the
enlarged Community would consist in changing the financing system.
Thus consideration should be given to a restructuring of the Common
Budget on the revenue side in the sense that a system of financial con-
tributions of the member countries based on their shares in GDP
(preferably GDP per head) is restored. Such a financing,system would
be in accordance with conceptions of fair burden-sharing applied in
other international organizations. This may be a starting point for
realizing a more ambitious system of financial equalization in the
future, including greater revenues powers at the Community level,
if through progress towards further integration, solidarity within the
enlarged Community really increases.
It remains to be seen whether the EC will be able to effectively deal230
with the budgetary problem, which by implication requires the re-
structuring of agricultural, regional and even trade policies (among
others). The Commission should not be expected to become a driving
force in this respect, because it could easily mean voluntary giving
up powers, which bureaucrats are not used to doing. There is always
the temptation to rest conte'nt with cosmetic changes and technical
compromises. It is the governments and parliaments of the mem-
ber countries which will have to push for policy reforms and to in-
duce the EC institutions to act more flexibly. Given the weight of the
EC in the world economy, and more so after the second enlargement,
basic reforms to break out of the present stage of crisis are both
desirable and imperative. If, however, the member states regard the
EC as a machinery for income redistribution, then economic integra-
tion in Europe does not have a promising future.231
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